Buchanan, the Patronage, and the Lecompton Constitution: A Case Study

Buchanan, the Patronage, and the Lecompton Constitution: A Case Study David E. Meerse James Buchanan's position near the bottom ofthe "Below Average" category in the pantheon of presidents has begun to change for the better. His handling of the secession crisis parallels and antedates Lincoln's postinauguration policies . His image as a president of "weak character" who caved in by July 1 857 to the demands of rabid Southerners for a proslavery policy in Kansas is also redrawn. Even a "voter revolt" against party efforts to admit Kansas as a (nominal) slave state is found to be exaggerated.' But with reference to congressional struggles to admit Kansas as a slave state under the notorious Lecompton constitution, Buchanan's reputation is unchanged . At the risk of oversimplification, he is charged with three political faults: ? ) he sought to drive Lecompton "naked"—that is, just as it came from the convention—through Congress; 2) he used presidential patronage power solely for this end, "ruthlessly dismissfing] every pro-Douglas officeholder who dared show his colors"; 3) the failed presidential efforts allowed the congressionally developed "English bill" to disguise a resubmission of the slavery question to Kansas voters, and, "Under immense pressure from the administration, which sanctioned the spending of large sums of money to break [anti-Lecompton] ranks," the English bill passed. These three faults had two major consequences. First, despite the unpopularity of the Lecompton policy, Buchanan sought to punish his congressional opponents by carrying on the "war" against the anti-Lecomptonites into the fall 1 858 congressional elections. And second, this unsuccessful "war" cost the Democrats their congressional majority in 1858 and paved the way for the party's disruption in i860, the election of Abraham Lincoln, secession, and Civil War. In sum, Buchanan 1 Bruce W. Collins, "The Democrats' Electoral Fortunes during the Lecompton Crisis," Civil War History 24 (Dec. 1978): 314—31. Kenneth M. Stampp, America in 1857: A Nation on the Brink (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1990), has carried the 1857 rehabilitation to its furthest extent. Civil War History, Vol. xli. No. 4 © 1995 by The Kent State University Press 292CIVIL WAR HISTORY displayed "an overstrong adherence to mistaken policies," which, ultimately, was "one of the most tragic miscalculations any President has ever made."2 The image of Buchanan as a rigid Goliath conducting an annihilation campaign against an Illinois David, and failing, needs redefinition also. Such redefinition must address the three political faults charged against Buchanan. The redefinition attempted in this essay focuses on four states: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio. These states illustrate Buchanan's appreciation ofpolitical reality before 1858 and allow a testing of his supposed loss ofthat appreciation during the Kansas struggle. The Midwest was the home political base of Buchanan's David, Sen. Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois; Buchanan's use of patronage there is the clearest measure of his ruthlessness against his rival. Voting shifts in the midwestern Democratic delegations illuminate neglected factors influencing congressional action. Buchanan initially set as his administration's goals "to arrest, if possible, the agitation of the slavery question at the North & to destroy sectional parties." Buchanan's 1857 policy of "selective rotation in office" sought to "destroy sectional parties" by building Democratic political strength. Selective rotation gave greater weight to Democratic vote-getting ability than to loyalty to Buchanan or support for his candidacy prior to the 1 856 Democratic convention.3 Indiana and Hlinois were among those states where Democrats controlled both the state government and held a majority in the congressional delegation. Douglas ruled the Illinois party without factional opposition. Selective rotation was applied in the Republican North, with Douglas and his lieutenants selecting the new nominees; incumbents were left undisturbed in the Democratic South. In Indiana, factions formed around Sen. Jesse D. Bright and former governor Joseph A. Wright. Of the six congressmen, only John G. Davis was a Wright backer. Wright himself was named ambassador to Berlin in recognition of his contribution to making Indiana a Buchanan state both at the Democratic convention and at the ballot box. Within the state, however, a slight preference was given to the Bright wing, but Buchanan did not renominate such Bright lieutenants as U.S...