When Character Is More Important Than Intelligence

Carl Elliott, ed. Slow Cures and Bad Philosophers: Essays on Wittgenstein, Medicine, and Bioethics. Durham: Duke University Press. 197 pp. $18.95.

Wittgenstein has not played a very important role in bioethics. Of course, the subject developed after philosophers' fascination with Wittgenstein's thinking had reached its peak. What's more, the idea that philosophy should aim at clearing up its own peculiar misunderstandings might at first glance not be suitable to bioethics. While the ever present problems in, for example, philosophy of mind and epistemology easily lend themselves to a description such as being held captive by a picture, the problems of bioethics seem real enough, being grounded in practices such as medicine and the real-life dilemmas facing its practitioners.

What are overlooked in such a description are the critical possibilities in Wittgenstein's philosophy. His critique aimed not only at metaphysical issues and logic; on the contrary, he had an ever greater bent for criticizing superficial and narrow ways of treating the truly important areas of life: religion, morality, and so on. He reportedly questioned the use of philosophy "if it does not improve your thinking about the important questions of everyday life" (2). For Wittgenstein, ethics was a very personal and serious affair, and any treatment of ethical questions that transforms them into something that can be answered from a dispassionate distance is highly suspect. The persistent urge to do so, he thought, was part of a broader cultural movement, characterized by over-belief in rationality, science, and technology. A belief in rational science and technology is naturally a distinctive feature of medicine, so it should come as no surprise that we might learn something about medicine's comrade-in-arms, bioethics, from Wittgenstein.

This volume tries to illuminate some of the problems brought to the fore by medicine and to make us think more clearly about them. Does it succeed? The introduction by editor Carl Elliott gives some hope. From the beginning he takes the tricky subject along the right path, providing a clear outline of what a Wittgensteinian bioethics can—and should—be. He discusses Wittgenstein's antitheoretical stance and how the urge to discover ultimate and final justifications leads us to a sort of foundational and metaphysical philosophy, which creates problems instead of solving them. He shows why philosophy of language is central for philosophy as here conceived. And lastly, he describes the much broader and deeper alternative put forward by Wittgenstein, in which the philosopher tries to cure a philosophical illness. This is a sort of personal philosophical quest in which character is of more importance than intelligence (10). What then is left for philosophy to do in the field of bioethics? Elliott perspicaciously examines the different answers provided by the authors and the possibilities shown in their contributions.

When reading the contributions, one finds that they are, as is often the case with edited volumes, much more diverse than the introduction suggests. The interesting paper from James C. Edwards seems rather out of place, as it is mostly concerned with religion and superstition, talking of medicine more as an afterthought. Nevertheless, it is crucial in another respect. Elliott's introduction, as good as it is, talks about the pictures that language presents to us and that then go on to constrain our thinking in different ways. Arguably, the deepest and most important of these pictures, which isn't accentuated by Elliott, is the idea that visible actions rest on, express, or satisfy our invisible beliefs, states of consciousness, and wishes. That actions might not be explained by anything hidden at all but are rather there, "like our life" (as natural to us as is breathing), is often overlooked. This is an important addition to Elliott's introduction, but what does it tell us about a Wittgensteinian bioethics? Not much, according to Edwards (30). It may help us see where deep differences among people lie (not in different beliefs but...