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
Notes on Panofsky, Cassirer, and the "Medium of the Movies"

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NOTES ON PANOFSKY, CASSIRER,
AND THE "MEDIUM OF THE MOVIES"

THE MODESTY of my title is not feigned. Panofsky's essay on "Style and Medium in the Motion Pictures"¹ is more often quoted than understood, and much of it proves upon examination to be curiously elusive. The notes and hypotheses offered here are tentative ones, meant only to point us in the direction of answers to two questions. How might Panofsky's well-known formulation ("the medium of the movies is physical reality as such") most usefully be construed?—useful for us as viewers and then perhaps as critics of movies. And what might he plausibly be supposed to have intended? It is to be hoped that these two points are not impossibly remote from one another.

I

In a recent discussion of "Fact and Fiction in Literature," Roger Shattuck takes Panofsky's essay as an extreme instance of a "belief in the basically documentary nature of film."² According to Shattuck, Panofsky supposes that a "film grows naturally out of material things," that it is generated spontaneously, without the intervention of authorial consciousness, from the "undifferentiated reality" before which a camera needs only to be set in motion. Now this is a familiar enough parody of "realist" theories of cinema. But it would be a curious position for anyone really to assert, and particularly curious for a writer so committed as Panofsky to idealist aesthetics. There is, to be sure, a puzzle about the way such an aesthetic might take account of an art that is said somehow to "do justice" to a materialistic interpretation of the world (p. 31). (We would presumably want to know if the justice in question is distributive or commutative: rendering unto Caesar or robbing Peter to pay Paul?) But does a disciple of Cassirer really need to be lectured at about the priority of the whole to the parts, or to be informed that what we call "reality" is constituted in the act of perception? There

are confusions enough in Shattuck's essay to suggest that he is not our best guide over an admittedly strenuous terrain. He informs his readers that Panofsky (and apparently Bazin and Kracauer too) "anticipate" the views of "many structuralists and semioticians," as if there were not a fundamental difference between the autonomy of *écriture* and the "animistic" view of physical reality Shattuck attributes to Panofsky and his followers. He then introduces a distinction between documentary and fiction films that makes Panofsky the prophet of Warhol, Wiseman, and South American snuff-films, when in fact he talks about Disney, the Marx Brothers, and the derivation of movies from comic strips and dime novels.

All this is worth bringing up because Shattuck does raise some crucial issues, if only by so noticeably fudging them. Like most of us who have responded to Panofsky's essay, he has chiefly in mind the assertion that "the medium of the movies is physical reality as such" (p. 31). He wants to construe this as saying that movies "document" or certify the world of external objects and thereby encourage certain sorts of naiveté: the belief that we are secure in our knowledge of the world "out there," and that the world really is "out there," independent of our hypotheses and untainted by our uncomfortable consciousness. That movies have often fueled some such nostalgia for the world seems undeniable,³ but the question elided in Shattuck's discussion is the critical one. To what extent and in what ways does a statement about the "medium" of the movies commit us to a position as to their proper content, or to a specific social program, or to a particular metaphysical understanding of the world? Shattuck cuts through these knotty matters rather than unraveling them. He talks as if Panofsky claims that physical reality as such is the *subject matter* of movies—which is where Warhol and *cinéma vérité* come in, as the inheritors of the tradition of Balzac. But this is not what Panofsky says, and it does not accurately describe the parameters of his taste. He objects to "artistic prestylization" in the manner of *Caligari*, and he thinks Max Reinhardt's *A Midsummer Night's Dream* was unfortunate. But he embraces Eisenstein as well as Keaton; and I hope I will be able to show that he would not—any more than Bazin—regard Welles's Shakespearean films as less "cinematic" than (say) *Nanook of the North*.

