Winfield S. Hancock and the Battle of Williamsburg

WINFIELD S. HANCOCK AND THE BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG Glenn Tucker late m 1861 mbs. wiNFiELD scott Hancock rented a Washington house to be nearby if her husband happened to be wounded. She found Washington society frivolous even under the shadow of war. Mrs. Lincoln insisted on maintaining formal receptions and contributed early to the festivities with an "exclusive" ball that brought her much criticism. But with it came some praise also because of the "spirit of independence with which she inaugurated" the social season.1 Though invitations went only to cabinet members, the diplomatic corps, senators, and the major generals of the army, Mr. and Mrs. Hancock , to their puzzlement, were included. Later Mrs. Lincoln explained that the invitation was in return for the courtesies members of her family had received from Mrs. Hancock's mother when they were or St. Louis visits. Mary Lincoln had overruled the President, who had d< murred over an invitation to a single brigadier general.2 Once while at the White House, Mrs. Hancock became disturbed by the President's careworn face. She remarked that she would show greater consideration if she did not require him to shake hands. She quoted his response in more formal language than was customary for Lincoln: "Ah, if this were aU that I was called upon to do, how willingly would it be done for all time; but to say 'No' to the poor unfortunates who come to me, in the belief that I am all powerful to pronounce that little word of only three letters, and who do not and will not understand that Mr. Tucker is a former Washington newspaper correspondent and New York advertising man who now writes such best-sellers as High Tide at Gettysburg at his Flat Rock, North Carolina, home. This article is from his latest study, Hancock die Superb, to be published next month by Bobbs-Merrill. 1 Mrs. W. S. Hancock, Reminiscences of Winfield Scott Hancock ( New York, 1887 ) , p. 82. Hereafter cited as Hancock Reminiscences. 2 Ibid., pp. 82-83. 56 I cannot always act as I wish, but have others to consult—this keeps me always unhappy."3 Secretary of War Edwin Stanton a little later felt free in talking with her and dweUing on a Presidential weakness. "Mr. Lincoln," he said, "has the biggest heart of any man in the world, and for that reason we have to watch him, or the Southern women , with their winning ways, would get his permission to carry with them enough contrabrand goods to supply the Southern army."4 Stanton sometimes would have a Lincoln pass recovered at Alexandria when the holder was going through the lines, and impudently have it torn up without explanation. He did precisely that with an unoffending acquaintance of Mrs. Hancock, who witii difficulty prevailed on him to let the lady go. Stanton, whocould be the most implacable of enemies, but was useful as a friend, warmed to General Hancock. An incident impressed the Secretary of War shortly after he took office. Agitated by a minor setback in West Virginia, Stanton asked Hancock, then new to his acquaintance , how long it would take him to make ready a special train for the front. "As long as it will take me to reach the station," Hancock replied. Then at Stanton's word he set out. The Secretary of War was holding a reception on the next evening. Hancock had insisted that his wife attend in his absence. She was in the next room when she heard Stanton inquiring . "Where is Mrs. Hancock? I want to see the wife of that soldier who is ready for an order in ten minutes." When he greeted her, thoughts of McClellan's slowness, contrasted with Hancock's alacrity, must have been in his mind. "If we had more such soldiers," he said, "if our generals were aU so ready, so unquestioning in obeying an order, what materials we would have for our army!"5 • · ß Hancock's brigade was formed on September 28, 1861, on the south side of the Chain Bridge at what was known as Camp Advance. At 5:00 a.m. on the 29th the bugles called. It was so early the recruits thought an alarm was being sounded for an enemy attack but quickly learned it was merely Hancock beginning drill. That afternoon they held their first dress parade, then continued driU with proper rests until nightfall. The next day the brigade advanced 3 Ibid., p. 83. * Ibid., pp. 84-85.» Ibid., p. 91. 