About Winning:The Political Economy of Awarding the World Cup and the Olympic Games
The hosting of major sporting events such as the Olympic Games or the FIFA World Cup has become the subject of intense competition among nations. Governments seem willing to make large financial commitments in order to win the bidding competition but evidence suggests that the economic impact of this spending is limited. While this outcome is easily understood in terms of rent seeking behavior, it is suggested that organizations such as the IOC and FIFA could better serve their constituents by diverting competition away from lavish provision of facilities towards goals that would raise participation in sports.
Rent Seeking Theory
The theory of rent seeking is perhaps one of the more convincing contributions of economists to understanding political processes.1 The fundamental insight is that a monopoly is not truly the absence of competition, but its displacement into competition to be the monopolist. Thus anyone with a property right over the allocation of a monopoly can extract substantial economic profits from the auction of that property right. When we are concerned with drilling rights for oil or the allocation of scarce spectrum to mobile phone companies, we are simply concerned with the transfer of money. When it comes to property rights to host the world's two most popular sporting events, the IOC's Summer Olympic Games and FIFA World Cup, the bidders do not openly promise cash transfers, but instead make commitments to those responsible for allocating the rights. These promises still entail spending of billions of dollars, almost entirely taxpayer dollars, underwritten by the guarantee of the state.2
The Olympics and the World Cup are awarded by tiny electorates—around 100 members of the IOC and the 24-member Executive Committee of FIFA.3 IOC membership is achieved through co-optation by existing members, while Executive Committee members are drawn from the national federations belonging to FIFA. Since Executive Committee members dispose of the large surpluses generated by the World Cup to member associations for development projects, their powers of patronage are legendary. The [End Page 87] tremendous power that key members of these organizations hold has also produced a large literature documenting its misuse.4
The extent of competition has in recent years reached new levels of intensity. At the end of 2010, FIFA announced Russia and Qatar as the winning bidders for the 2018 and 2022 World Cups. The head of the Russian bid, Alexander Sorokin, apparently suggested at one point that Russia is planning on spending up to $180 billion on public infrastructure in preparation for 2018,5 while Qatar has set itself the engineering task of finding a way to keep 60,000 seat stadiums cool in summer when temperatures can rise to levels in excess of 45 degrees centigrade.6
There can be little doubt that the escalation in spending is a consequence of increasing competition. The current cycle of competition kicked off after the 1984 Olympic Games in Los Angeles, which found itself to be the only bidder. Faced with no competition, Los Angeles opted to stage the Games without financial support from the public sector, made minimal investments in infrastructure, and posted what were probably the most profitable Games ever. Following the tragedy of Munich in 1972, the financial disaster of Montreal in 1976, and the political debacle of Moscow in 1980, the 1984 Games sparked interest in what the Games could do for host cities and nations. The perceived success of the Barcelona games in 1992 added further luster to appeal of hosting, while the attraction of the millennium Games, the near desperation of Greece to act as hosts again and the political will of the Chinese government ensured that promises became ever more lavish.7
The intensity of competition to host the World Cup has also grown significantly over recent decades. As with the Olympic Games, financial guarantees provided by the host government are increasingly seen as essential to ensuring success in bidding. Unlike the Olympics where the scale of facilities demanded by the IOC are typically far in excess of what a bidding nation currently possesses, most nations that bid for the World Cup already possess large stadiums suitable for hosting soccer matches. Historically, preparation for the World Cup involved the refurbishment of old stadiums, but, increasingly, the construction of new stadiums has become an important element of the host nation bid.
One of the difficulties of assessing the economic dimensions of these events is the allocation of the costs of non-sporting infrastructure. If a new airport, subway, or road is built, does this count as a cost of the Games or not? The correct answer depends on the lifetime use of the infrastructure and only the use of that infrastructure directly for the event should be called [End Page 88] an "event cost." However, there are opportunity costs incurred if infrastructure is built in a way that is not well suited to its "legacy" use—its use after the Games end—because of the requirements imposed on hosting the event. This legacy infrastructure issue only came to prominence in the 1960s as Olympic hosts began to view these major events as catalysts for redevelopment. There can be little doubt that the legacy infrastructure has become an increasingly important part of the cost of bidding for these events. The best example of recent years is the award of the 2012 Summer Olympic Games to London in 2005, in face of strong competition from Paris. Paris had already run two unsuccessful bids before 2012, and was the clear favorite. One of the key elements of the city's pitch was that the infrastructure was largely in place already as a consequence of commitments entered into for the previous two bids. London, by contrast, proposed a plan that required the complete transformation of the proposed Olympic site where minimal expenditure had already been made. Yet it was precisely this promise of transformation, which could be almost entirely attributed to the patronage of the IOC, which made the London bid so attractive to the electorate.8
Why do Politicians Value the Games?
