In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

[ 6 ] asia policy “East Asia remains the world’s most rapidly developing region and one in which the United States continues to enjoy a residue of goodwill and potential for mutually beneficial partnership. For the new administration to fail to build on these forces, and thereby fail to reverse recent negative trends, would be to squander a powerful opportunity.” • Unbungle East Asia T.J. Pempel The incoming administration is in danger of being swamped by the monumental catalogue of problems created by or left unresolved by the Bush regime. Two wars in the Middle East are draining two billion dollars per week from the U.S. Treasury. An international economic recession tied to the collapse of the U.S. housing market and the lack of economic regulation over hedge funds and derivatives demands sweeping and coordinated attention by global financial institutions. Inattention to the escalating problem of global warming threatens to choke off long-term growth prospects. And a cratering of global respect for the United States undermines the hard-won goodwill that long allowed others to cut the United States a bit of tolerant slack for past foibles. With the possible exception of the North Korean nuclear problem and the six-party talks, few Asian issues demand inclusion on any responsibly constructed list of the five most pressing problems for the new administration. The danger is that East Asia could be relegated to the back burner of policymaking as a new administration scrambles to put out a host of non-Asian conflagrations. Yet the Bush administration bungled Asia in numerous ways and the new administration would be mistaken if it did not make a major effort at “unbungling.” The most immediately pressing issue in Asia is the nuclear situation in the DPRK. At the moment, a deal seems to be in place through the sixparty process that, while far from achieving all U.S. goals, has at least led to the shuttering and global inspection of the DPRK’s plutonium facilities. Still, numerous steps must be taken for satisfactory resolution of the current crisis. Of most immediate concern is tackling any possible nuclear program involving highly enriched uranium (HEU) as well as the surrender of the t.j. pempel is Professor of Political Science at the University of California–Berkeley. He can be reached at . [ 7 ] special roundtable • advising the new u.s. president DPRK’s current arsenal of fissile material. Lurking in the background are additionally nettlesome issues involving nuclear proliferation, Japanese abductees, the DPRK’s extensive missile program, and ultimately steps to help the DPRK overcome its dreadful economic isolation and the poverty of its citizens. Serious attention to the Korean Peninsula will be essential. Three deeper structural problems created by the Bush administration are less likely to command immediate attention: (1) the recent U.S. reliance on military approaches to virtually all East Asian problems, (2) the dreadful mismanagement of the U.S. domestic economy and the consequent surrender of what had long been one of the United States’ greatest assets in dealing with an economically self-conscious Asia, and (3) U.S. unilateralism and the failure to integrate with East Asia’s rising regionalism. If these issues are not addressed, the poisons spawned by all three could metastasize across the region and dramatically weaken long-term U.S. influence in East Asia. U.S. military prowess has long been a critical stabilizer in East Asia. But it is time to return to a more nuanced mix of policy tools compatible with the complexity of the problems faced across East Asia. The United States has advanced its war on terrorism across Southeast Asia while gutting public diplomacy, foreign aid, economic linkages, pandemic assistance, and other non-military policy instruments. Japan has been pressed to enhance military cooperation with the United States with seemingly no sensitivity to the reality that a militarily-bolstered Japan is more often seen by other Asian countries as a threat, not a stabilizer. The Bush administration’s excessively military approach to the DPRK cost the United States and the rest of Asia several years of potentially beneficial negotiating time and has left the DPRK with substantially more fissile material and nuclear muscle...

pdf

Share