In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

ROOK REVIEWS367 in post-emancipation Ireland. He finds it equally lamentable that Ireland did not possess a leader of the caUber of Daniel O'Connell who could have rendered articulate and valuable expression to such complex issues as slavery. The author does feel, however, that the tiny band of radical unionists had the more positive grasp of the O'Connellite vision of the 1840's, particularly insofar as they affirmed the uses and appUcation of power in achieving needed social reform, as in the instance of aboUtion. Gladstone and Acton merit special mention for having remained consistent in their actions even in later years when men Uke John Bright and others took an entirely different tack on the subject of the Irish Home Rule Bill. In conclusion, the influence of Irish-Americans upon nationaUst opinion in Ireland was significant on such subjects as slavery and Anglo-American relations. But there was no common appreciation of views on the topic of southern secession between native Irishmen and Irish-Americans largely because the latter thought of themselves primarily as Americans and subsequently viewed the issues from that perspective. Professor Hernon provides a brief but helpful bibUographical essay and a good index. Manuscript sources are extensive and the newspapers utiUzed for this study are widely representative. Also, the published primary and secondary materials cited are very nearly exhaustive in scope for this subject. Having disclaimed in the preface any pretense at statistical sophistication, Hernon ably supports his thesis and the product of his efforts has contributed richly to the Uterature of both die American Civil War and nineteentii-century Irish history. Thomas E. Hachey Marquette University Lee and Longstreet at Gettysburg. By Glenn Tucker. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-MerrĂ¼l, 1968. Pp. xi, 286. $6.00. ) The Gettysburg campaign has long fascinated historians and readers, and the Ust of pubUcations continues to grow endlessly. Most of them are merely reiterations of accepted opinions, but with Lee and Longstreet at Gettysburg Glenn Tucker offers a refreshing challenge to some of the older and more orthodox premises in examining the causes for the Confederate defeat. Much of the book deals with a reassessment of Longstreet's role at Gettysburg, the "sunrise attack order," and the contrasting battle plans of Lee and Longstreet. In analyzing the history of the charge against Longstreet for failing to attack at sunrise, Tucker points out that it was not put forth until after Lee's death. Previously, commanders such as Jeb Stuart had been cited for the failure of the campaign, but later, Jubal Early and others, for personal and poUtical reasons, shifted much of the blame to Longstreet. The charge was that his delay was costly and his reluctance to order Pickett's charge on the third day infectious. Tucker, in utiUzing die generally neglected papers and opinions of Major General Lafayette McLaws as well as other sources, feels that the actual 368CIVIL WAR HISTORY deUvery of such an order is questionable, and certainly, if one was issued, Lee changed it in conformity with existing conditions. McLaws pointed out that the so-called delay occurred under Lee's supervision and that Round Top could hardly have been seized at any time witiiout a desperate struggle. The key to such an attack was the completion of a reconnaissance by Captain Johnston. Tucker concludes that actually Lee "expected too much of Longstreet's two divisions" on the second day. In examining the two Confederate battle plans and citing numerous military historians and experts, Tucker asserts that Longstreet's strategy of interposing the southern army between the Union forces and Washington was the superior one, while Lee's assumption of the tactical offensive was a serious mistake. In not taking into account the changing technology of warfare, the decision to make Pickett's charge was disastrous. For Tucker, the reason why Lee chose to attack an impregnable position remains an enigma. Criticism in the book is reserved chiefly for Jeb Stuart, Jubal Early, and Ewell. Stuarts failure to provide Lee with inteIUgence left him to grope blindly at Gettysburg, and it was "perhaps the most significant factor" in the defeat. Early is also taken to task for allowing the moment to seize Cemetery Hill...


Additional Information

Print ISSN
pp. 367-368
Launched on MUSE
Open Access
Back To Top

This website uses cookies to ensure you get the best experience on our website. Without cookies your experience may not be seamless.