In principle it is national federations, whether Olympic or football, together with the cities involved, that bid to host games. This inevitably involves at least an informal link with political authorities, especially at the local level. However, this is far from saying that politicians have always been in charge of managing the process of bidding for and running major international sporting events. Yet, increasingly, politicians seem to be taking charge.
The hierarchy of global sports governance was created in the twentieth century as a means of promoting sport and competition among adherents. It is important to note that this international cooperation was created not primarily by politicians and the state, but by privately organized national federations, which in turn were comprised by smaller organizations who wanted to promote their sport in a national context. Thus in the case of soccer, a group of eleven clubs formed the English Football Association in 1863, and by 1900, a dozen or more national associations had been created mostly in Europe and South America.9 Then in 1904 (at the initiative of the French), a group of national associations created FIFA to promote international cooperation and friendly competition, leading to the creation of the World Cup in 1930.
The modern Olympic Games were revived in 1896, thanks to the efforts of Baron Pierre de Coubertin who wanted the games to be controlled by athletes themselves rather than politicians and states. Nonetheless, from the earliest days a form of political competition established itself. As early as the Stockholm Games of 1912, there were jingoists who perceived athletic rivalry between Great Britain and Germany as a form of proxy war,10 and [End Page 89] while politicization has been most evident in particular Games such as Berlin 1936 and Moscow 1980 (as well as Los Angeles 1984 with the matching athletic boycott), the IOC itself has been acutely aware of the potential for the Games to be used as political propaganda.
There is no doubt that politicians view these events as a form of political endorsement. Again, this is politically charged when it concerns non-democratic regimes (as well as Berlin 1936, the 1934 World Cup in Mussolini's Italy, the 1960 European Nations Championship in Franco's Spain, and the 1978 World Cup under Argentina's military junta have all caused political controversy, as more recently did the 2008 Beijing Olympics). 11 But democratic politicians, like Roman emperors, also believe that bringing the games to the people brings reflected glory. Indeed, in his recent autobiography, Tony Blair devoted an entire chapter to the winning of the 2012 games (admittedly shared with the reaction to tragic suicide bombings in London that took place on the following day).12 Of course, this is enhanced even more if the nation is successful in competition and there is a clear positive correlation between home advantage and sporting success. In particular, winning the World Cup represents one of the most potent symbols of political virility (as yet the Women's World Cup does not carry the same degree of kudos), and national politicians have carefully exploited the opportunity presented by a victory on home soil (England in 1966, West Germany in 1974, Argentina in 1978, and France in 1998) through photo-shoots with the players, the award of national honors, and so on.
In general, politicians are not wrong in thinking that hosting major events will boost their popularity. Surveys consistently show that a majority of citizens view hosting a major event in a very positive light,13 and there is reason to believe that happy citizens are likely to vote for incumbent political parties in democratic regimes and at least tolerate or even admire non-democratic regimes that can claim responsibility. In democracies this can be double-edged, since a government which secures the rights to host may be out of power by the time the event takes place and may have to watch their political rivals take the credit, but given the prominence accorded to these events, it is reasonable to suppose that there will be at least some collective memory and gratitude.
But while the incentive for politicians seems clear, the scale of public investment in recent years has risen to levels that are problematic. Estimates vary wildly, but some reported figures include $3.4 billion for the Sydney [End Page 90] 2000 Games,14 $8.9 billion for Athens in 2004,15 $6 billion for Japan's half share of the 2002 World Cup,16 and $5.1 billion for the 2010 South Africa World Cup17 (an astronomical sum for a nation with a GDP per capita of only $5,786). There are no official estimates, so one can only wonder at the cost of Beijing 2008, but if the 2007 estimate for London 2012 was $18,650 million,18 it may yet well rise above this figure. Welcome as the feel-good factor of hosting an event may be, politicians seem to view public investment on this scale as too great to be justified in these terms alone. Hence, there has developed a small industry devoted to the proposition that major sporting events create significant economic benefits for the host country.
