France's New President

July/August 2007 Historically Speaking 39 to arrive into the Presence of the Lama, and what superior advantages have you had over other Travellers who are only allowed to see him at a Distance while you are admitted into Long Conversations and he has laid open to you the Treasures of Religion and the Principles ofJustice, which are hid from the rest of Mankind." If Bogle was granted extraordinary privileges, he received them with a remarkably open mind. His Tibetan journals and letters have none of the cultural arrogance commonly found in travel writing of the period. In the process of learning about another culture, Bogle began to question his own. To recover Bogle's story is to add a new dimension to our knowledge of 1 8th-century orientalism and broaden our understanding of the varieties of colonial and cultural encounter. Kate Teltscher is reader in English literature at Roehampton University. Hermost recent book, which has been shortlistedfortheJames Tait Black MemorialPri^e forBiography, is The High Road to China: George Bogle, the Panchen Lama, and the First British Expedition to Tibet (Farrar, Straus <& Giroux, 2007). 1 Kathleen Wilson, ? New Imperial History: Culture, Identity, and Modernity in Britain and the Empire, 1660-1840 (Cambridge University Press, 2004); CA. Bayly, Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering andSocial Communication in India, 1780-1870 (Cambridge University Press, 1 996); and William Dalrymple, White Mughals: Love and Betrayal in Eighteenth-Century India (HarperCollins, 2002). France's New President George Ross Nicolas Sarkozy does not look like earlier French presidents, whether tall, imperious figures like Charles de Gaulle, or short, intellectual types like François Mitterrand. "Sarko," as almost everyone calls him, is a dark-haired, hyperkinetic, small man. He talks like a machine gun, has ready answers to everything and everyone, fidgets, and has a reputation for bullying and losing his temper. He is often filmed jogging, surrounded by bodyguards. He is quite devoid of historical and literary flair, and is a fan of pop culture. In short, although brilliant in a cutting and ambitious way, he is not, as the French say, sympa. He is, however, a formidable politician, as he needed to be to get elected president of France by 53%-47% over his Socialist opponent , Segolène Royal, and then lead his center-right forces to a solid majority in the French Parliament.2007 © AU has not gone well recently for France. With low economic growth for two decades, France has had high unemployment (upwards of 10% since the 1990s), deepening inequality , and a dangerous social dualism, illustrated in the 2005 ghetto riots in suburban Paris. The French themselves have been anxious about their future. The political scene has been worrisome as well. No country would have been happy with an event like the 2002 presidential election, when the xenophobic demagogue Jean-Marie Ie Pen reached the runoff against Jacques Chirac. And France shocked Europe in May 2005 when voters rejected the proposed European Constitutional Treaty. Elites in other countries have underlined these troubles with widespread anti-French sneering, and few weeks have passed of late without the Economist, the Financial Times, and/or the WallStreetJournal¡ionizing about France's economic fecklessness and inability to be a player in the new world of Sarkozy at a press conference on international matters, February Horacio Villalobos/epa/Corbis. globalization. The 2007 elections signaled a shift in leadership generations. Both presidential candidates, Sarkozy at 52, and Royal, 53, were born well after World War II, knew little of the disgrace of the postwar Fourth Republic, were children during the Algerian War, and were too young to have fully tasted May 1968. Sarkozy is an immigrant's son whose father, a minor Hungarian noble who fled communism by joining the French Foreign Legion, married a Jewish Frenchwoman to produce Nicolas, and then moved on to found other families. Nicolas grew up in Neuilly, a posh Parisian suburb, but did not follow the French political class's path through the elite Ecole Nationale d'Administration (ENA) into government. He became a lawyer first, but by age 28 he was mayor of Neuilly, then a deputy, and eventually minister (several times, most recendy as 28, minister of the interior) and leader of the Gaullist Union for a Popular Movement, every step of the way demonstrating great energy, policy intelligence, and networking skills. Perhaps the most extraordinary dimension of Sarkozy's victory was his ability to pose as a candidate of change, of rupture tranquille and l'ordre en movement—no mean feat for someone long involved with French center-right machine politics. Incumbent President Jacques Chirac, beyond well-known foreign policy flourishes, had in twelve years become a monument to extravagant promises followed by remarkable inaction. Chirac was known for doing one thing well, however: winning and holding onto power, and his favorite technique was to destroy anyone