On the Rupture

118 the minnesota review Pierre Macherey On the Rupture Jorge Semprun's text grapples with almost every subject at once, all the themes that permit us to define ourselves as "marxists." The notion of humanism, it seems to me, only plays in this text the role of a pretext. Likewise, while reading Semprun we can choose an entirely different point of application than the one indicated in his title. That's why I would choose for a point of departure one of the few paragraphs in which the problem of method is posed: . . . Every conception of the progressions of thought (Marx's in this specific case, but the observation has a general value) by means of "ruptures" or "qualitative leaps," in spite of its dialectical appearance, is disputable. The most correct, the most rational thought (that is, the thought most adequate to the real understanding and transformation of the world) is never a revelation , but an elaboration, in which "praxis" plays a more or less important role (in Marx that role was decisive). In cultural and ideological analysis, the notion of "rupture" should be handled with extreme care, if we truly want to avoid extremisms. Here, we touch on the problems of the discussion about "bourgeois science and proletarian science," of the discussion about "Proletkult ," etc.1 The whole interpretation of this paragraph lies in the translation to be given to the words "extreme care." Obviously, the concept of rupture, like all concepts, must be used, not with prudence or precaution but with care; that is, in its true meaning. If that meaning has been acquired, appeals to prudence are superfluous; the rigor that guides a rational usage is enough. Without prejudging the domain to which this concept refers, one thing at least is certain: between Semprun's and Althusser's course there is a rupture. The language employed by each isn't the same: not only because the words used by each aren't the same, but especially because the same words take on different meanings. Althusser's statement is, as he designates it himself, theoretical. He has an obvious claim, which is expressed with rigor. Semprun doubts that this claim is legitimate, because the rigor seems to him too "abstract." But doubt never has been and never will be the instrument of a scientific statement; only demonstration can provide a criterion. For example, as long as Althusser's explanation isn't macherey 119 demonstrated to be false (not rigorous), it should be considered true (endowed with a certain degree of knowledge). But this isn't what Semprun does. He chooses another language which is less "abstract" and more generous: the language of the "real" and of "practice." This choice takes place less between distinct objects than between levels of statement. The term "practice," for instance, is common to the two languages, but its value in each language isn't the same. For Althusser practice is the object of a theory. Let's say that it's an object of thought, a concept, to which a scientific analysis can be applied. For Semprun practice is a "real" object : practice itself, in person, insofar as it is given independently of a theory, insofar as it is imposed on Marx himself before any theory. The two uses of "practice" can only be confronted, faced off, their conflict can't be resolved. They slide over each other, for they belong to different, incompatible universes. Between Althusser and Semprun there can be no question of a "debate." Between the two of them there is no object—a real to be thought—given before all thought. Each has his own language; each has the object of that language. As a result, the two texts aren't opposite each other in a relationship of exchange, since they are precisely shifted. Here is where the rupture appears. There is a word which can belong to Semprun 's vocabulary but which simply can't have any place in Althusser's: that word is "dialogue." There is no room for dialogue in the sense that, from the conflict of two discourses, by means of either a resolution in thought or else a real resolution, there would emerge a...