Evidence on Economic Benefits
It seems reasonable enough, on the face of it, that a major sporting event watched by millions at home and possibly billions abroad should create a substantial economic impact. The two obvious activities that might create an economic impact are the construction of facilities (stadiums and infrastructure) and the revenue generating activities that take place during the event itself (ticket sales, food and beverage, merchandising, sponsorship, and broadcast income). Undoubtedly this activity in total adds up to a significant amount of money, but this does not mean that it necessarily amounts to a significant economic event. There is a mismatch between the social perception of an event and its true economic significance. For example, the Beijing Olympics were without question the most significant event in China in 2008, both in terms of domestic and international interest. Even the most extreme press reports in 2008 suggested a cost of staging the Games of $62 billion,19 which represented only three-quarters of 1 percent of China's GDP in that year. Indeed, given that these costs were spread over several years, the annualized cost could be as low as one-tenth of 1 percent of GDP. This is not to say that $62 billion is not a large sum of money which might have been put to better use, but merely that in terms of the entire economy, the impact, whether positive or negative, is almost inevitably negligible. Of course, for countries with either relatively small populations (for example, Greece) or relatively low GDP per capita (for example, South Africa), then the economic impact can be larger, but is still not likely to be very large.
According to traditional Keynesian economic theory, even small injections of spending into the economy can have large economic effects due to the multiplier. In theory, every expenditure in the economy represents an income for someone as well (for every buyer there is a seller), and when income is received this will in turn be spent on goods and services. Hence an injection of spending can cause a kind of chain reaction so that the total final impact will be much larger. This theory was popular up until the 1960s, but subsequent evidence has suggested that multiplier effects associated with public spending projects are quite small.20 Even the most positive economic models do not suggest that the impact of public spending on GDP is significantly greater than the initial spending (in other words, a multiplier equal to one), while some models suggest that public spending impacts are negative because they crowd out private sector spending. [End Page 91]
Nonetheless, consultants have produced ex ante reports claiming that economic impacts could be very large indeed. For example, a report for the Japanese government claimed that the 2002 World Cup would produce an economic stimulus in Japan equivalent to $24.8 billion, while a Korean study claimed that the stimulus in Korea (the two countries shared the event) would amount to $8.9 billion.21 One estimate for the impact of the 2010 World Cup in South Africa amounted to $6 billion. A study claimed that the 1996 Atlanta games would produce a $5.1 billion stimulus for the local economy, another claimed that the 2004 Athens Games would add $10.6 billion to GDP and yet another claimed that the impact of the 2010 Vancouver Winter Games would increase GDP by around $10.5 billion.22
The methodologies adopted in these studies have various degrees of sophistication. The most sophisticated use models of the economy (I-O (input-output) or CGE (computable general equilibrium)) which seek to capture the interdependencies between different sectors of the economy (for example, if there is increased construction demand, then the demand for cement goes up, but this also causes the price of cement to rise, making construction projects elsewhere in the economy more expensive and possibly uneconomic).23 These studies are technically complex and often unstable unless simplifying assumptions are made. However, the main drawback is that they are essentially impossible to test, since they are built on the assumption that specific injection into an economy is made at a particular point in time, and its effects are followed through on the basis of a specific set of baseline assumptions. In reality, most of these assumptions will be violated with the passage of time, as unexpected events (for example, an economic bubble or a recession) make an impact on the economy. Thus it becomes impossible to tell whether actual outcomes are the consequence of the planned spending or whether other events have intervened. Logically, what one wants to know is the difference between the actual state of the economy after the event compared to what it would have been had the event not occurred (the counterfactual), which of course cannot be observed.
