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368CIVIL WAR HISTORY deUvery of such an order is questionable, and certainly, if one was issued, Lee changed it in conformity with existing conditions. McLaws pointed out that the so-called delay occurred under Lee's supervision and that Round Top could hardly have been seized at any time witiiout a desperate struggle. The key to such an attack was the completion of a reconnaissance by Captain Johnston. Tucker concludes that actually Lee "expected too much of Longstreet's two divisions" on the second day. In examining the two Confederate battle plans and citing numerous military historians and experts, Tucker asserts that Longstreet's strategy of interposing the southern army between the Union forces and Washington was the superior one, while Lee's assumption of the tactical offensive was a serious mistake. In not taking into account the changing technology of warfare, the decision to make Pickett's charge was disastrous. For Tucker, the reason why Lee chose to attack an impregnable position remains an enigma. Criticism in the book is reserved chiefly for Jeb Stuart, Jubal Early, and Ewell. Stuarts failure to provide Lee with inteIUgence left him to grope blindly at Gettysburg, and it was "perhaps the most significant factor" in the defeat. Early is also taken to task for allowing the moment to seize Cemetery Hill to sh'p from his grasp. Lee is faulted for exercising too much mildness and consideration in his handling of both Early and Ewell. However, the author's characterization of Ewell seems to this reviewer to be a Uttle too harsh in context with Milroy's defeat at Winchester, and a more direct examination of the reorganization of the Confederate army following Chancellorsville might have added to the study. Tucker's treatment of the many facets and questions of the campaign from Lee's loss of "equipoise" to General Armistead's last words is done with remarkable insight. The various sketches of Confederate commanders contribute to understanding the interaction of the southern command at Gettysburg . One minor criticism might be directed toward some of the book's digressions which, even though they add charm, do not always contribute to its content. The case for Longstreet is well made and adds a better perspective to this general's military standing. The book is certainly an excellent supplement to the author's earUer work, High Tide at Gettysburg, and is a notable addition to the campaign's Uterature. Richard R. Duncan Georgetown University Before and After: Or, The Relations of the Races at the South. By Isaac DuBose Seabrook. Edited by John Hammond Moore. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967. Pp. vĂ¼, 157. $5.50.) Isaac DuBose Seabrook (1855-1929) was a landless, intellectual son of an established South Carolina family, who, after graduating from Sewanee, taught school, sold books and did clerical work. In 1895, while employed as clerk in a Charleston hotel, he composed an essay on the problems of race ROOK RLVIIiWS369 in die South. In it he discussed the reasons and remedies for the racial tensions then at a new high in Soutii CaroUna. After Seabrook's death the unpubUshed booklet was found among his possessions, and since 1946 has rested in the South Carolina Library, where occasional scholars have read it. Seabrook's ideas were an inconsistent blend of southern aristocratic conservatism , intellectual Uberalism and New South economics. Starting from the premise that the government of the people should be by all the people, white and black, he blamed the slavery background for the current racial friction. Slavery had made whites assertive and blacks subservient, and it had prevented diversification of the southern economy. Because freed Negroes and white laborers competed for jobs, neither blacks nor whites could progress. A diversified economy would help eliminate friction, according to Seabrook, and would enable blacks to make more money, buy more property, get more education and care more about poUtical affairs. New jobs would challenge them to higher educational levels and property would assure their poUtical responsibibty and reduce their social amoraUty. Time, of course, would be a major ingredient—probably a century or more. But if blacks were kept in contact with whites, if no artificial barriers were...


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