Propositions about a "medium" are useful for tasks quite different from those about messages or subject matter. The first explain how we go about responding to any text whatever; the second paraphrase the intentions of particular artists, schools, or movements. The one is theoretical, the other historical. In confusing them, Shattuck gets Panofsky wrong and impoverishes our sense of the ways film may in fact be able to document the world. If Balzac thought he was to

be “secretary” to 19th century French society, he did not suppose that it was the nature of his medium that enabled him in this task, but his own “patience and perseverance.” Talking about “realism” in connection with subject matter of a Balzacian sort is a way of describing an author’s concern for the relation between what he does as a writer and what other men and women of his society are meanwhile doing; or, as one might say today, between literary codes and the other cultural codes of his society. A theory of formal “realism,” however, would be a way of speaking about the ontology of movies, of how they are in the world and how we experience them.⁴ Such a theory would give us grounds for explaining why such films as *Caligari* seem to deny their own premises; but it would also account for films that render the world less rather than more substantial (like those of Welles or of Franju, whose *Judex* is as much a documentary as *Le Sang des Bêtes*) and would not necessarily, as Bazin too has recently been accused of doing,⁵ point us down the road to cinéma vérité. It would not be, like Kracauer’s theory or Shattuck’s parody of Panofsky, an “aesthetic of content.”⁶ It would explain how “physical reality as such” is implicated in the formal structure of the movies.

II

But what, then, does it mean to say that the *medium* of the movies is physical reality as such? The problem is obviously that it could mean so many things. Theorists disagree about the medium, or the raw materials, or the matter, of movies, not only because they have decided to enlist in opposing camps, but also because the terms themselves are so slippery: more than one question is being posed. Sorting out some of the concepts involved in “medium” would seem to be a necessary preliminary to coming to grips with Panofsky.

The “materials” of a work are the stuff *from which* it is made: what existed before the work and is consumed in its manufacture. The ruling metaphor here is that of a craftsman: the artist “makes” his work from paint and canvas, the sculptor from stone, the writer from ink and paper—or, as Panofsky suggests, a dictaphone tape. (It may be a symptom of the limits of the notion of artist as maker that the “material” of such temporal arts as music and dance are rather more difficult to specify. What moves in time is apparently not “made” in the same sense as what sits still for our inspection. A symphony, each time we hear it, seems to spring up *ex nihilo* and, like the universe itself, to be sustained only by the continuous solicitude of the creating idea.) As Stanley Cavell has observed,⁷ the arts whose materials are physical reality as such are landscape gardens, minimal art, and *tableaux vivants*

(whose materials are consumed for the duration of the work itself). It is one of the incoherencies of Kracauer's theory that he proposes physical reality as the raw material of motion pictures in just this sense and then claims that it is "exhibited" rather than consumed (p. x). This does not so much distinguish movies from other arts as render meaningless Kracauer's own vocabulary, since "raw material" has no signification apart from the idea of being consumed. And of course the movies do, like other arts, have a raw material: film itself, exposed and projected, consumed in the process of what Cavell calls photogenesis.

The opposition between matter and form is quite different from that between raw materials and finished product. Matter is not the stuff from which something is manufactured but the pure potentiality *through which* its form or principle of operation is manifested: it is what "bodies forth" or "materializes," as the body manifests the soul's operations. Perhaps the best model here is not the craftsman but the orator, human or divine, whose Word must be made flesh in order to be known. According to traditional rhetorical theory, the "inner sweetness" of thought is like a vital spirit that must be embodied in "polished words" and the "colors" of rhetoric.⁸ Matter, as Donne argued for his own purposes in "The Ecstasy," has to do with communication: it is a language without which a great prince in prison lies. The raw materials of something exist before it does; strictly speaking, matter and form come into being simultaneously, although the "matter" of the arts has often been thought of as logically subsequent to the idea by which it is informed. The sequence would be: paint and canvas; *disegno interno*;⁹ the *istoria* manifested in mass, volume, line and color. Or: ink and paper; "foreconceit," *inventio*; elocution, the thought embodied in elegant language and figures of speech. Looked at in these terms, a painting or a poem could seem like a creation *ex nihilo* rather than a mere fabrication—a view more popular in the Renaissance than now, but still not wholly unheard of. Bachelard, for example, insists on the absolute newness of poetic creation.¹⁰ Unlike ink or paint or marble blocks (whose irregularities might, as in the case of Michelangelo's *David*, impose their own imperatives), the writer's lexicon and the artist's vocabulary of forms have only a virtual existence apart from their actualization (being informed with a specific intention, set operating toward this or that specific goal) in the *Opera* of the poets and painters who thereby reconstitute the lexicon for their successors. Any code is an inventory of possibilities rather than a collection of objects, which is why it is convenient to call such units as words and visual motifs and musical tones "matter" rather than material. The matter (in this sense) of the movies is the shot rather than film; and its study involves the whole semiotic dimension of movies considered as discourse rather than as physical presence.