What academic researchers have focused on is ex post studies where outcomes on specific variables such as output, employment, wages, and property values can be measured before, during, and after the event. A typical approach is to measure these changes in locations where the event occurred (for example, cities hosting World Cup matches) compared to cities which did not.24 The consensus among ex post studies is that the measurable economic impacts are negligible.25 The problem is that the sporting infrastructure created to host major events often has limited use after the event takes place and therefore do not generate a flow of economic services in the long term. Moreover, even when a stadium is used to house a sports team that plays in regular competition, the number of games played is often quite small and most of the time the facility is underused. In recent times, facilities have even been demolished after the event or reduced in capacity. The injection of tourist spending also tends to be smaller than expected. The potential number of tourist visitors is often overstated, while negative effects such as the discouragement of tourism unrelated to sports are [End Page 92] ignored. However, there are signs that public policy makers are starting to take note of these results, and claims of economic impact are starting to be more carefully qualified. For example, the UK government has been careful to avoid claiming that the national economic impact of the London 2012 games in terms of a specific increase in GDP.26
At a more local level, bidders have usually tried to integrate the construction of facilities and the publicity for the event into a wider plan for urban regeneration. The 1992 Barcelona games are widely viewed as a triumph in this respect, and represented part of a significant and long-term plan dating back to the 1970s to transform the city from a run-down industrial backwater into an international commercial and tourist destination. There is no doubt that specific infrastructure investments associated with the preparation for specific events (such as the airport and metro construction for Athens 2004) can have a major impact on particular cities. It is clear that hosts are trying to pay more attention to legacy issues when planning their infrastructure spending and that this can have long-term benefits. Again, from an economic perspective, the costs and benefits of these expenditures need to be weighed against their opportunity costs (the next best alternative), and since these are by their nature long-term plans, impacts are hard to evaluate. Ultimately the issue is whether large sports facilities tend to make good hubs around which related investment spending can develop so as to attract commercial activities and develop communities. The publicity effect might suggest an event would signal a transformation and so kick start regeneration. However, studies of the impact on property rental values in locations where stadiums are built suggest that these rental values have not appreciated dramatically, questioning whether the amenity values generated are that great. The problem of scale is frequently a problem for legacy. As there are hardly any events in world sport that could be considered as big as the Olympic Games or the World Cup, the scale of infrastructure required to host major sporting events is so much larger than any likely post-event use of the facilities that after the event the locality can appear too big and unwelcoming. This perception caused the planners for London 2012 to decide that the 80,000 seat Olympic Stadium would be only a temporary structure to be reduced in size after the event (probably to around 60,000). Even more strikingly, Qatar, which recently won the right to host the 2022 World Cup, is promising to construct stadia that can be disassembled after the event and shipped to other parts of the world where a large stadium may be needed.
Does it matter if the costs of hosting major sporting events cannot be justified in terms of the economic benefits? In principle, the answer should be no. The Olympic Games and the World Cup are events of huge social significance and evidence suggests that citizens are willing to pay very large sums to bring these events to the host nation. Hosting a major event is an expense, but one that can be justified as an experience that is highly valued [End Page 93] by a large fraction of the population—the best analogy is to think of it as throwing an enormous party, and no one would imagine that throwing a party could make you rich, or even consider that as a possible motive for throwing the party in the first place.
There would not even be an issue here if these events were privately funded. As Los Angeles showed in 1984 and Atlanta in 1996, it is possible for these events to run without substantial injections of public funds. However, while Los Angeles was seen as a success, many observers criticised Atlanta for being too commercial—the "Coca-Cola Games"—and as a result, the IOC has increasingly looked to the state to underwrite the event. FIFA also demands state guarantees, and both organizations seek to share in the credit for publicly funded infrastructure built for their events, while largely ignoring the evidence that the net economic effects are negligible. There can be little question that privately funded events would be less lavish, while the iconic nature of the events would guarantee that fans would follow them as enthusiastically.
The members of the IOC and the FIFA Executive Committees do little to discourage extravagant spending. The memberships of these organizations have frequently been accused of outright corruption in the past, but corruption is only one part of the problem. It is perfectly reasonable for the IOC and FIFA to extract a surplus from the sale of TV and sponsorship rights to fund the global development of sport. However, the unjustified claim that these events produce substantial economic benefits can (a) mislead people into believing that their taxes are being productively spent on social regeneration rather than just funding mass entertainment, and (b) lead some private individuals to invest their own wealth in the expectation that an event will generate returns when it is unlikely to do so. For example, if some people were to spend their life savings renovating a hotel in the anticipation of a tourist boom that does not materialize, then these individuals would suffer real harm simply by being misled. Of course, in both cases one might say that individuals are responsible for their own choices, but when government is directly or indirectly involved, this response does not seem adequate.
