Counterfactualism Defended

24 Historically Speaking · March 2004 COUNTERFACTUALISM DEFENDED Jeremy Black One of the great pleasures ofbeing a "nuts and bolts" historian is that every so often one's intellectual betters explainwhatI'm doing. Molière phrased it better, but it is late. Reading Richard Evans's characteristically thoughtful and interesting piece, I discover that, on at least one occasion, I've been "liberal Whiggish" or "conservative, pessimistic," ifnota "young fogey." For, I must confess, I have employed counterfactuals in From Louis XIV to Napoleon: The Fate ofa Great Power (UCL, 1999), published an essayentitled "A Different West? Counterfactualism and the Rise of Britain to Great Power Status" (Francia 28/2 [2001]: 129-145), frequently lecture in the U.S. on the topic "Could the British Have Won the American War ofIndependence " (not "should"—more interesting, but outside my competence), and have discussed, on radio and in print, the "what if theJacobites had marched on from Derbyin December 1745. 1 hope I can reassure Richard that Ihave no particular sympathyforJacobites or any other defeated group, nor would I like the French to have beaten the British in their struggle for dominance in 1689-1815. Instead, my interest comes from the material Iworkon. The historyofdiplomacy, war, and governmentis not "verynarrow" or only "about events," and it includes "processes, structures, cultures, societies, economies, and so on." The subjects are sometimes, indeed, approached in schematic and structural terms, a method I have contested, for it is difficult to spend a long time reading in the documents without being returned to their sense ofuncertainty. Furthermore, itis necessary to probe this uncertainty in order to understand contemporary debates and to make evaluations about competence. I have recently finished a monograph on foreign policy and Parliament in the 18th century in which I try to evaluate the role ofParliament and to consider the quality ofparliamentary debates. The former does rather require consideringwhatwould have happened had the role of Parliament been less prominent (let alone such counterfactuals as: would the Ochakov crisis of 1791 have been handled differently had Parliament not been in session —see e.g., the Dutch crisis of 1787?), while, in order to assess speeches, itis necessary to consider the practicality ofthe policies that were suggested. Taking a different approach, given the apparent role of counterfactuals in modern politics, it is appropriate to ask why they should notbe used to pose questions forhistorical research. Leaving aside the wonders of democracy in Florida and California, to take Britain in recent decades, the striking coal miners might have failed against Heath in 1974 but succeeded against Thatcher a decade later. Had there been no means of exploitingnatural gas or oil in the North Sea, their absence would have put great pressure on Thatcherite public finances, making it harder to cut taxes and thus expand the private sector. It is instructive to contrast Britain with the majority ofEuropean states, which lacked these resources. Alternatively, earlier exploitation ofthe oil might have weakened the position ofthe coal industry (as well as removing the need to investin nuclear power) and also possibly saved the reputation ofthe Wilson government bypermittingitto avoid devaluation in 1967 or even enabled Heath to see offthe miners' strikes. The ability of the Thatcher government in early 1985 to saythat thanks to the state ofelectricitysupplies there would be no power cuts helped speed the demise ofthe miners' strike. Again, by calling a general election in 1978, as he was pressed to do, Callaghan might have thwarted Thatcher; while, by not invading the Falklands in 1982, the course followed by previousjuntas, the Argentinian military mighthave denied Thatcherthe opportunity to regain the domestic political initiative. She might have been killed by the IRA, either at Brighton in 1984 or elsewhere. By failing to replace Thatcher in 1990 the Conservatives mighthave helped Labor tovictorytwoyears later, and left them to bear the burden ofthe 1990s recession and the Maastricht debate, helping the Conservatives to return to power in 1997, ifnot earlier—a counterfactual that politicians have discussed with me and that clearlyshapes partoftheir thinking. Byrefusing to support the U.S. in its war with Iraq in 2003, Blairwould have faced averydifferent international situation, and this might have affected the domestic political debate about...