The Present Emergency

February 2002 · Historically Speaking1 7 DISPATCH FROM THE UK Jeremy Black The Present Emergency The nature of the present crisis is such that the perspective I am offering may swiftly seem redundant. At present, there have been no bin Laden attacks in Britain, but a "Real IRA" car bomb lastnight in Birmingham is a pointed reminder ofour vulnerability. All historians, however, write against the background ofchange, and it is therefore worth taking up the invitation to do so. It is clear to me from ten days spent in the U.S. in late October and early November that the complexity of the "British" response (ifanyone can thus simplifythe attitudes of a large population) is not appreciated . This complexity has played out in the remarks ofcommentators, including historians , as well as in polls. To characterize it all too crudely, there has been a vast amount of affectionate sympathy for Americans along with a certain degree of criticism ofAmerica . The horror ofthe acts of September 11 was imprinted firmly through television, radio, and the press, and there has been a widespread understanding ofthe urgency of a response. British commentators have also offered a wealth of information on a range of related topics, from the history ofAfghanistan to the problems of defining terrorism. Prominent historians who have found themselves called on include Michael Howard, pressing for a judicious response and underlining the difficulty ofthe task; Felipe Fernandez-Annesto, writing on the nature ofIslam; andJohn Keegan , usinghis position as defense correspondent for the most conservative of the newspapers , the Daily Telegraph, to urge avigorous military response, including the dispatch of cruise missiles against those who send encrypted messages through the Internet. Comparing the British with the American newspapers, the former have devoted more space to the political background and dimension ofthe struggle. The British experience also provides a different context for understanding terrorism. Although there has been no single act ofhorror to compare with September 1 1 (the IRA fortunately failed when they tried to destroy the British version of the World Trade Center—the far uglier Canary Wharf), the population of Northern Ireland proportionately has taken tar heavier casualties from terrorism than that ofthe U.S. so far; and, ofcourse, much ofthe IRAterrorismwas funded byAmerican sympathizers . SimonJenkins pointedly asked in the Times where the Americans were when the IRAnearly destroyed the government in the 1985 Brighton bombing. The sense that Americans are being introduced to the real world is presentin some ofthe commentary. There are, of course, differences, not least the greater global range and ambition ofthe bin Laden organization. Much ofthe British commentaryhas been about the need for a political as well as a militarystrategyto confrontthe threat. Destroying bin Laden will only profit us so much if another radical Islamic organization arises determined to repeatwhat has hitherto been an act that has reaped many of the consequences its progenitors presumably sought. . . . the use ofhistorical evidence toprovide rapidsupportforpolicy advice is all too easy in a crisis . . . Furthermore, as is very clear, it could get much worse ifthe full repertoire ofscientific weaponry is brought into play, and also if states such as Egypt fall into hostile hands. A political strategy, however, requires a reexamination ofAmerican policies in the Middle East that may well be impossible for American politicians and policymakers. Ifso, this violence is likely to recur. There is no inherent reason why Islamic society should be anti-American, and there is more in common between Islam and the U.S., with its powerful affirmation ofreligious values, than China, Russia, or Europe. However, both because of pronounced support for Israel since the 1960s and due to a failure to engage with developing trends in Islamic politics from that period (both, in part, unfortunate consequences of the focus on Vietnam and the habitual confusion of means and ends), the situation is nowverydangerous. Societies with rapidly growing, youthful populations, centered on volatile urban communities, are defining themselves in a way that can only partly be compensated for by advanced weaponry. Indeed, a very senior British historian pointed out to me recently that Britain itself has not faced a comparable challenge from a large section of the population not sharing common values since the Catholics under Elizabeth...