Gettysburg: The Second Day (review)

BOOK REVIEWS355 Pennsylvania to the Republican column because of the tariff campaign borders on common knowledge. Nevertheless, Huston constructs the account with great clarity, and he adds information about the precise timing and means for implementing the tariff issue. Further, the book has useful insights into the perceived tariff benefits for labor as well as business owners. Historiographically, Huston provides an excellent guide not only for the older dispute between Beardian Progressives and Revisionists, but also for the more current maze of republicanism, modernization , and even "Celtic fringe" theories of Civil War causation. Indeed, the last chapter qualifies as the best, most current Civil War historiographical essay available. John V. M ering University of Arizona Gettysburg: The Second Day. By Harry W. Pfanz. (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1987. Pp. xxii, 601. $34.95.) In two ways, this book is reminiscent of Richard J. Sommers's Richmond Redeemed: The SiegeatPetersburg (1981). First, the title ofeach book is misleading. Sommers did not cover the entire siege, but only Grant's Fifth Offensive, which lasted less than a month. Similarly, Pfanz does not describe all the action on July 2 at Gettysburg, but concentrates exclusively on the Confederate attack against the Union left, thereby omitting the fighting on the Union right at Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill. Second, both authors demonstrate extraordinary knowledge about their subject. A friend of mine at the Army Command and General Staff College, Dr. Philip J. Brookes, has a knack for coining neologisms. One of his most recent is "overstanding," which goes beyond mere understanding . In regard to historians, it would connote an almost superhuman grasp of the details and issues surrounding an event. All historians overstand their subjects in the eyes of the lay public, but occasionally a historian achieves a degree of overstanding that truly impresses even experts in the field. Sommers did it, and so has Pfanz. Pfanz's overstanding of the Confederate attack and its repulse comes from a massiveresearch effort and an intensive study of the terrain. The 108 pages ofnotes and bibliography attest to his mastery for the relevant sources, and his career in the National Park Service—including ten years at Gettysburg—allowed him to examine the terrain in minute detail. In spite of Pfanz's magnificent scholarship, many questions about the battle at the tactical level remain unanswered. The book abounds with educated guesses, conjectures, and outright admissions that some things cannot be known. For instance, before maturing his plan for July 2, Lee sent three scouting parties to investigate the Union left. The area they 356CIVIL WAR HISTORY reconnoitered was a beehive of Union activity, yet the parties reported seeing only a few enemy cavalrymen. Not even Pfanz can explain how this happened. Still, despite such mysteries, the author's description ofthe fighting at the Devil's Den, Little Round Top, the Wheatfield, the Peach Orchard, and the slope of Cemetery Ridge is as complete as any historian could ever expect. It surpasses that of Edwin B. Coddington's The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command (1968), which has long been the standard account. The latter devoted approximately 100 pages to these events; Pfanz exceeds this by 220 pages. Although quite detailed, the book is never tedious because of riveting anecdotes, sparkling writing style, and excellent analysis woven into the narrative. Pfanz offers astute interpretations concerning the leadership on both sides. He praises Meade for his "aggressive decision" (p. 54) to fight at Gettysburg even after part of his army had been defeated there on July 1, and for his generalship on July 2. Lee does not fare so well. He was overconfident, based his attack on faulty intelligence, and erred in not using Ewell's corps to strengthen the assaulting force. Hence, eleven Confederate brigades assailed twenty-two Union brigades. Longstreet said these eleven brigades did the finest three hours of fighting done by any troops anywhere—which may be true—but they should not have had to fight so well against such uneven odds. Moreover, in contrast to Meade's direct role in orchestrating the defense, Lee played an excessively passive role after giving the attack order. Both commanding generals...