In addition to what I have called (with a little violence to traditional terminology) the “from which” and the “through which,” there is a third notion, more primitive and possibly more fundamental to the imagination, included among our senses of what a medium might be. We still say that the medium of a fish is water, of birds, air; and in doing so we echo the usage of Plato’s *Timaeus*, whose “receptacle” of Being is not matter so much as matrix, milieu, that *in which* forms come to birth. The idea that “matter is sometimes called place”¹¹ may take some getting used to, but it is not so unfamiliar as it may at first seem. The paradigm it implies is drawn not from craft or from oratory but from the experience of the sacred: theophany, the moment when a particular place is charged with a potency that sets it apart from the amorphous profane. Plato’s receptacle is an only half-demythologized version of Hesiod’s “seats” of the gods, places that give birth to deity. To discuss the medium in *this* sense of poetry, painting, or movies would be to discuss where, in each case, we must situate ourselves in order to share the mystery proper to each. We would be asking about the milieu each provides in which we might expect the sort of experience described in *The Winter’s Tale* when Apollo’s oracle is spoken of:

something rare
Even then will rush to knowledge.

(3.1.20–21)

I think we may best understand Panofsky by taking him to mean that the milieu of the movies is physical reality as such. But what he might mean by *that*, and the critical uses to which we might put such an idea, will still require explanation.

III

Critics have found useful all three of these concepts of medium because any work of art is at once a physical object or presence; a communication, a presented “meaning”; and a place or world for the imagination to inhabit. This particular articulation of the ways we apprehend what Cassirer calls “cultural objects” is of course the basis for the methodology Panofsky adopts from Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms. Raphael’s *School of Athens* (to take Cassirer’s example)¹² is at once canvas covered with flecks of color, a representation of a conversation between Plato and Aristotle, and a revelation of Raphael’s own sense of the world. “Pre-iconographical description” is concerned with what is available to our senses, the object in space and time. This is the realm of style, which emerges largely unconsciously from the

artist's attempt to impose form upon his raw materials. "Iconographical analysis" is the task of decoding consciously transmitted meanings. At this level, sensuous forms become, as it were, transparent to analytic reason. They are no longer perceived as self-sufficient entities but as possibilities whose nature is fulfilled only when we grasp the idea they convey: they are matter for a discursive intention. But mere information ("Plato and Aristotle are conversing") does not exhaust the content of the object. *This* particular idea bodied forth in *this* particular form allows us to recreate, by an act of "synthetic intuition," the inwardness of the artist's own "world." The object does not deliver us a "finished content" which we passively receive (Cassirer, p. 193); it becomes a place or milieu where we discover a living dialogue.

This "iconological" meaning, Panofsky claims, even though it is the last to be perceived, is the essential one, while the other two are merely phenomenal. "It may be defined as the unifying principle which underlies and explains both the visible event and its intelligible significance, and which determines even the form in which the visible event takes place" (p. 28). The fundamental principle of the epistemology Panofsky derives from Cassirer is that the parts are subsequent to the whole and generated by it. As I have already suggested, this is the point that needs to be reiterated against charges of naive naturalism in Panofsky's film theory. Even the physical presence of the object is not simply given in sensation—as if it could be known as an accumulation of impressions from a pre-existing material. It is, rather, constituted by the system or "cosmos" into which it is placed: the scientist sees measurable outlines or light waves where the art historian sees "painterly" or "linear." The intelligible meaning too is only phenomenal. To grasp the "intrinsic content" of a statement it is not enough simply to decode the language through which it is embodied: we must re-place it in the "world perspective" from which it derives specific value or direction. (When we wonder, of a friend's remark, "what did he mean by that?" we are confessing our inability to "place" words that are in themselves perfectly intelligible.) Cassirer's account of the four symbolic forms (science, mythology, language, art) is a "systematic philosophy of human culture in which each particular form [takes] its meaning solely from the *place* in which it stands."¹³ The media of culture are not pre-existing materials ("nature" in the naively realistic sense) on which our ideas are arbitrarily imposed; neither are they merely the instruments by which the mind externalizes its own preoccupations. Both ways of talking would perpetuate the rift between world and self Cassirer intends to close. The media are milieus in which forms are generated, in which the object and our knowledge of it come into being simultaneously.

