International Jihad and Muslim Radicalism in Thailand?: Toward an Alternative Interpretation

© The National Bureau of Asian Research, Seattle, Washington Joseph Chinyong Liow is Assistant Professor, the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He can be reached at . Note • The author would like to thank M. Ladd Thomas, Sheldon Simon, and the anonymous reviewers for their feedback and comments on an earlier draft of this paper. This project received valuable assistance from Saroja Dorairajoo, Chaiwat Satha-Anand, Anthony Davis, Don Pathan, Ahmad Somboon Bualuang, Panitan Wattanayagorn, Surat Horachaikul, Kavi Chongkittavorn, as well as others from the Thai intelligence establishment and the Malay-Muslim community who have requested to remain anonymous. Parts of this article were based on research conducted under the auspices of a project generously supported by the East-West Center, Washington, D.C. International Jihad and Muslim Radicalism in Thailand? Toward an Alternative Interpretation Joseph Chinyong Liow asia policy, number 2 (july 2006), 89–108 research note [ 90 ] executive summary asia policy This research note explores the extent to which radical Islamic ideology— particularly as linked to a wider international movement—is responsible for recent violence in southern Thailand. main argument Though the conflict in southern Thailand is becoming increasingly colored by religion, there is scant evidence to suggest links either to any radical Islamic ideology that exhibits links to pan-Islamism or to broader global jihadi terrorism and violence. The conflict in southern Thailand remains rooted not only in the political ideology of Malay-Muslim nationalism and separatism but also in the state’s misguided policies to deal with the violence. policy implications • U.S. policymakers must be careful not to conflate the ongoing violence in southern Thailand with global terrorism as there is currently no convincing evidence that the separatist struggle has been subsumed into a larger global jihad. • Because the nature of violence in southern Thailand is primarily rooted in local grievances rather than radical Islamist ideology, Washington and Bangkok would benefit from taking concrete steps to identify and address these local grievances. • In order to avoid further radicalizing Malay-Muslims—and thereby render them more susceptible to the appeal of violence and militancy—Bangkok must mitigate both tactical and public relations disasters (such as those at Krisek and Tak Bai) and state-sanctioned acts of injustice. [ 91 ] liow • muslim radicalism in thailand? Ever since January 4, 2004, when Malay-Muslim militants mounted a raid of an army camp in Narathiwat province, violence has become an almost daily affair in southern Thailand and has accounted for close to 2,000 casualties, more than half of which have been deaths. According to some observers, attacks have taken place in some 20–30% of all southern Thai villages and towns. These alarming casualty figures indicate that violence has intensified—even as the identities of the perpetrators remain for the most part shrouded in mystery. Indications suggest that what is being witnessed today heralds the emergence of a new phenomenon in the conflict in southern Thailand. For one, the almost routine targeting of civilians was unheard of even during the previous peak of separatist violence in the 1970s. Tactics have also transformed from rural-based guerrilla skirmishes to bombings in urban centers. Finally, while traditionally confined to the Malay-Muslim provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, violence has gradually expanded northwards, prompting the Thaksin administration to extend controversial emergency legislation into Songkhla province as well. Inattemptingtoexplainthisdisturbingupsurgeinviolence,theprevailing tendency in many quarters has been to view southern Thailand as yet another manifestation of the nebulous international jihadi movement. Reports have surfaced that videos and training manuals filmed in Chechnya and Talibanruled Afghanistan are being found both in religious schools and in residences of local religious teachers. Images of the violence in southern Thailand have appeared on international jihadi websites. In June 2003 several alleged Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) members were arrested in Thailand. In August, Thai authorities arrested JI operations chief Riduan Hishamuddin (also known as Hambali) in Ayutthaya en route to Bangkok. Such revelations have fanned speculation that the international jihad had arrived on Thailand’s shores. This research note attempts to question prevailing perceptions of the violence, in particular the prevalent view that this violence is part and parcel of a global jihad. This essay argues...