Can Anything be Done?
My own view is that politicians get away with making extravagant claims about the economic benefits of hosting major events because ultimately most people do not care very much. Relative to total annual budgets, the sums spent do not weigh that heavily and are often wrapped up with other programs. More importantly, people want to have these events, say they are willing to pay substantial amounts to have them,27 and seem to feel happier once they have had them.
It can be argued, therefore, that in truth there is little need to make large claims about the economic benefits (any more than it is necessary to understate the costs, even though final costs almost always appear to turn out much higher than the initial estimates, suggesting that there is systematic understatement of the costs). It may be that the mounting evidence of [End Page 94] low levels of economic impact will in any case lead to more cautious estimates in the future.
But rather than see the rent seeking contests associated with major sports events as necessary evils, they could actually be turned to the benefit of the host nations and to the long-term interests of sports, as well as of the sellers. It is within the power of those who run the auction to change the rules as they please. Thus, instead of creating a competition to provide the most extravagant games possible, FIFA and the IOC could take credit for supporting fundamental change by awarding major events to nations that could demonstrate significant achievement in the pursuit of socially desirable goals.
An example of a constructive approach to auctioning the right to host events would be to tie the award to widening sports participation. It is widely recognized that part of the solution to the global obesity crisis is to support people in leading more active lifestyles. More generally, active lifestyles are likely not only to improve long-term health outcomes, but are often associated with higher levels of life-satisfaction and higher educational achievement. Bidding cities and nations could therefore be ranked according to their achievements over some period of time (say the five years prior to the award), which could be empirically measured, for example, increases in sports and physical activity participation rates. As far as the quality of the facilities required for the event, bidders could be provided with a minimum set of standards, rather than competing to provide the best, and indeed these standards could be adjusted according to the wealth of the nations concerned so as to provide opportunities or greater inclusivity. If I am right, no one would be put off from attending an event because the facilities were not grand enough, since what people want to see takes place on the field, in the arena, or in the pool, not in the surroundings. Likewise, TV viewers would accept that the facilities were not lavish so long as they believed the host nation was genuinely deserving. While the details of this approach would need to be ironed out, there is no lack of expertise in the design of auctions that could be used to ensure that desirable outcomes can be achieved. What is required is the will to change.
Stefan Szymanski is a Professor of Economics and Director of Sports Business Network Research Centre at Cass Business School, City University London.
1. See for example Anne Krueger, "The Political Economy of the Rent Seeking Society," American Economic Review 64:3 (1974): 291-303 or Gordon Tullock, "Rent Seeking," The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, (United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 1987) vol. 4, 147-149.
2. For an economic perspective, the best synopsis of recent games is provided by Holger Preuss, The Economics of Staging the Olympics: A comparison of the Games 1972-2008 (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2004).
3. For organizational details see Jean-Loup Chappelet, The International Olympic Committee and the Olympic System The Governance of World Sport, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008) and Alan Tomlinson, FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association), (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011).
4. See Christopher A. Shaw, Five Ring Circus: The Myths and Realities of the Olympic Games, New (Society Publishers: 2008)
5. Paul Kelso, "Russia Hope Their 2018 World Cup Bid Shines Bright Through the Fog of Corruption," The Telegraph, August 18, 2010. [End Page 95]
6. Shane McGinley, "Qatar Reveals Stadia Plans for World Cup 2022 Bid," Arabianbusiness.com, April 28, 2010.
7. For an economic perspective, the best synopsis of recent games is provided by Holger Preuss, The Economics of Staging the Olympics: A Comparison of the Games 1972-2008 (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2004).
8. See for example Mike Lee, The Race for the 2012 Olympics: The Inside Story of How London Won the Bid, (London: Virgin Books, 2006).
9. See for example Stefan Szymanski, "A Theory of the Evolution of Modern Sport," Journal of Sport History 35, no. 1 (2008): 1-64.
10. Matthew Llewellyn, "A Nation Divided: Great Britain and the Pursuit of Olympic Excellence, 1912-1914," Journal of Sport History (Spring 2008): 73-97.
