Forrest at Brice's Cross Roads (review)

BOOK REVIEWS85 accrued by the eventual elevation of Grant to supreme military command. Grant's experience in the West had matured his judgment, enlarged his perspective, and brought him to the same conclusions McClellan had earlier reached by study and reflection, specifically that the navy could place armies in spots where alone they could not rapidly or easily go, and then supply and sustain them (p. 35) . "Indeed, the plan [Grant] had in mind for 1864 was almost a replica of McClellan's grand strategy for 1862" (pp. 324-25) . But poor gullible and impressionable Grant was done in by his well-meaning subordinate Sherman and die dunderhead Halleck (pp. 326-27). Grant himself was in no way responsible for the "march to the sea" (p. 432,ni0), and it is just as well, because Reed sees that as an unwise and unnecessary campaign that Grant only agreed to in order to appease his colleagues. So, to sum up, in spite of its defects, this book suggests new paths for scholars. It is fresh and provides some excellent accounts of combined operations, improved by good maps. It has a spectacular thesis: that "The Federal government's almost total failure to comprehend the most elementary principles of war, or to trust generals who did understand diem" (p. 188) gready prolonged the contest. But it is only partly sound. The author does not show that McClellan actually had die plans attributed to him, that they would have worked as she believes, or that McClellan could have executed them in any case. The lack of adequate support for a challenging interpretation makes the whole too much like the inconsequential typographical error on page 233 where Reed mentions the Mississippi Central Raidroad. Erroneous, yes, but it piques one's thoughts! Herman Hattaway University of Missouri-Kansas City Forrest at Brice's Cross Roads. By Edwin C. Bearss. (Dayton, Ohio: Morningside Bookshop, 1979. Pp. ix, 382. $19.95.) This publication is the result of a project originally begun by the late Glenn Tucker, well-known author of significant and popular Civil War studies, especially those on Chickamauga and Gettysburg. Tucker's death came before he had finished his research and thus the writing style, from first to last, is unmistakably that of Edwin C. Bearss. A National Park Service historian who has published many scholarly articles, as well as books on Vicksburg and Wilson's Creek, Bearss was a good choice to carry on Tucker's work. He possesses a wide-ranging knowledge of the Civil War, particularly the Western Theater. Based upon the Official Records as the major source, Bearss has presented an accurate, highly detailed (sometimes the movement of a single company is described), blow-by-blow account, not only of Brice's Cross Roads, but the campaigning in northern Mississippi from midApril through August, 1864. The real importance of the book is two-fold. 86CIVIL WAR HISTORY First, it is a carefully researched tactical study of the batde at Brice's Cross Roads (universally acclaimed as the military masterpiece of Nathan Bedford Forrest) that reveals Union commanders, particularly Samuel D. Sturgis, who led the expedition, blundering again and again. Also of interest, Bearss establishes that Colonel Edward Bouton's black brigade did some capable fighting in spite of the ultimate defeat. Secondly, the book concerns the strategic war, in which William T. Sherman sought to prevent Forrest from breaking the Yankee supply line during die Adanta campaign by sending out various expeditions from Memphis to keep the legendary cavalryman pinned down in northern Mississippi. A highly commendable feature of the book is that Bearss manages to avoid the partisanship of most Forrest biographers, dealing objectively with the successes and failures of both Union and Confederate warriors. For a notable example, he does not accept the often advanced view that the Tupelo campaign was a standoff and of no significance. Implying diat Forrest and Stephen D. Lee blundered through impatience, and rightly crediting Andrew J. Smith's command with defeating the forces under Forrest and Lee at Harrisburg on July 14, Bearss points out that "four of Forrest's seven mounted brigades were so terribly mauled that their combat effectiveness was destroyed." Additionally...