Stonewall in the Valley: Thomas J. 'Stonewall' Jackson's Shenandoah Valley Campaign, Spring, 1862 (review)

284CIVIL WAR HISTORY Through her meticulous use of primary sources Sterling is able to refute many of the misconceptions or stereotypes deriving from this period, most notably the idea that blacks were frightened by the costumes of the Klan. Sterling demonstrates through the use of eyewitness accounts that blacks were not frightened; that they saw through the disguises with one black witness to a rally noting that he had known some of the participants for twenty years. When reading the book one is forcefully reminded that some of the problems black people had a hundred years ago are still very much with us. Obviously, racism and discrimination are still present but on another level one is struck by a real sense of deja vu when reading the letters of black college students immediately after the Civil War. Is it in 1867 or 1967 that black college students in Northern, predominantly white, schools are writing their parents complaining of theloneliness and sense of isolation they feel in these "alien" environments? And is it 1867 or 1967 when their parents write back that they must persevere, not only to help themselves but to help their people? Ms. Sterling has annotated and edited a fine collection of documents which not only describe "the troubles they seen" but also how those troubles were overcome. Mindful of her selected topic coverage (Sterling does not discuss the fight between Congress and PresidentJohnson, blacks in the North, or the impact of sympathetic whites), this book makes an excellent contribution to histories of the period and would be invaluabke in supplementing even those histories written from the black perspective such as Cruden's The Negro in Reconstruction. Kenneth W. Goings College of Wooster Stonewall in the Valley: Thomas J. 'StonewaW Jackson's Shenandoah Valley Campaign, Spring, 1862. By Robert G. Tanner. (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1976. Pp. 436. $10.00.) In the introduction to Stonewall in the Valley Robert Tanner states that he is offering a "readable account of the South's largely unknown Valley Campaign of 1862, to analyze a classic of the warrior's art, and to trace the forging of an army which, at its peak in the spring of 1862, was dreaded as invincible." I am pleased to report that Mr. Tanner has admirably succeeded in all of his objectives. Stonewall Jackson's campaign in the Shenandoah Valley in the spring of 1862 is, of course, familiar to all students of the Civil War and to the majority of students of military history. This campaign was a profoundly stunning achievement in which an outnumbered Confederate army defeated several significantly larger Union forces. This was accomplished by taking advantage of Northern errors with rapid maneuvering and concentration, resulting in the isolation and defeat of BOOK REVIEWS285 various fragments of the Federal forces. However, from virtually the conclusion of the campaign in June of 1862 until the present an aura of romanticism has veiled the cold hard facts of this unique military operation. In a thoroughly researched and amply documented effort Mr. Tanner has torn away this veil of romanticism and in a comprehensive narrative has provided us with an excellent chronological description of military operations in the Shenandoah Valley from November, 1861 through June, 1862. Included are not only the strategy and tactics employed in the Valley but their effects on forces operating in Virginia outside the Valley. Mr. Tanner writes from a Southern viewpoint but this has not prevented him from being objective. He has included several chapters as well as an appendix on Federal strategy which enables the reader to be aware of the entire military situation at all times. The most important effect of Jackson's campaign was that Union troops at Fredericksburg under General McDowell were sent to the Shenandoah Valley in a vain attempt to defeat Jackson instead of completing their primary mission (i.e. to join McClellan's Army of the Potomac near Richmond). The reason that is usually given for this is that Lincoln panicked and feared an attack on Washington by the Valley Army. That was not the case. The reader is told almost to the point of redundancy that Lincoln did not panic and that...