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BOOK REVIEWS365 empire (limited success at first, but failure after 1865), the empress's desperate mission to Europe (failure), and the final Franco-American "promotion of abdication." Imperial relations with the United States constituted a major, and unresolved, problem for Maximilian. In fact, some of Blumberg's most interesting chapters deal with the astute diplomacy of Secretary of State William Seward. As the author notes, "It is part of the genius of Seward 's policy that he managed to delude the imperialists into thinking that he was secretly sympathetic to them, almost to the very moment when he sprang the trap and revealed openly his willingness to use force to restore the Mexican Republic." He shows that Seward maneuvered the French into cooperating with the United States, thus giving them a face-saving exit from an embarrassing situation. Professor Blumberg concludes that one of Maximilian's most serious mistakes was his failure to negotiate an alliance with the Confederate States of America. This is an interesting conjecture, but this reviewer believes that Maximilian 's only real hope for survival lay in an accommodation with the United States. A Confederate alliance would have prevented any such occurance, even if Maximilian could have completely defeated Benito Juárez and the Republicans. And, if the United States had gone to war to defeat a Confederate ally, Mexico would probably be smaller today. There is one important deficiency in this work, and that is in the coverage of Benito Juárez and the Republican forces. Professor Blumberg does not say very much about these opponents of Maximilian. Throughout the book they lurk in the shadows and only emerge in the final sweep to victory. The author does discuss Maximilian's failure to mobilize internal support, but he tends to ignore the support for, and the activities of, the Juáristas. Professor Blumberg's research efforts can be classified as almost exhaustive . In addition to the State Department archives, he has utilized archival material from Austria, Germany, Italy, Belgium, England, Mexico, and other countries. The result is a valuable contribution to the history of Mexico and United States foreign relations during the 1860's, and one which will necessitate a change in some interpretations of the imperial period. Robert Freeman Smith University of Toledo The Impeachment and Trial of Andrew Johnson. By Michael Les Benedict . (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1973. Pp. x, 212. $2.45.) In this new addition to the Norton Essays in American History, Michael Les Benedict seeks to reassess his subject in the light of modern theories on Reconstruction. Calling the impeachment of Andrew Johnson the only event that has "resisted" the general historical reversal concerning the post-war era, he attempts to correct the alleged misconceptions of the past by approaching the issue from a revisionist point of 366CIVIL WAR HISTORY view. Not only does he agree with the radical Republicans' theory of the propriety of impeachment for non-indictable offenses, but he also sympathizes with their insistence upon the political as distinct from the legal nature of impeachment. Thus he concludes that the radicals were fully justified in seeking Johnson's ouster, partially because he had blocked Republican policies in the South and partially because, by dismissing the Secretary of War, he had violated the law. In addition, the author insists that the votes of those senators favoring acquittal were as politically motivated as those of their opponents. Professor Benedict's approach is challenging. Whatever may be thought of his conclusions, he has given us a most stimulating account of the impeachment, the trial, and the events leading up to it. Neither his impressive legal scholarship nor his familiarity with quantitative methods mars his lively style, and many of his points are well taken. It is doubtless true that Republicans treated Johnson with great indulgence . Again and again Congress offered him a way out of his difficulties; again and again he refused to accept any kind of compromise . It is also a matter of record that the moderates, whom the author calls conservatives, were generally in control of their party, although they were often goaded on by their more radical colleagues. Finally, it is certainly a fact that...

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