The Presidency of Abraham Lincoln (review)

BOOK REVIEWS The Presidency of Abraham Lincoln. By Phillip Shaw Paludan. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994. Pp. xx, 384. $29.95.) Abraham Lincoln's unique place in American history rests upon his record as president. If he had not occupied the White House at the time of the great crisis of the Union, he might be remembered as no more than an intriguing and somewhat eccentric figure of minor historical interest. A book on the Lincoln presidency therefore presents both a great opportunity and a great challenge to the author. The opportunity is to concentrate on the crucial years of Lincoln's life, rather than to add to the mixture ofbiography, psychology, mythology, and hagiography that feeds offthe limited stock ofhistorical evidence abouthis earlier years. The problem, on the other hand, is to write a history of the Lincoln presidency without allowing it to broaden into a history of the Civil War. Phillip Paludan seizes the opportunity eagerly and purposefully and tackles the problem with impressive skill and judgment. Generally, he supplies adequate background, and he excels at seeing links between apparently disparate points and at placing familiar events in a fresh context. But, quite rightly, Lincoln is seldom far from the center of the picture. The balance is just about right, although there are some surprising omissions, especially in the later chapters. It is almost as if the author was running out of steam—or perhaps his publisher was running out of patience! For example, the Hampton Roads conference—a remarkable event in its way—is not mentioned at all. Lincoln's visit to Richmond shortly after its capture—one of the truly dramatic moments of his final days—receives no more than a passing allusion. The greatest casualty of Paludan's inevitably selective treatment is the war itself, but here he faces an almost impossible problem. Rightly, he emphasizes that Lincoln's first priority in all situations was the prosecution of the war and the maintenance of popular support for the struggle to save the Union. On the other hand, he says comparatively little about the conduct of the war itself. Obviously , he is wise to avoid detailed narrative of campaigns, but Lincoln's strategic ideas and the tangled history ofhis relations with his generals deserve closer attention. They are crucial to any understanding of the role of the president as commander in chief. In his valiant and largely successful effort to impose order and coherence on his vast subject, Paludan commits himself to a clear and carefully articulated thesis. He insists that "freeing the slaves and saving the Union were linked as 3l8CIVIL WAR HISTORY one goal, not two optional goals" (xv). By turning the rights proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence from a self-evident truth into a proposition, Lincoln was able to convert equality into a promise for the future. The argument is somewhat akin to that presented by Garry Wills in his Lincoln at Gettysburg. Paludan uses less dramatic language, but he develops his thesis in more detail and with more restraint. He does not strain too hard in trying to force every aspect of Lincoln's multifaceted presidency into this one mold. He is content to recur to it from time to time and to introduce it thoughtfully into his discussion of emancipation, reconstruction, and the war effort itself. One distinctive feature of Paludan's argument is his insistence that the key to both the salvation of the Union and the fulfillment of its promise lay within the political process and the constitutional structure. For Lincoln there was no necessary tension or conflict between institutions and ideals. Paludan makes effective use of what is, at the very least, a serviceable working hypothesis, but he needs to confront the fact that secession and civil war themselves constituted a major breakdown of the very political and constitutional system by which he sets such store. His thesis serves him best in dealing with emancipation, reconstruction , and the turbulence of wartime politics. It is less helpful in dealing with issues where Lincoln's role was more marginal—for example, the international aspects of the conflict or the economic and social changes generated or accelerated by the...