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34 Historically Speaking January/February 2006 flux. Violence, to offer one example, he described as a "pulsation" (Pulsieren) rather than a constant.6 In any case, ifwar's common elements were constants, the zealots would be justified in canceling them out oftheir formulae for success, as indeed they try to do now. I suspect Gray would agree with this portrayal ofthe nature of war. My concern, however , is not with his interpretation, but how it might be received by those who lack his breadth and depth of knowledge. His argument can be taken as claiming that all one needs to know about the nature of the weather , for instance, is that it consists of a few common and inescapable elements, such as barometric pressure, heat index, dew point, wind velocity, and so on. This line of reasoning does not allow us to appreciate that there is indeed a qualitative difference between a rain shower and a hurricane—so much so in fact that we might do well to consider them two entirely different types of weather and prepare ourselves accordingly. We ought, therefore, to recognize not only the elements common to all forms ofweather, but also how those elements relate to each other, and how changes in one or more of them will affect how we should prepare ourselves before stepping outdoors. After all this, I think Gray and I are largely in agreement, except ofcourse on those niggling details. Antulio J. Echevarría II is the Director of Research andDirector ofNational Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute, U. S . Army War College. He is the author o/After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers before the Great War (University Press ofKansas, 2001), and is currently working on two books, one that examines Clausewitz 's On War as an "unfinished symphony " and one that compares amateur andprofessional military views offuture war in the West before 1914. 1 See, for example, the U.S. National Intelligence Council, Mapping the Global Future (National Intelligence Council, December 2004). 2 Antulio J. Echevarría II, "The Trouble with History in Military Education," Historically Speaking: The Bulletin ofthe Historical Society (September/October 2005): 11-15. 3 Vom Kriege, Book I, Ch. 2, 214.·* Vom Kriege, Book I, Ch. 1, 212-13. 5 Vom Kriege, Book VIII, Ch. 3B, 970-74. 6 Vom Kriege, Book I, Ch. 2, 210. Comment on Gray Andrew J. Bacevich I concur with Colin Gray. Indeed, I am almost tempted to say that I agree with every jot and tittle of his essay and to leave it at that. Almost, but not quite. Gray expects others to find his essay "shocking" and "unfashionable" and "controversial ." He should prepare to be disappointed . Serious students of war will judge his views to be commonsensical and even conventional . There is not a lot new here. Simplifying only slightly, Gray's argument reduces to a single sentence: "Clausewitz got it about right." Indeed, he did, especially in fixing the relationship of war to politics. The ugly truth is that as long as politics persists so too will large-scale, politically motivated violence. That the innocent, the naive, and the idealistic will bridle at that prospect is to be expected. As with those who rail against the market or deny the existence of Original Sin, theirs is an exercise in futility. To be sure, those opposing all war as a matter of principle serve a useful purpose: they make it harder for ambitious or bloodthirsty politicians to portray the conflict lurking over the horizon as high-minded, moral, and unavoidable. So two cheers for those who protest and demonstrate and proclaim "hell no, we won't go." Yet no amount of emoting for peace, however well intentioned, will succeed in making an end to war. Gray puzzles over the fact that some of those actually in the war business fall prey to their own peculiar version of romanticism. The counterparts to the pacifists denying the utility of war are the visionaries—soldiers as well as strategists—who entertain dreams of perfecting war, liberating it from Clausewitzian risk and uncertainty. Since the end ofthe Cold War, Americans have shown a particular susceptibility to such fantasies. Theorists have developed...

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