Fountain of Discontent: The 'Trent' Affair and Freedom of the Seas (review)

BOOK REVIEWS175 showing how vigorously and efficiently the abstainers agitated. These insights, coupled with the wide sweep of each chapter, serve to outdate Krout's durable old study. But we still need many more case studies in order to develop the detail necessary for a definitive book on this complicated and polyvalent reform. In light of the very recent surge of monographic work on liquor and antiliquor, Tyrrell's useful survey may prove just a bit premature. Robert L. Hampel Boston, Massachusetts Fountain of Discontent: The 'Trent' Affair and Freedom of the Seas. By Gordon H. Warren. (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1981. Pp. xiv, 301. $18.95.) There is no mystery surrounding the enduring attraction of the Trent episode for historians. Here was an international drama (if not melodrama ), complete with naval and troop movements, at the moment of supreme domestic crisis for the American Union. The principal actors were the political giants of the period—Palmerston and Russell performed for the British and Lincoln and Seward for the Americans. Even the secondary players—Charles Wilkes, James M. Mason, John Slidell, Lord Lyons—were figures of some stature. There was, in addition, the Prince Consort's act of selfless statesmanship in rewording one of the British notes even as he was heading feverishly towardhis grave. Yet, on balance, the Trent affair contains more bathos than pathos. Moreover, the outline, indeed the details, of the incident and theensuingevents are too well known to require further elaboration here. Thatvery familiarity poses an obvious question—is another accountofthe affair eithernecessary or useful? Professor Warren attempts to counter this potentially dismissive criticism in a short preface, where he strives manfully (but not with complete success) to justifyhis study. Not surprisingly, he finds all earlier works wanting. "The inadequacies ofthe literature—its partial quality, its confusions, its mistaken emphases—thus have obscured an interesting chapter in Americanhistory." Of course, his assertion thatnot a "book-length account" of the episode appeared between the publication of Thomas Harris's in 1896 and that of Norman Ferris in 1977 is not strictly accurate. Evan John'sAtlantic Impact 1861 (1952) certainly lacks the traditional scholarly framework but is not entirely devoid of merit. Far more discouraging than this oversight, however, is the tone of the war Warren wages in his footnotes on the work of Ferris, which may strike readers as churlish. The book does have much to recommend it, not least the admirably clear statement of the legal aspects of the incident and a careful elaboration of the grounds on which the Trent might have been seized and then condemned as prize. Equally, there is always a case to be made for the 176CIVIL WAR HISTORY retelling of an exciting if well-known tale. And his claims to the contrary notwithstanding, Warren's account differs little if at all from earlier versions. This book follows essentially the same course as his thesis (1969), which was recently published by University Microfilms and is a mine of information. Unfortunately, his interpretation of the material is not always convincing. His assessments of the personalities involved are far from novel or penetrating, and his harsh judgment of Lord Lyons might have been modified by an examination of his Papers. (Another significant omission from the bibliography is the Somerset collection) . The estimate of Seward's role appears to be influenced by the far from objective opinion of Gideon Welles. In 1861, Seward had reason to fear British meddling in the Civil War, and by his behavior he did much to discourage them from pursuing this line of conduct. One obvious strategy was to remind the British government of the vulnerability of Canada, and to this extent the October circular to the governors of seaboard and Great Lakes states served a purpose. As for opinions and attitudes of Canadians toward the troubles of the Union, Professor Warren's view of them is somewhat naive. Finally, his suggestion that the international crisis persisted until news of the surrender of Mason and Slidell reached Britain is not supported by the evidence. Once the initial excitement subsided, there was no imminent danger ofwar. Long before the reply to the British government's demand forthe return ofthe Confederate...