In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

BOOK reviews89 Southern fear ofcentralized power, and the obvious lack ofany precedents to guide them, they boldly expanded executive powers beyond anything envisioned in the antebellum years. It was the governors who initiated and tried to coordinate wide-ranging programs in such fundamental areas as raising and supplying troops, financing the war at the state level, and providing economic relieffor soldiers' families and civilians. The obstreperous and backbiting image of the Confederate governors rests almost entirely upon the performances of just two men, Zebulon Vance of North Carolina and Joseph Brown of Georgia. This image, however , was a carefully cultivated one which often masked very positive contributions to the Confederacy. Vance, for example, headed a government that provided the Confederacy with seven thousand more conscripts than any other Southern state. Both Vance and Brown shrewdly projected themselves as tireless defenders ofindividual liberties against the centralizing tendencies ofthe Richmond government. By so doing they were able to deflect voter resentments over their own centralizing state governments onto the distant authorities in Richmond. This was the key to their political success and, in particular, it enabled them to retain the support of the yeomanry. The loss ofthat supportwas instrumental in the mid-wardefeats of such otherwise effective pro-Richmond governors as John Letcher of Virginia and John G. Shorter ofAlabama. The Confederate Governors makes a welcome contribution to Confederate historiography. Nonetheless, two reservations are in order. As a consequence ofthe chapters being alphabetized by individual states, fundamental distinctions between die lower, upper, and border South are constantly blurred in what rapidly becomes a disjointedjumble oftwentyeight separate administrations. Secondly, and beyond the fine introductory essay by W Buck Yearns, the volume needs a central point of synthesis that draws together its findings and relates them to the strategic and social issues at the heart of the Confederate experience. As matters stand, die authors tell us much about the administrative history of their states but little about how it all fits together. William L. Barney University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Phil Sheridan and His Army. By Paul Andrew Hutton. (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1985. Pp. xvi, 479. $29.95.) The fighting reputation earned by General Phil Sheridan in dieWarfor the Union is well known. Phil Sheridan and His Army is the first comprehensive study of the general's later career as the country's chief Indian fighter. From his division headquarters at Chicago, Sheridan's command stretched from the Missouri River to the Rocky Mountains, and from Texas to the Canadian border, one million square miles ofterritory. The greatest Indian campaigns fought on die Great Plains between 1867 and 1883 were 90CIVIL WAR HISTORY planned and executed under his direction. Sheridan's Indian fighting obviously gave him an important place in westward expansion, but like the army he commanded, Sheridan lived in die shadow of the Civil War. In this volume his Civil War career gets just nine pages, a summary sufficient to show the hero's fighting qualities. Sheridan planned and directed the first Indian campaign on the Southern Plains in 1868-69. Determined to take the starch out of the Kiowas, he personally accompanied one column and ordered die construction of Fort Sill. To obtain the services of a fighter whom he respected, Sheridan had Custer's court-martial sentence suspended. He directed die Red RiverWar of1874-75 and devised the plan ofthe Sioux War diat broke the power of the Northern tribes. For all of diat, he is not particularly remembered as an Indian fighter. His Indian fighting days are overshadowed always by his dramatic Civil War career. He was short on imagination and long on self-assurance. He had littìe experience with Great Plains winters, and no one could tell him anything of die problems of winter campaigns. Each ofhis campaigns was a duplicate ofthe first one—a winter war and converging columns which would destroy the Indian's possessions and animals and leave them destitute. His greatest talents were tiiose ofa tactical field commander, and the Indian wars gave him little opportunity to show those skills. The autiior gives us few battlefield stories. The main story is told from Sheridan's headquarters and...


Additional Information

Print ISSN
pp. 89-91
Launched on MUSE
Open Access
Back To Top

This website uses cookies to ensure you get the best experience on our website. Without cookies your experience may not be seamless.