who challenged him. In 1995, Sarkozy, then a rising young star, supported Prime Minister Edouard Balladur against Chirac for the center-right presidential nomination, and this earned him Chirac's active and eternal enmity. It was for good reason, therefore, that Sarkozy could not have the role of successor, hence his "outsider" posture in 2007. Sarkozy's campaign combined right-wing populist appeals and liberal reformism. Seducing farright votes away from Ie Pen was electorally critical, hence his tough law-and-order policies and hard line on immigration. As minister of the interior Sarkozy had ordered zero police tolerance in the banlieues and responded harshly to the 2005 riots by threatening to expel arrested illegal immigrants and calling the rioters "rabble." He also sponsored new immigration policies to limit regularization of illegal immigrants, tighten up family reunification policies, and promote employment-targeted admission—immigration by "choice." In his campaign Sarkozy added pledges to make punishment harsher for recidivists and lower the age for punishment as adults 40 Historically Speaking July/August 2007 from 18 to 16, plus a new youth employment program , reflecting his predilections for affirmative action . Sarkozy's economics package came wrapped in strong exhortations that France needs to work harder—more hours per week, more years in a lifetime , more women in the labor force. Most of Sarkozy's proposals, however, were to free up France's markets, particular its labor market. He proposed tax deductions for overtime to undercut France's Socialist-originated 35-hour workweek laws, plus changes to unemployment compensation programs that would oblige workers to accept reasonable job offers. He also proposed a new basic labor contract to ease hiring and firing that would link legal job security to seniority and replace the existing CDI {contrat a durée indéterminé), which confers maximum protection almost immediately , leading employers to be reluctant to hire and promoting dualism between those with protected jobs and those employed precariously or without jobs at all. Another Sarkozy proposal will oblige public sector unions to do "minimum service" during legal strikes to limit their ability to veto reforms by paralyzing the country. Pledges to make mortgage interest payments tax deductible , abolish inheritance taxes, and establish a 50% maximum income tax limit were designed to appeal to besieged middle-class taxpayers and benefit the rich. Promising to eliminate every second civil servant over time attracted attention as well. Sarkozy did not propose serious attacks on the French welfare state, however. Significant also were Sarkozy's repeated assertions that France and Europe have the right to protect themselves against the worst of globalization. Finally, Sarkozy complained about the restrictive monetary policies of the European Central Bank. Sarkozy played to everything and everyone, to intolerance and greed, solidarity and generosity, liberalism and republicanism, the rich, the poor, and everyone in between. After Chirac, who had promised the moon and delivered practically nothing, this had its risks. Thus in keeping with his role as candidate of a safe break with the past, Sarko issued guarantees for his promises. If unemployment did not come down to 5% during his five years in office, for example, then he would have failed and voters would be entided to hold him accountable. While this may turn out to be simply rhetorical, it indicated that Sarkozy, like his opponent, was well aware that the French had become deeply skeptical about politics, politicians, and promises of reform. Segolène Royal, Sarkozy's Socialist opponent in the presidential elections, who bears an uncanny resemblance to a Renaissance painting (which handlers exploited to the hilt in her campaign), tried to match Sarkozy's proposals—putting the police back in ghetto neighborhoods, placing young offenders in boot camps, raising the minimum wage, new contractual arrangements for hiring young people, better education. Like Sarkozy, she sought to establish herself as a new political face, but in a different way. Before making any campaign pledges at all she conducted an exhausting series of face-to-face "participative debates" with "the people" and ran an open campaign Web site where individuals and groups could identify problems, suggest new programs , and generally express themselves, allowing her to advertise a "deliberative democracy" new to France and that served her well early in the campaign . She labored under large handicaps, however, some not of her own making. First, the electoral base that had carried Socialist candidates to victory in the past had diminished from that which had alSarkozyplayed to everything and everyone, to intolerance and greed, solidarity and generosity, liberalism and republicanism, the rich, thepoor, and everyone in between. lowed François Mitterrand to win two presidential terms (1981-1995) and Lionel Jospin a parliamentary majority (1997-2002). By 2007, absent an extraordinary Royal