Lincoln and His Admirals: Abraham Lincoln, the U.S. Navy, and the Civil War (review)

In May 1861 President Abraham Lincoln admitted to Gideon Welles, his new Secretary of the Navy, "I know but little about ships." This is an incredible statement made by the man whose presidency included the largest naval acquisition program in the history of the United States until World War II. Despite the growth of the Civil War Navy, and the important role it played during the conflict, historians have rarely considered Lincoln's interaction in naval matters. Historian T. Harry Williams's groundbreaking work Lincoln and His Generals (1952), scrutinized Lincoln's role as Commander in Chief, but Williams failed to appraise the president's relationship with the Navy. Craig Symonds has remedied this in Lincoln and His Admirals.

Symonds approaches his study of Lincoln by looking at large themes and campaigns to scrutinize the president's handling of situations and his subordinates. During the Fort Sumter and Fort Pickens relief expeditions, Lincoln revealed that he was not ready to take the helm as Commander in Chief. His wait-and-see attitude to resolve these problems failed. While this exposed the president's inexperience, he learned from his mistakes, which would later make him a better leader. Symonds shows that during the war Lincoln grew in confidence and competence and found he had to become more assertive. Thus, the book is as much about Lincoln's emergence as a wartime commander as it is about his relationships with the Navy leadership and the conduct of war.

Symonds documents well Lincoln's management of both the civilian and military leaders of the Navy. Welles was one of only two cabinet members who remained in office during the length of Lincoln's presidency. In personnel issues, Lincoln almost always deferred to Welles's decisions. While the president remained interested in the appointments and might have intervened frequently, he let Welles, a capable manager, make the final decisions. The president did make clear that he preferred officers who were energetic and not cautious. Symonds's understanding of the personalities involved helps him make his points effectively.

As a manager, Lincoln set broad guidelines for his cabinet officers and then let the members run their respective departments. This management style, however, forced the president to react to crises and required him to manage expectations. During the war, he constantly found his advisors fallible. With no Joint Chiefs of Staff organization, Lincoln was compelled to arbitrate disagreements between the Army and Navy on the prosecution of the war. At times he was not unlike an umpire at a fight when the Army and Navy cabinet heads had bitter and acrimonious disagreements. The president also had to continuously interject himself in situations when Secretary of State William Seward interfered with naval matters.

Lincoln also had to deal with diverse issues, such as privateering, the establishment of the blockade and the international issues associated with the blockade's enforcement. Symonds argues that Lincoln failed to be proactive for the first year of his presidency and he did not start acting as Commander in Chief until the beginning of 1862. Mistakes made by naval officers in their interpretation of the blockade drew constant complaints from foreign powers. When naval officers did not move with speed or showed indecisiveness or lethargy, Lincoln became personally involved. He also concerned himself in issues such as the aftermath of the CSS Virginia's attack on the Union fleet in Hampton Roads, the Norfolk campaign, the 1863 attack on Charleston, and the Red River campaign. In these cases, Lincoln showed flexibility regarding strategic goals.

Lincoln and His Admirals is solidly researched and well written. The book provides an excellent synthesis and strategic level study of the Civil War Navy. The work relates that, overall the Navy's leadership was very good. While naval power was important in winning the war, Symonds shows that Lincoln was an important component of the success.