The Riddle of "The Great Divergence": Intellectual and Economic Factors in the Growth of the West

Historically Speaking September 2003 The Historical Society will begin a membership drive this fall. The aim is to double our membership. We seem to have reached a comfortable cruising speed as an organization. Both the JournalandHistorically Speakingare doing well, and our next national meeting in Maine this June will have twice as many panels as our last meeting in Atlanta. The time has come to reach a broader sector ofthe historical profession. Please help us do that. Single outthe one person ofyour acquaintance who, in your estimation , is most likely to benefit from membership in the Society. Offer thatperson a Peter Coclanis THS President UniversityofNorth Carolina, Chapel Hill sample copy ofamJournal or Historically Speaking and direct him or her to www.bu.edu/historic.1 And do one more thing: please request that your library subscribe to theJournal and ask your department to sign up for a departmental membership so that your colleagues and especially your students may have access to the scholarly debates sponsored by the Society. Please let us know how we may assist your effort to promote the Society. And do not forget to come to the conference inJune. This promises to be a truly exciting intellectual event. Louis Ferleger Executive Director Boston University 1Ifyou need sample copies, please contact us at historic@bu.edu. The Riddle of "The Great Divergence": Intellectual and Economic Factors in the Growth of the West1 Joel Mokyr There is anewlyfound interestamong economists in the issue ofwhat Eric Jones two decades ago called "The European Miracle" and what Kenneth Pomeranz more recently termed "The Great Divergence." Even in an age in which Eurocentrism, triumphalist or otherwise, has fallen out of favor, the most radical social scientists have to concede that whatever one might think ofits causes, modern economic growth has transformed the world. This is equally true for countries that experienced economic growth early and in large doses and those hopeful or frustrated societies whp are nowknown as "developing economies." How did it all begin? Economists have increasinglydemanded an answer from historians , threatening that ifthey do not get * Some ofthe material in this paper is adapted from my books The Gifts ofAtbena: Historical Origins ofthe Knowledge Economy (Princeton University Press, 2002) and The Enlightened Economy: An Economic History ofBritain, 1100-1850 (Penguin Press, 2004), and my paper "Thinking about Technology and Institutions," presented at the Macalester International College Roundtable, "Prometheus's Bequest: Technology and Change," October 10-12, 2002. September 2003 · Historically Speaking one, they will supply one themselves.1 The storytheytell is that the Industrial Revolution started in the late 18th century and (with a lag) prompted what they call "modern economic growth." Before the Industrial Revolution the world was "Malthusian" and experienced little, ifany, economic growth. In the 19th century the West started suddenly to grow, making (almost) everyone in it rich. This was accompanied by growing investment in human capital (mostly education), inducing people to have fewer (but better educated) children, and sustained technological progress, reinforcing the process of growth. Historians canpoke endless holes in mese stylized facts. There was more growth in the premodern economies than economists suppose , and evidence that the world was in a "Malthusian trap" before 1750 is decidedly mixed. The connection between education, economic growth, and human fertility is hugely complex and differs across various Western societies. The details reveal a far more nuanced and subde storythan the crude stylized facts thatinspire economists to build their models. But the basic story must be right: whether the world economy before 1750 was indeed in a stasis or not, there can be no doubt that economic growth as we knowitis a novel phenomenon. For instance, income per capita in the UK in 1890 was about $4100 in 1990 international dollars. It grew in the subsequent years by an average of1.4% peryear. Had itbeen growingatthat same rate in the previous 300 years, income per capita in 1590 would have been $61, which clearly is absurdly low. Whatever the exactcause, the centuryofthepaxBritannica witnessed the departure of the Occident Express with the British car in the lead. The train ride tooktheWesternworld to unprecedented prosperity, leavingmuch ofthe world behind on the platform. By 1914 the current division between rich...