campaign combined with a Sarkozy collapse, the votes were not there. Next, the Socialist Party had resumed its snake-pit political life, replete with middle-aged male vipers in fancy suits, each determined to be the party's candidate and, if this did not happen, to make life miserable for whomever was. In part because of the unpleasantness associated with this game, in part because she was not heavyweight enough to do so, Royal sought the Socialist nomination by mobilizing from outside. She paid dearly for doing so. The competing bosses—"elephants," as they are called—withheld support and condescended to her, as in the classic crack of former Prime Minister Laurent Fabius about "who will take care of the children." Her "presidential pact" was vague and platitudinous, too obviously costly for a moment of budgetary constraint, and well seasoned with Socialist favorites that had long lost their taste. Finally, she was prone to gaffes that revealed a lack of familiarity with key issues and often took refuge in gaseous preaching about values where specific persuasiveness would have served better. Failure to seduce support from François Bayrou, a centrist who had won 18% of the first-round votes, and trap Sarkozy into mistakes in the final campaign debate sealed her fate. The very minute her defeat was announced , the Socialist elephants in their fancy suits renewed their fighting over party leadership. French voters spoke decisively and in very large numbers (a turnout of 84% in the presidential runoff) in favor of Sarkozy. After years of voter apathy, occasional explosions of extreme behavior, and loud complaints from punditry about a "crisis of politics," this was positive. The clarity of victory, however, puts Nicolas Sarkozy on notice that he has to deliver on his promises. "Sarko" started out well, appointing a small, but talented government that was politically open well beyond his own party, with Socialists (including the outspoken and moralistic Bernard Kouchner, founder of Doctors Without Borders, as foreign minister) and almost as many women as men. His prime minister, François Fillon, himself a centrist, is good at framing issues and conciliating differences. The government also has a new super-ministry for sustainable development (including the environment, energy, and transport ) to respond to new urgency about global warming. And the creation of a new super-ministry for immigration, integration, national identity, and co-development bowed to those frightened by the presence of non-European foreigners on French soil. Sarkozy is now widely appreciated for political astuteness and skills, but the appreciation is often grudging, particularly on the Left and Center-Left, where he is seen as a neoliberal who muted his convictions to win. Moreover, he is committed to rapid implementation of his domestic program, and his government has already announced an exhausting schedule that cannot be realized without tension and drama. On the table are pledges to cut the size of the civil service and public sector, to grant universities new autonomy and make them more competitive with one another, to change the basic labor contract and insist that rambunctious unions no longer be allowed to block reforms by shutting down trams and trains, and much more, all in six months. French watchers anticipate that those threatened by Sarkozy's reforms will fight back. The new president has chosen his potential enemies carefully, however. France's public sector unions are pugnacious but weak, and perhaps not up to the task of fighting a French version of the British miners' strike of 1985. Civil servants, when threatened, may try to gum up the works, but few will go to the barricades . And anyone in France who is unaware that universities need shaking up is living in the wrong century. Sarkozy's commitment to public services and social programs—the core of the French "social model," may keep him away from the real danger spots. The first months of his presidency will be a high-wire act, however, and it may make Sarkozy vulnerable. His presidential predecessors cultivated monarchical aloofness, letting their governments do the dirty work and take the hits that followed. Sarkozy's style is hands-on, however, and he is an omnipresent micromanager. The odds are that everything will not go well, since it rarely does in politics, and Sarkozy will then find himself in the line of fire, and everyone may learn more about his limits. The French have been outdoing themselves wallowing in "crisis" talk and bemoaning the alleged precipitous decline of their country. It may be that things are less dire in France than this, however. It helps Sarkozy's prospects that France has been doing better economically over the past year or so, for example. In part because of German recovery, July/August 2007 Historically Speaking 41 French unemployment has dropped nearly two percentage points. France has an inflexible labor market , partly due to rigid labor laws and rules. Changing these laws and rules could make a difference in employer and consumer