Nature and culture do not, then, differ as what is given and what

is made, but as different places or “cosmos” where an object may be encountered. The place of the objects of nature is the cosmos of mathematical law, where we encounter an “it.” The objects of culture stand in a place where a “you” emerges. It is worth emphasizing, as Cassirer does again and again, that such objects do not merely represent a transmission between two finished “selves,” which would be to reduce them to the level of communication. It is, rather, within the objective cosmos of words, tones, or visual motifs that the I and the You come mutually into existence (Cassirer, p. 109)—just as in sacred space the mythological mind discovers a power that cannot be distinguished from an enhancement of its own being. This is why a poem or painting is not a message but a dialogue, an arena of ceaselessly renewed becoming (Cassirer, pp. 113, 193).

I would, then, propose this paraphrase of the formula at which we have been worrying, and this rehabilitation (by way of the *Timaeus*) of “subject matter”: Physical reality as such is the “subject matter” of movies; i.e., it is the place (matter as milieu, matrix, medium) where we encounter the subject—that subjectivity or inwardness by which both the sensuous form of the film and its intelligible meaning (story, character, themes) are determined. The special materialism of cinema manifests itself in this relocating of subjectivity and not (as Shattuck complains) in doing away with it. Panofsky remarks, to be sure, that the style and the symbolic resonance of a film may be created without a “conscious interpretation in the artist’s mind.” But this does not distinguish film from any other art, where it is always the case that “the intrinsic meaning is . . . as much above the sphere of conscious volition as the external meaning [the realm of style] is beneath this sphere” (Panofsky, p. 28). What does in Panofsky’s account distinguish the movies is the way they transcend the absolute distinction between the “spatio-temporal cosmos of things” and the autonomous milieus of the traditional arts; or seem to transcend this distinction, answer to our need to believe that the distinction may be transcended. Movies put to rest the anxieties aroused by our discovery of the sacrifices by which the objective world of science—and indeed of ordinary perception—has been constituted: “This thing-world is inherently soulless. All that harks back, in any way, to the ‘personal’ experience of the ego is not only suppressed; it is removed and extinguished. As a result, human culture can find no place of its own in *this* scheme of nature” (Cassirer, pp. 142–43; his italics). In taking “physical reality as such” as the milieu of the subject, movies seem to heal the breach between the “perception of things” and the more primitive “perception of expression,” and to restore to the world of space and time its lost qualities of gesture. Particularly “cinematic” moments—in life, one might

claim, as well as in film—are those in which the world seems to regain its mythological capacity for utterance, when physical reality becomes a party to the dialogue in which the self is constituted.

Since Panofsky is not proposing a theory about the materials of movies, he does not—although he fails to confront the issue himself—prevent us from acknowledging that the spatio-temporal world is filmed, and from seeking to define what this might imply about the mode of its presence to us. Since he is not proposing a theory about the matter of movies, he does not prevent us from acknowledging that movies encode the world; and indeed one would have thought that he says enough about the conventions of film “language” to forestall the kind of charges Shattuck brings against him. He does claim, in dealing with the milieu of the movies, that the place into which they invite us is different in certain fundamental ways from that of the traditional arts. “Filmic space,” unlike the virtual spaces created by words or paint or musical tones, is the space of our ordinary perception of things; and it is in *that* space and in *those* things that we meet with the inwardness the film brings into being. So far is Panofsky from supposing that the movies eliminate authorial consciousness that he professes to find a place for the subject in the very world that has for so long been abandoned to the claims of scientific objectivity. Perhaps it will not seem inappropriate to associate the movies—as Bazin does—with a special kind of love, if we remember the old distinction between the different ways in which the soul attempts to “become the whole universe”: the intellect by transforming all things into itself, the will by transforming itself into all things; the “former [striving] to bring it about that the universe . . . should become intellect, the latter, that the will should become the universe.”¹⁴

