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364CIVIL WAR history "aroused in Lincoln a new interest in politics" is controverted by Lincoln 's own actions, especially his meeting with Richard Yates at the train depot in Jacksonville, Illinois on August 9, 1854 to talk about Yates' running for re-election to the Congress, marking Lincoln's reentry into politics. It is also disproved by Lincoln's own written statement in 1860: "In 1854 his [Lincoln's] profession had almost superseded the thought of politics in the mind, when the repeal of the Missouri Compromise aroused him as he had never been before," a kind of conversion experience found in new determination and power, I would suggest. To say that "1858 was the year of a [Republican] party looking for a principle" (p. 155) is to miss the very important fact that a principle was present at the birth of that party, outside of Illinois as well, as early as 1854, if not, certainly by 1856. Did Lincoln "steadily, earnestly, and eloquently" oppose efforts to restore national harmony? "Was Lincoln . . . making the sectional difficulties more difficult, helping make the Civil War certain, in order to win elections?" (p. 170) is the kind of question that cannot be answered and indeed is not here. Surely this work is another contribution to Lincolniana but it could have been more "new" than it is. Nevertheless, the subject of Lincoln and the politics of slavery is still worthy of careful consideration. Ronald D. Rietveld California State University, Fullerton The Diplomacy of the Mexican Empire, 1863-1867. By Arnold Blumberg . (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1971. Pp. 152. $5.00.) Professor Arnold Blumberg of Towson State College has written what can be legitimately called the "definitive history" of the Mexican Empire . In this extensively-researched and detailed volume, Professor Blumberg clearly proves that the ill-fated empire of Ferdinand Maximilian had an authentic, independent existence, and that it was not a French puppet-regime. One of his major conclusions is that Maximilian's efforts to achieve true independence may have helped to destroy his empire by alienating European support. The volume begins with the triumph of the French Army in 1863, and concludes with the execution of the Emperor in 1867. In between, Professor Blumberg describes a number of diplomatic campaigns as well as the activity of the foreign diplomatic corps in Mexico. Some of the more important episodes covered are the attempts of Maximilian to secure a firm agreement for French economic and military support (a tailure), the problem of Maximilian's renunciation of claims to the Habsburg crown, the efforts to secure foreign recognition (generally successful in Europe), the attempt to negotiate a concordat with the Vatican (failure), the problem of recruiting a foreign army for the BOOK REVIEWS365 empire (limited success at first, but failure after 1865), the empress's desperate mission to Europe (failure), and the final Franco-American "promotion of abdication." Imperial relations with the United States constituted a major, and unresolved, problem for Maximilian. In fact, some of Blumberg's most interesting chapters deal with the astute diplomacy of Secretary of State William Seward. As the author notes, "It is part of the genius of Seward 's policy that he managed to delude the imperialists into thinking that he was secretly sympathetic to them, almost to the very moment when he sprang the trap and revealed openly his willingness to use force to restore the Mexican Republic." He shows that Seward maneuvered the French into cooperating with the United States, thus giving them a face-saving exit from an embarrassing situation. Professor Blumberg concludes that one of Maximilian's most serious mistakes was his failure to negotiate an alliance with the Confederate States of America. This is an interesting conjecture, but this reviewer believes that Maximilian 's only real hope for survival lay in an accommodation with the United States. A Confederate alliance would have prevented any such occurance, even if Maximilian could have completely defeated Benito Juárez and the Republicans. And, if the United States had gone to war to defeat a Confederate ally, Mexico would probably be smaller today. There is one important deficiency in this work, and that is in the coverage of Benito...

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