confidence. The now successful Germans were long written off for being hopelessly stuck in inefficient corporatism and crippled by debts from reunification. A few relatively small labor market reforms (controversial enough to cost Gerhard Schröder his job, however) plus the efficient ways in which German corporatism managed to squeeze down wages, have regenerated confidence and revved up the machine. Something like this in France is not out of the question. The presidential campaign was remarkably quiet about international matters. Sarkozy did make clear that he favored shrinking the ill-fated European Constitutional Treaty down to a "mini-treaty" that could be passed without a new referendum. Sarkozy has in mind stripping the existing document to a minimum of key propositions and amputating its "constitutional" pretensions. This approach was remarkably successful at the June 2007 EU summit when Sarkozy emerged as a key deal broker behind German Chancellor Angela Merkel, helping to begin a process that may liberate the EU from its present state of paralysis. Many other EU leaders are also quietly pleased with Sarkozy's rejection of Turkish EU membership, although few will confess to this. In addition, Sarkozy has pledged to shake up, if not end, France's longstanding postcolonial practices in its African ex-colonies. He has also proposed a "Mediterranean Union" that would link countries around the Mediterranean shores, although what this means remains to be explained, even if it is redolent of failing EU "neighborhood" policies. Many of the Gaullist premises of French foreign policy also need rethinking. But the idea that Sarkozy will take on the Quai d'Orsay on anything fundamental is far-fetched, even if Bernard Kouchner , the new foreign affairs minister, may have passionate words to say about this. Sarkozy's expressed desire that Europe should be more proactive in protecting Europeans from globalization is backed by a track record of protecting French big business, and this has elicited much liberal ink and indignation . His advocacy of reining in the European Central Bank and obliging it to pay more attention to Eurozone member states is a no-no inside Brussels and Frankfurt beltways. The new president has already been put on warning by European Central Bank and Commission budgetary specialists for initial tax and spend inclinations that could put France again outside Eurozone limits for deficits and perhaps precipitate fireworks. There will be issues in Europe, therefore. Finally, Sarkozy's (and Kouchner 's) fondness for America notwithstanding, the new president is unlikely to be an easy ally. Sarkozy is a combative character, and he is French. French and American interests have not been, and will not be, always the same. As Sarkozy has himself underlined , friends must learn to deal with other friends when they don't agree. George Ross is Morris Hillquit Professor in Labor and Social Thought and director of the Centerfor German and European Studies at Brandeis University . He is the author of, among many other works, Jacques Delors and European Integration (Polity/Oxford University Press, 1995). Western Europe's America Problem* Andrei S. Markovits When my father and I arrived in the United States as immigrants from Romania —by way of Vienna—in the summer of 1960, we spent a number of weeks living with American families in the greater New York area. Some wereJews, like us; most were not. But all spoke some German because our English was virtually nonexistent at the time. What impressed me to no end, and will always remain with me, was how all those people adored my Viennese-accented German, how they reveled in it, found it elegant, charming, and above all oh-so-cultured. For business and family reasons, my father had to return to Vienna, where I attended the Theresianische Akademie, one of Austria's leading gymnasia. The welcome accorded to me in that environment was much colder and more distant than it had been in the United States, not by dint of mybeing a Tschusch and a Zuagraster, an interloper from the disdained eastern areas of Europe , but by virtue of having become a quasi American . From the get-go until my graduation many years later I was always admonished by my English teachers , in their heavily accented, Viennese-inflected English, not to speak this abomination of an "American dialect" or "American slang," and never to use "American spelling," with its simplifications that testified prima facie to the uncultured and simpleton nature of Americans. Of course, any of my transgressions , be it chatting in class or playing soccer in the hallways, was met with an admonition of, * This essay is adapted from Andrei S. Markovits, Uneouth Nation: Why Europe DistiktsAmerica (Princeton University Press, 2007). An earlier version of it appeared in The Chronicle RfMW1JaUUaTy 19, 2007. A Puck magazine cartoon from 1900 showing William McKinley, as a tailor, measuring Uncle Sam for new "expansionist" clothes. Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division [reproduction number, LC-USZC4-2158]. ...