(K)not Yet Untied: Comments on Richard Bush's Untying the Knot

[ 110 ] asia policy (K)not Yet Untied: Comments on Richard Bush’s Untying the Knot Allen Carlson Richard Bush, who served as the acting director of the American Institute in Taiwan from 1997 to 2002, is one of America’s most experienced observers of Taiwanese politics. His new book, Untying the Knot, clearly reflects such expertise, and forwards a timely, comprehensive, and fairly wellbalanced account of the evolution of contemporary cross-Strait relations. The book makes two main contributions to the already vast literature on this potentially explosive relationship. First, Bush attempts to explain the tenacity of conflict across the Taiwan Strait. As an initial step, he identifies sovereignty and security as forming the interlocking core of the conflictual relationship between Beijing and Taipei. He then calls attention to three “aggravating” factors—domestic politics, the decisionmaking process, and leverage-seeking—that have made this volatile situation even more intractable. As a second contribution, Bush suggests a set of policy measures that, if enacted, would be conducive to lessening tensions and reducing the chances of outright military conflict across the Taiwan Strait. More specifically, he recommends that Beijing move beyond the “one country, two systems” formula. Taipei is encouraged not only to refrain from pushing Beijing into a corner (via formal measures to declare Taiwan’s independence) but also to strengthen Taiwan’s own status both at home and abroad in order to maintain its negotiating position vis-à-vis the mainland. Finally, Washington is called upon to help facilitate dialogue between the two sides, though without operating as a direct intermediary. On both of these scores, Richard Bush’s analysis is generally accurate and illuminating. He is clearly an informed observer of cross-Strait relations, and his book will quickly become required reading for all those with an interest in the tenuous relationship that exists across the Taiwan Strait. Illuminating Post-2004 Legislative Yuan Cross-Strait Relations Especially impressive is the extent to which Bush’s main arguments are consistent with the developments that have taken place in cross-Strait Allen Carlson is an assistant professor in Cornell University’s Government Department. He is also a participant in the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations’ Public Intellectuals Program. His book, Unifying China, Integrating with the World: Securing Chinese Sovereignty in the Reform Era, was published by Stanford University Press in 2005. He can be reached at . [ 111 ] book review roundtable • untying the knot relations since Taiwan’s 2004 Legislative Yuan election. Analysts on both sides of the Taiwan Strait (and in Washington) widely expected Chen Shui-bian’s narrow re-elect­ion to the presidency in the spring of 2004 to augur well for his Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) prospects in the legislative contest. Some even felt that the DPP would capture a majority in the island’s legislative branch. In anticipation of Chen utilizing such an electoral outcome to further cement Taiwan’s independence, analysts also predicted a further worsening of the relationship between Beijing and Taipei. When, to the surprise of most observers, this outcome did not come to pass, leaders in both Taipei and Beijing were faced with a major shift in Taiwan’s domestic political situation: the apparent waning of DPP influence. These leaders were also presented with an unexpected opportunity to re-orient cross-Strait relations away from the increasingly confrontational rhetoric and policy positioning that had defined the relationship during much of 2004. For many of the reasons Richard Bush has identified, neither side effectively seized this opportunity. The main players in both Beijing and Taipei failed to address the central issues of security and sovereignty. Instead, China’s leaders looked to take advantage of the DPP’s weakened political position by extending invitations to visit the mainland to Taiwan’s most prominent opposition leaders—the Kuomintang’s Lien Chan and, subsequently, the People First Party’s James Song. When both Lien and Song accepted these invitations (in the hope of strengthening their own reputations), the resulting visits made for great photo opportunities for Beijing. Not surprisingly, however, these visits produced little in the way of substantive results. All the more disappointing was that this outcome effectively stifled what might have been the...