Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: A New Look at the Militancy-Madrasah Connection

© The National Bureau of Asian Research, Seattle, Washington C. Christine Fair is a senior research associate in the Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), where she specializes in South Asian political and military affairs. She is available at . Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: A New Look at the Militancy-Madrasah Connection C. Christine Fair asia policy, number 4 (july 2007), 107–134 • http://asiapolicy.nbr.org • Note u This presentation is drawn from a forthcoming monograph by the author that explores the connections between education and militancy in Pakistan, to be published by USIP Press in late 2007. The author is grateful to Vali Nasr, as well as to the two anonymous reviewers who provided very useful feedback on earlier versions of this draft. The views expressed here do not represent those of the United States Institute of Peace. keywords: pakistan; terrorism; militancy; madaris; u.s. policy executive summary asia policy This study presents a new framework to exposit the connections between Pakistan’s religious schools (madaris) and militancy in Pakistan and beyond. main argument Contrary to popular belief, madrasah students are not all poor and madaris are not categorically tied to militancy. Madaris—along with mosques and public proselytizing events (tabligh)—are, however, “gathering” places where militant groups, religious ideologues, and potential recruits can interact. Religious leaders of some madaris issue edicts (fatwas) that justify the use of violence, and a small number of madaris are used for militant training. Limited evidence suggests that madrasah students more strongly support jihad than those of public or private schools—but public school students, who comprise 70% of Pakistan’s enrolled students, also have high levels of support for violence. policy implications • With respect to intelligence collection and analysis, asking whether or not madaris produce militants is the wrong question. Querying the educational and other characteristics of key tanzeem (militant group) operatives, while keeping in mind the impacts of group efforts to select for desired skills and capabilities, will inform counterterrorism efforts more effectively. • A number of implications are pertinent to U.S. policy toward Pakistan and the threat posed by Pakistan-based terrorism to U.S. interests: - The U.S. can act unilaterally against known militant madaris only at great cost to other objectives (e.g., Musharraf’s safety); Pakistan will cooperate in this regard only with varying degrees of commitment, limited capability, and diminished respect for rule of law and human rights. - Pakistan’s entire education system requires comprehensive reform; such reform may be beyond Pakistan’s capability and there may be only limited scope for the United States to help. Increased participation by multinational organizations and demand for accountability by all partners are required to complete this daunting task. The costs of failure are too high to countenance. - Because efforts to restrict the supply of terrorism have rapidly diminishing margins of return, interventions to reduce demand for terrorism are needed. - Madaris merit continual observation as they may contribute both to the demand for terrorism and to the limited supply of militants. For the same reasons, Pakistan’s public school sector deserves much more attention than it currently enjoys. [ 109 ] fair • militant recruitment in pakistan Ever since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Pakistan’s madaris (pl. of madrasah or “seminary”) have attracted the attention of policymakers in the United States and elsewhere. Pakistan’s madaris are posited both to be incubators of militants in Pakistan and to be responsible for creating communities of support for militancy in Pakistan, South Asia, and beyond. Consequently, the United States and other countries have strongly encouraged Pakistan’s president, General Pervez Musharraf, to reform these institutions and close down those madaris for which there is evidence of links to militant groups, or tanzeems as they are known in Pakistan. Consonant with the perceived threat posed by these religious schools, the popular,academic,andpolicyliteraturesonPakistan’smadarishaveexpanded. Theseanalyseshaveproducedcontradictoryfindings.Whileseveralprominent authors have argued that madaris are critical to militant production in the region and beyond, others have cast doubt upon these claims, noting that few known militants have had madrasah backgrounds. This essay argues that the extant literature likely has overestimated some risks associated with Pakistan’s seminaries while...