"Things like truths, well feigned": Mimesis And Secrecy in Jonson's Epicoene

"Things like truths, well feigned": Mimesis And Secrecy in Jonsons Epicoene Reuben Sanchez i In TheLightin Troy,Thomas M. Greene takes as his subject"the literary uses of imitatio during the Renaissance," but emphasizes as well that these "uses" extended beyond the literary to many other areas ofeducational , aesthetic, artistic, and political expression.1 We do not know why imitatio, known as mimesis to the Greeks, became so pervasive, nor do we know why it eventually faded in significance, but we do know that it remained in Ben Jonsons time a central concern for theorists and artists alike.2 For example,the significance ofimitatiomaybe seen most clearly in a play like Jonsons Epicoene, or the Silent Woman (first performed December 1609 or January 1610); from start to finish it is, after all, a play about imitation, and it is difficult to believe Jonson does not intend to offer a critique of imitatio via this problem play. On the one hand, he is in keeping with the dominant precept of his age. On the other hand, he intentionally and paradoxically uses that precept as avenue andobstacle to understanding.Jonsons critique ofimitatiois given itsvitalitybymeans ofhis understanding ofthe Renaissance concept of secrecy. By combining imitatioand secrecy,Jonson at once acknowledges his debt toAristotle and Sidneyand yet, as artist and theorist, avoids relying too heavilyupon them.3 Jonson, of course, recognizes and appreciates what Aristotle and Sidneymeant by imitation,but the manner in which he practices that art exhibits his independence from both, and therefore his interest in originality .After all, in Discoverieshe contends that one must remain vigilant regarding the dangers of imitation: 313 314Comparative Drama Nothing is more ridiculous than to make an author a dictator, as the Schools have done Aristotle. The damage is infinite knowledge receives by it; for to many things a man should owe but a temporary belief, and a suspension ofhis own judgement, not an absolute resignation ofhimself, or a perpetual captivity. Let Aristotle and others have their dues, but ifwe can make farther discoveries of truth and fitness than they, why are we envied? Let us beware, while we strive to add, we do not diminish, or deface; we may improve, but not augment.4 Jonson strikes a balance between a recognized poetics and one's own attempt at "discoveries," strikes a balance, that is, between what Greene calls the"opposition originality/imitation."5WhileJonson acknowledges that one might learn from, add to, or improve upon Aristotle, he departs from Aristotle where he practices the art of imitation in Epicoene by presenting a patently false "speaking picture." Though the Latin term imitatio was dominant during the Renaissance , Jonson prefers the Greek mimesis-, further, Jonson is not as interested in relying upon Juan Luis Vives or Roger Ascham, two of the better- known theorists regarding imitation, as he is in relying upon Aristotle. In the Poetics, Aristotle defines mimesis as the imitation of three different types ofhuman action, or praxis: the imitation ofthinking (as in dialogue and soliloquy),the imitation ofphysical actions leading to a spécifie result, and the imitation ofgenre and form.The first two types constitute the formal causes ofpoetry. But Renaissance humanists also believed that because it imitates rhetorical models, the third type of imitation could be considered rhetorical imitatio, the final cause ofpoetry . In The Defense ofPoesy, Sidney alludes to both the formal and the final causes of poetry: "Poesy therefore is an art of imitation, for so Aristotle termeth it in the word mimesis—that is to say, a representing, counterfeiting, or figuring forth—to speak metaphorically, a speaking picture—with this end, to teach and delight."6 Like Sidney, Jonson believes that mimesis can be an aid to, or adjunct of, rhetoric, and therefore that the causes ofpoetry can be both formal and final. Although he differentiates between "poesy," "poem," and "poet," he seems to validate Aristotle's definition of mimesis as well as Sidney's reading ofAristotle. "Poetry and picture are arts of like nature," Jonson argues in Discoveries , "and both are busy about imitation" (561). In his list of the "requisites " of a poet, Jonson describes the third as rhetorical imitatio, or the Reuben Sanchez315 imitation offorms used by...