IV

I should concede that I am not prepared to say how plausible philosophers are likely to find this as epistemology or cultural anthropology. (There seems to be an asymmetry in the way Panofsky’s terms apply to different arts: one would, for example, want to avoid reducing the question of “style” in literature to the level of penmanship.) Instead, I wish to devote a few summary remarks to a more limited topic—the critical tools Panofsky’s essay makes available for describing how we respond to particular films. At a time when semioticians, even the best of them, are claiming that “cinema is more cinema when it is viewed at the editing table than when it is viewed on the screen,” or even that the “filmic” can be grasped only in stills,¹⁵ Panofsky’s emphasis on the milieu of the movies seems to me particularly important.

It is an affirmation of the value of our experience of movies, an assertion that this experience is not irrelevant to our understanding of what movies are.

I take it as evident that there is a difference between knowing about (say) a poem and understanding it; and that the latter involves experiencing it in some way from the inside. We do not observe its words as objects among other objects in the world; on the contrary, we inhabit its language and so find ourselves in the world to which the poem itself gives birth. As Northrop Frye has said, the world is in the poem rather than the poem in the world.¹⁶ The different media are distinguished by the constitution of the places into which they invite us; but in mixed media (opera, ballet, theater, film) the nature of the invitation may seem problematic. The true “place” of Shakespeare’s theater, for example, is that which is called into being by language. It was perhaps the newness of this conception that made so vulnerable a butt of those novices (like the ones in *The Taming of the Shrew* or *The Knight of the Burning Pestle*) who were distracted by the physical reality of stage and actors. Because the medieval drama did so largely take place in the horseplay and spectacle on the trestle or wagon itself, it was difficult for groundlings in a quite different theater to recognize the milieu in which the aesthetic event was to be apprehended. It is to this sort of question that Panofsky chiefly addresses himself. Since he is most concerned to distinguish movies from drama, and since this distinction is posed most drastically in the case of Shakespeare (whom Kracauer, we have noted in passing, sees as *prima facie* “uncinematic”),¹⁷ I shall draw some illustrations from Orson Welles’s version of the Falstaff plays, *Chimes at Midnight*.

Panofsky’s complementary formulas, “dynamization of space” and “spatialization of time,” are most fundamentally attempts to characterize the difference between the milieu of the theater and that of the film: to distinguish, in each case, the container from the thing contained. In speaking of time in the theater, Panofsky is not speaking merely of the chronology of events. He is referring, rather, to “the medium of emotion and thought conveyable by speech” (p. 19). Language—which is to say, lived time, time articulated by ideas and feelings—is the medium of the theater in the sense that it is within the continuous flow of language that events unfold and the play’s form emerges. Language is the site, as the unchanging space of the physical stage is not, of what “goes on” in the play: “Hamlet may deliver his famous monologue lying on a couch in the middle distance, doing nothing and only dimly discernable to the spectator and listener, and yet by his mere words enthrall him with a feeling of intensest emotional *action*” (p. 19; italics added). In the movies, on the other hand, the “uninterrupted flow

of movement in space" (p. 20), rather than language, constitutes the milieu of what happens. Speech is no more than a local event, not the container but the thing contained. This is why filmed Beckett is apt to be so dismal. His plays work by defeating our expectations about the verbal milieu of the theater: the silences become so persistent that we are disquietingly forced to relocate the play on the actual stage of the theater. But this effect is inconceivable in the movies, where vacancies in the dialogue are normal. Didi and Gogo, set down in the midst of actual fields, beneath actual clouds, "wait" no more excruciatingly than the taciturn hero of an average Western.

