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366CIVIL WAR HISTORY into battalions, and the battalions into "regiments," and tried to centralize command at the corps level. And, of course, his defensive tactics were well-suited for artillery. Daniel strengthens his arguments about the questionable judgment of tfie army's other commanders by drawing comparisons between the western "long arm" and the Army of Northern Virginia's artillery. True, Lee's army had governmental priority in terms of ordnance, but more importantly, Lee employed his artillery more wisely. Although Daniel recounts the artillery's participation in the major battles in the western theater, he never buries his broad themes under a mountain of detail. Thus, for example, he relegated to an appendix an outline of all the Confederate artillery batteries at Shiloh, Murfreesboro, Chickamauga, Chattanooga, Dalton, Atlanta, and Nashville. And he did not become bogged down in technical data, offering no explanation of the difference between, say, spherical case shot and shells. Such technical information is unimportant for Daniel's purposes, and is available elsewhere, particularly in Warren Ripley's Artillery and Ammunition of the Civil War. If the artillery was, as one officer asserted, "the neglected branch" of the Army of Tennessee, it has also been neglected by Civil War historians. Based on extensive research in the Official Records, the Confederate Veteran, and unpublished reports, diaries, and correspondence in numerous repositories, this book is an excellent addition to the handful of existing artillery studies, such as Jennings C. Wise's The Long Arm of Lee, L. Van Loan Naisawald's Grape and Cannister, and John W. Rowell's Yankee Artilleryman. Peter Maslowski University of Nebraska-Lincoln Richmond After the War, 1865-1890. By Michael B. Chesson. (Richmond : Virginia State Library, 1981. Pp. xxii, 255. $20.00 cloth; $12.50 paper.) Richmond has finally been discovered by scholars. Two first-rate histories of the Virginia capital have been published in recent years, and one of them is the book under review here (the other is David R. Goldfield's treatment of antebellum Richmond in his Urban Growth in the Age of Sectionalism: Virginia, 1847-1861 [1977]). After so many decades of neglect, it is gratifying to find that the city's postwar past has fallen into hands as capable as those of Michael B. Chesson. His Richmond After the War fills a major gap in Southern urban history and does so with considerable flair. Chesson's coverage of the years from 1865 to 1890 is thorough and is based on extensive primary research. He actually begins with chapters on antebellum and wartime Richmond, and the latter contains the best discussion to date of the Bread Riot of 1863. But he moves quickly from BOOK REVIEWS367 there to the decades embraced in the book's title. His treatment of Reconstruction is strongly revisionist. Although blacks made up a majority of registered voters from 1867 to 1869, none served as aldermen or city councillors, and indeed "blacks held no important offices in city government" throughout the years of Reconstruction (115). Military commanders displayed considerable sympathy for conservative white attitudes , and they made no effort to confiscate the property of former rebels or to disfranchise them . Advances were made in areas like public education and police protection, and these reforms survived the city's "redemption " by Conservatives in 1870. But Chesson shows clearly that the former capital of the Confederacy got off with little more than a slap on the wrist. The stock white description of the immediate postwar era "as five years of unbroken tyranny" was nothing more than the usual Reconstruction mythology (115). Subsequent chapters provide an excellent discussion of the economic, social, and political history of the city during the 1870s and 1880s. The dominant theme of this section of the book is that "Richmond fell dramatically short of its urban promise" (xv) and basically "failed" as a nineteenth-century American city (xviii). The yardstick by which Chesson measures success is growth, and Richmond simply did not grow as rapidly as many other Southern cities. A number of factors were involved: the lingering effects of the devastating 1865 fire; failure to develop a deep-water port; relatively poor rail access; inadequate sources of raw materials for the city...


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