Arkansas and the Vicksburg Campaign

Dr. Scroggs is Professer of History at North Texas State College and a member of the board of editors of the "Historian." Mr. Reynolds is Assistant Professor of History at Decatur Baptist College. Arkansas and the Vicksburg Campaign JACK B. SCROGGS and DONALD E. REYNOLDS although historians have long recognized the significance of the faU of Vicksburg in 1863, the role of the Trans-Mississippi West in this campaign has been largely ignored. Striking deep into Confederate territory, Grant on this campaign was dependent upon a lengthy Mississippi River supply line, which Confederate raiders from Arkansas should have been able to cut. The faüure of the Confederacy to initiate any such raiding actions serves to illustrate basic weaknesses in the Southern command structure, particularly in the organization of Confederate command in the West. Until the Union commander was able to cut his own supply lines and live off the land, nearly five months after the second phase of the campaign began, the serpentine Mississippi served as his only reliable means of supply. The opportunity to destroy transports passing down the river to the dependent army below was at least as great as that so successfully utilized earlier by Generals Nathan Bedford Forrest and Earl Van Dorn, who had completely foiled the first plan to take Vicksburg from the east. The western or Arkansas bank of the river was the only practical position for launching such an attack, for the greater height there would permit the establishment of artillery positions able to command the entire width of the river. Also, the streams flowing into the Mississippi from the west, or at least those above Arkansas City, adjoined the river at fairly large angles, whereas the tributary streams on the east ran parallel to the river, creating formidable obstacles for a raiding party approaching from that direction. In the last analysis, the chief responsibility for the failure to utilize this opportunity must be 390 attributed to the equivocation of the commanding officer of the Department of Arkansas, Lieutenant General Theophüus H. Holmes, and the inabüity of the departments involved to co-operate. General Holmes was completely independent of General John C. Pemberton, who commanded at Vicksburg, and was little disposed to co-operate with him, a common faüure in the Southern command system . Recognizing this weakness, President Davis sought to effect a closer liaison between the departments. In late December, 1862, just as Union forces were preparing for a Christmas attack upon the bluffs north of Vicksburg, Davis reminded Holmes of the vast importance of Vicksburg to the South, and told him of an impending Federal attack upon it. Davis noted that he had requested Holmes to co-operate with the Vicksburg commander before, but Holmes had not complied. In outlining the government's policy with regard to the defense of Vicksburg , the President discounted the possibüity of using mobüe raiding parties on the Mississippi when he pointed out that, although he recognized the great value of fortifications on the west side of the river, he thought that the Confederates should rely mainly on defenses at Vicksburg and Port Hudson.1 The Confederate commander at Vicksburg apparently agreed with Davis on the strategy of making Vicksburg and Port Hudson the focal points of operations. Pemberton knew well in advance of the impending Union move down the Mississippi, and as Davis' letter to Hohnes indicates the campaign had been expected for some time. Consequently, the whole area of Federal operations on the road to Vicksburg was wellcovered by Confederate spies.2 Instead of considering a transfer of artillery to Arkansas, which after all was in another department, Pemberton directed his complete attention to the reinforcement of Vicksburg itself, in accordance with the President's statement of policy. General Joseph E. Johnston, over-all commander in Mississippi, also approved of Davis' plan to defend Vicksburg by concentrating troops in the vicinity of that city. He told the President that he had ordered 18,000 troops east of the Mississippi, 9,000 from Louisiana and the same number from Holmes's command: I firmly believe . . . that our true system of warfare would be to concentrate the forces of the...