Locating the milieu of a work allows us to determine the hierarchy of its other elements. In Shakespeare's theater, the imaginative resonance of what we see is determined by what we hear: without the poet's language, Juliet's garden is no more than bare boards. In movies, the opposite is true. Words are "not detachable from the visual" (p. 21), which is to say that their expressive quality derives from their visual milieu, just as (Panofsky later explains) a film's characters derive their expressive substance from the physical presence of actors. The "principle of coexpressibility" simply describes the consequences of this spatialization of the temporal nature of language: a speech will seem "literally, out of place" if the author of the film fails to situate it in "physical reality" in such a way as to reinforce its claims on our imagination by some gestural quality in what we see.¹⁸

This sort of out-of-placeness is often especially evident in filmed Shakespeare. Even Olivier's consummate performance as Richard III does not always succeed in distracting us from the oddity of actors standing about in archaic costumes and speaking poetry at one another. *Chimes at Midnight* is notable for the headlong way in which it attacks the problem. What is likely to strike us first about Welles's film is the peculiarly objectified quality of its language—the apparent divorce between words and expression. I do not mean only that the soundtrack is out of synch, although this is symptomatic. We are not invited to inhabit Shakespeare's language, but only to observe it from outside, as we might observe a moan or an outcry whose pitch and volume are more important than its actual words. Language becomes an event like any other event, rather than the medium in which a world of human response comes into being. Shakespeare's dialogue is broken into fragments, dispersed in space so that we cannot connect it with the countenance of the speaker or with the reaction of whoever hears. Only rarely do we have any sense of the texture of conversation, of a reciprocal flow of intimation and comprehension. This may be appropriate for Bolingbroke, whose pronouncements always seem to issue from an inhuman distance. Welles is perhaps taking deliberate

advantage of the narcissistic quality of Gielgud's voice, whose effect may be seen more clearly in the castle's cold air than in any response it elicits. We are likely to be more unsettled by the discontinuities introduced into the familiar give and take of Shakespeare's inn scenes (I am thinking particularly of the almost Dickensian rhythms of the long scene in Act II of *2-Henry IV*) or of the scenes with Shallow and Silence. What is missing in the collage of gargoyles Welles characteristically gives us is just what is so moving in Shakespeare, the feeling for shared verbal space, an ongoing rapport, an obstinate clinging to whatever may make for continuity, however comically enfeebled, in the face of senility and loss.

To say this, however, is not to say that Welles has surrendered his claim on the inwardness of his characters, but only that it is to be discovered in a place quite different from where we look for it in the plays. The subjectivity of the movie's world awaits us not in what the characters say but in what we see: its place is in the object. Physical reality is not a mere setting for language, an embarrassingly vivid backcloth as it so often is in filmed Shakespeare. It is, rather, the continuously plastic medium in which the film's human drama is transacted. In the first part of *Henry IV*, the "worlds" of Bolingbroke, Falstaff, and Hotspur are defined by the linguistic habits current in each. It is a measure of the play's optimism that Hal, able to "drink with any tinker in his own language," manages to master the idiom of all three. In the film, the characters are distinguished less by the language they speak (significantly, Welles omits the episode with Francis the drawer) than by the sort of space they inhabit. It is perhaps a source of the movie's elegiac fatalism that the images are so mutually exclusive. The chilly and hieratic world of the court is static, vertical, full of empty distances and lit by diagonal shafts from above. Hotspur's world is more humanly horizontal, but, damagingly, it is a world without depth: he paces in front of an ornamental screen for his "bright honor" speech, while his uncles look on, framed by the empty architecture that aligns them spiritually with Bolingbroke. The inn is a labyrinth of the sort we have come to associate with Welles himself: with its low ceiling and narrow winding passages (a close fit for Falstaff, and too cramped, finally, for Hal, who cracks his skull against a beam); its constant bustle and staccato collages of closeups, faces peering over shoulders or out of unexpected loopholes; its gallery from which an audience can look down on the excitement rather than, as at court, gazing up toward an awesome elevation.