11. See Stefan Szymanski and Andrew Zimbalist, National Pastime: How Americans Play Baseball and the Rest of the World Plays Soccer (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2005).
12. Tony Blair, A Journey (London: Hutchinson, 2010) Chapter 18, Triumph and Tragedy.
13. See Georgios Kavetsos and Stefan Szymanski, "National Wellbeing and International Sports Events," Journal of Economic Psychology, 31 (2010): 158-71.
14. Preuss, p. 33.
15. See John and Margaret Gold, eds., Olympic Cities: City Agendas, Planning, and the World's Games, 1896-2016 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), p. 337—this figure excludes the cost of the airport and the metro, so the extent of public expenditure is understated.
16. Stefan Szymanski, "The Economic Impact of the World Cup 2002," World Economics 3 no. 1 (2002): 169-177.
17. Jonathan Berr, "Why Hosting the World Cup is a Losing Proposition for South Africa," Daily Finance, June 12, 2010.
18. National Audit Office, "The Budget for the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games," available at http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/0607/the_budget_for_the_london_2012.aspx.
19. "Venues and Infrastructure for the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing," available at http://factsanddetails.com/china.php?itemid=1009&catid=12&subcatid=79.
20. See for example Olivier Blanchard and Roberto Perotti, "An Empirical Characterization of the Dynamic Effects of Changes in Government Spending and Taxes on Output," NBER Working Paper, No. 7269 (1999) or John F. Cogan, Tobias Cwik, John B. Taylor, and Volker Wieland, "New Keynesian versus old Keynesian Government Spending Multipliers," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 34, no. 3 (2010): 281-295.
21. Szymanski (2002).
22. See Victor A. Matheson, "Mega-Events: The Effect of the World's Biggest Sporting Events on Local, Regional, and National Economies," College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics Faculty Research Series, 2006, Paper No. 06-10.
23. See for example James A Giesecke & John R Madden, "The Sydney Olympics, Seven Years On: An Ex-Post Dynamic CGE Assessment," Centre of Policy Studies/IMPACT Centre Working Papers 2007, g-168, Monash University, Centre of Policy Studies/IMPACT Centre and A. Blake and C. DeHaan, The Economic Impact of the London 2012 Olympics (2005).
24. See for example R.A. Baade, & V.A. Matheson, "The Quest for the Cup: Assessing the Economic Impact of the World Cup," Regional Studies 38, no. 4 (2004): 343-354.
25. This a growing literature, but the following are representative: S. Allmers & W. Maennig, "Economic Impacts of the FIFA Soccer World Cups in France 1998, Germany 2006, and Outlook for South Africa 2010," Eastern Economic Journal 35, (2009): 500-519; J.L. Crompton, "Economic Impact Analysis of Sports Facilities and Events: Eleven Sources of Misapplication," Journal of Sport Management 9, no.1 (1995): 14-35; P. Porter, "Mega-Sports Events as Municipal Investments: A Critique of Impact Analysis," in J.L. Fizel, E. Gustafson, and L. Hadley, eds., Sports Economics: Current Research (New York: Praeger Press, 1999); R.A. Baade and R. Dye, "The Impact of Stadiums and Professional Sports on Metropolitan Area Development," Development Growth and Change 21(2), (1990): 1-14; R.A. Baade and V.A. Matheson, "An Assessment of the Economic Impact of the American Football Championship, the Super Bowl, on Host Communities," Reflets et Perspectives 39, no. 2-3 (2000): 35-46; D. Coates [End Page 96] and B.R. Humphreys, "The Effect of Professional Sports on Earnings and Employment in the Services and Retail Sectors in U.S. Cities," Regional Science and Urban Economics 33, no. 2 (2003): 175-198.
26. See for example UK Department for Culture, Media, and Sport, Olympic Games Impact Study Final Report (2005).
27. see Giles Atkinson, Susana Mourata, Ece Ozdemiroglu, and Stefan Szymanski, "Are We Willing to Pay Enough to 'Back the Bid'?: Valuing the Intangible Impacts of London's Bid to Host the 2012 Summer Olympic Games," Urban Studies 45, no. 2 (2008): 419-444. [End Page 97]