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Reviewed by:
  • The Rebel Den of Nùng Trí Cao
  • Peter Lorge
James Anderson. The Rebel Den of Nùng Trí Cao. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2007. Pp. xiv, 276. $30 (paperback). ISBN 9780295986890.

James Anderson has written a capable, straightforward, and thorough treatment of the context and significance of the 1052 “rebellion” of Nùng Trí Cao (known in Chinese as Nong Zhigao 儂智高). Anderson’s account goes beyond Nùng’s rebellion, both setting the stage for the political and military events of 1052, and explaining its continued significance to the modern states of China and Vietnam. Song specialists will find this book particularly useful for its coverage of the modern and pre-modern Vietnamese perspectives on Nùng, and for Anderson’s focus on southern border problems. Anderson brings a rare perspective to these issues through his knowledge of Chinese and Vietnamese.

At the heart of Anderson’s book is the evolving relationship between the Song Dynasty and that of the Vietnamese Đại Cồ Việt (968–1054) empire. The border area where these two powers abutted one another was mountainous and difficult terrain distant from their power centers, but it nonetheless gained increasing importance through growing trade. After a sharp military clash in 981, which the Song lost, formal tribute relations between the courts stabilized, with the Vietnamese ruler responsible as a dependent ruler for managing the various groups along the border. The Song court was far more concerned with its northern border, and the problems of managing the Liao and Xi Xia.

Despite the Vietnamese court’s participation in the Song world order through regular tributary relations, a more Southeast Asian structure of management obtained along their shared border. The Vietnamese court controlled the Tai-speaking (Zhuang) groups through personal connections [End Page 155] to local strongmen. For its part, the Song court used a loose-rein (Jimi 羁縻) system for managing the same people. Without a clearly demarcated border and border controls, however, there was considerable movement of people between the two empires. None of this was a problem as long as the attention of both courts was focused elsewhere. It all changed when both empires consolidated control of their respective territories and extended their administrative reach into formerly lightly supervised areas along the border.

Nùng Trí Cao had actually rebelled against the Vietnamese court twice before he moved into Song territory. These earlier rebellions fit into the ordinary course of Vietnamese, or Southeast Asian, political management, based, as it was, on the personal connection between ruler and local leader. Rebellion was a regular way to negotiate this personal relationship, without any of the more serious implications that rebellion had for Chinese rulers. The Vietnamese court suppressed Nùng Trí Cao’s rebellions, capturing and releasing Nùng after a period in custody. Frustrated by these failures to gain greater political authority from the Vietnamese court, Nùng tried to establish a closer relationship with the Song court. When this was rejected, he took military action against the Song.

Nùng Trí Cao was successful at first against a poorly prepared Song government and army. That all changed when Di Qing 狄青 was placed in command. Di quickly improved the strength and training of Song forces and defeated Nùng’s army in the field. Nùng fled and was never heard from again, though rumors of his survival continued for some time. The direct intervention of the Song army changed the status quo in Song-Vietnamese relations, beginning a growing assertion of Song power along the border. Soldiers from northern China who had participated in suppressing the rebellion were demobilized in the border area. The new Chinese immigrants opened the door to even more trade and more immigration, thus changing the demographic and economic makeup of the border area.

Anderson makes a solid case for the idea that Nùng Trí Cao’s Rebellion and its aftermath laid the groundwork for the 1075–77 Song-Vietnam War. The Song court no longer relied upon the Vietnamese court to manage local strongmen, and the Vietnamese court had no real governing structures in the area, leading to diminished Vietnamese influence. The Vietnamese court preferred the...

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