Words achieve their proper resonance only within these spatial milieus, just as in opera (Panofsky suggests the analogy) language is realized only in music. The pre-title sequence is a text-book illustration of the

principle of coexpressibility. The retrospective vagaries of Shallow and Falstaff ("Jesu, Jesu, the mad days I have spent") are strangely disembodied, echoing across a snowy landscape in which we see two tiny distant figures (too distant, really, to be overheard), one thin, one fat, framed by dark rocks and bare trees in the foreground. "No more of that, Master Shallow"; without transition we are shut away from the winter light, stationed inside the dilapidated barn we see them entering, closer now, their own dilapidation more apparent. "Old, old": the camera abruptly draws back to let us see the two figures dwarfed by the barn's high timbered ceiling. "We have heard the chimes at midnight": an extreme closeup of Falstaff's weatherbeaten face. The words are, in effect (as no doubt in fact), merely superimposed upon the sequence of images that is the chief means by which the nostalgia of the scene is evoked. We remember the lines as much as actually hearing them. Where, indeed, but in memory will the words of figures so remote as those in the beginning of the sequence resonate so portentously? Or the sound of midnight chimes be so muffled by the sheer weight of physical weariness? "Physical reality as such" becomes the very shape of memory and so places us in the midst of the film's true subject.

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1. Erwin Panofsky, "Style and Medium in the Motion Pictures," in Daniel Talbot, ed., *Film: An Anthology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), pp. 15-32.
2. Roger Shattuck, "Fact in Film and Literature," *Partisan Review* 44 (1977): 539-50.
3. See especially Stanley Cavell, *The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film* (New York: Viking Press, 1971).
4. Cavell's aim and also Bazin's: "not . . . the realism of subject matter or realism of expression but that realism of space without which moving pictures do not constitute cinema." André Bazin, *What is Cinema?*, I, trans. Hugh Gray (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 112.
5. Peter Wollen, "Semiotics and *Citizen Kane*," *Film Reader* 1 (1975): 9.
6. Siegfried Kracauer, *Theory of Film* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. ix.
7. Cavell, p. 16.
8. Matthew of Vendôme (12th cent.): *interior favus or sapor sententiarum, verba polita, dicendi color*.
9. Erwin Panofsky, *Idea*, trans. Joseph Peake (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1968), esp. pp. 85-93.
10. E.g., Gaston Bachelard, *The Poetics of Space*, trans. Maria Jolas (New York: Orion Press, 1964), p. xix: "expression creates being."

11. Calcidius' Latin commentary on the *Timaeus* (late 3rd or early 4th century); in J. C. M. Van Winden, ed., *Calcidius on Matter* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1959), p. 46.
12. Ernst Cassirer, *The Logic of the Humanities*, trans. Clarence Howe (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960), p. 99. Although it was written after Panofsky's essay (1934, revised 1947), *The Logic of the Humanities* is a convenient summary of *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*; unless otherwise noted, references in the text are to this book. Panofsky's methodological assumptions are spelled out in *Meaning in the Visual Arts* (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1957).
13. Ernst Cassirer, *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, I: Language*, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), p. 82.
14. Marsilio Ficino, "Five Questions Concerning the Mind," in Ernst Cassirer, P. O. Kristeller, John Herman Randall, Jr., eds., *The Renaissance Philosophy of Man* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 200-201. The association of Cassirer with the project of Renaissance Neoplatonism whereby the soul was to "become the whole universe" is not fortuitous; see especially *The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy*, trans. Mario Domandi (New York: Harper and Row, 1964). And Ficino's distinction between knowledge and love seems to me a reasonable transposition of Panofsky's observation that while the traditional arts operate "from top to bottom," the movies encounter the world "from bottom to top" (p. 31).
15. William Luhr, "Semiotics and Film: An Interview with Umberto Eco," *Wide Angle* 4 (1977): 67; Roland Barthes, *Image/Music/Text*, trans. Stephen Heath (New York: Hill and Wang, 1977), p. 65.
16. Northrop Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 115-28.
17. See note 6, above.
18. Cf. Bazin, pp. 95-124.