57 58GLENN TUCKER two or three miles to a camp called "Vanderwerken," then the day after to Camp Griffin at Lewinsville, its headquarters until the following spring. DriUs in the school of the soldier, squad, company, and battalion were held regularly at Camp Griffin. Hancock's trumpet-like voice was such as to inspire awe among recruits , who would come from other commands to watch the brigade's performance. The 5th Wisconsin, one of his regiments, was under Colonel Amasa Cobb, a distinguished lawyer and state legislator from Mineral Point, Wisconsin, who had served as a private in Mexico. But he was rusty on army drill and Hancock often had to correct him, to the secret amusement of his soldiers, who knew he had been the distinguished speaker of the house, adjutant general, and a celebrated figure in his home state. Members ofthe 6th Wisconsin, camped nearby, would gather to look through the wülows along the river bank as Hancock shouted commands. Cobb would sometimes march his men off on a tangent, and Hancock would bellow, "Colonel Cobb, where in the name of Heaven are you going with that battalion?"8 The men came to call the drill "Hancock whispering to his brigade."7 When Cobb was in earshot and Hancock at a distance, they would mimicthrough thebushes, "Colonel Cobb, where in the name of Heaven are you going with that battalion?" But Cobb learned along with his men and made an intrepid officer who won citations and remained in the service until after Appomattox. Hancock's other regiments were the 49th Pennsylvania, 43rd New York, and 6th Maine. The last was probably the farthest down-east regiment of the army, having been built around the Brownville Rifles, with a Bangor lawyer, Abner Knowles, its first colonel. By chance a second lieutenant of Company F, 49th Pennsylvania, was John Hancock ofNorristown, Pennsylvania, the general's youngerbrother , who was soon appointed assistant adjutant general at the brigade headquarters. The regiment had one other volunteer officer who would be closer to Hancock even than his brother almost to the end of his life. Lieutenant William G. Mitchell of Company H soon became his aide-decamp , rose to the rank of brigadier general, served Hancock as chief-ofstaff , and was one to whom he always turned for any paper or any confidence , until MitcheU's death. The regiment's arms of ancient .68 caUber flint-lock muskets that fired three buckshot were as dangerous to their owners as to the enemy. Hancock eventually had them replaced with .54 caUber Austrian rifles firing Minié baUs. OccasionaUy there were exciting breaks in the drill routine. The brigade took part in the great review of November 20, 1861, held by Mc8 Rufus R. Dawes, Service with the Sixth Wisconsin Volunteers ( Marietta, O., 1890), p. 24. ^ ¡bid. Hancock and Williamsburg59 Clellan at Munson's Hill. This grandest spectacle of the war to that date was participated in by 70,000 men of the divisions of Smith, McCaU, McDoweU, Heintzelman, Porter, Franklin, and Blenker—ninety confident regiments with twenty batteries aggregating 100 guns. Hancock's uncompromising discipline was revealed during the review . After Colonel William H. Irwin had taken the 49th Pennsylvania past the reviewing stand, his showmanship overcame him and he began to driU his snappy Pennsylvanians on the parade ground, thereby blocking the units behind him and halting the entire parade. Hancock, angered, dashed to the front, liberated the column, rebuked the colonel and put him under arrest. Hancock had him tried by court martial in the interest of discipline, but recognized the error as one of zeal and retained him in his command. General W. F. ("Baldy") Smith, who commanded the division, credited Hancock with "indefatigable labors" in driUing and disciplining his brigade during the winter months and said that for the balance of the war it retained the impress of his teaching.8 One of Hancock's customs was soon revealed. He made no distinction between volunteer and regular army officers. At an early stage of the war, when there was still clannishness and some snobbery, he never gave a hint of regular army arrogance. Francis A. Walker of his staff noticed this respect for the volunteer soldier and observed near the end of the war that with a single exception—and this an officer Hancock had inherited from Sumner and Couch—Hancock always picked volunteers for his close müitary family and never gave a regular army officer an important staff assignment. Perhaps he felt the regulars were needed for line duties, or possibly it was mere chance, but at a time when he could have had any young officer in the army, he chose volunteers who had distinguished themselves.9 Baldy Smith termed his treatment of volunteer officers "a surprise and mystery to them." They were accustomed to aloofness and stern words. Smith found his reproofs "prompt and sharp," but when the officers were off duty the brigade commander's geniatity and hospitality— what Smith called his "courteous and unrestrained" attitude—put the subordinates at ease.10 Officers fresh from civilian Ufe came to understand that there were two distinct phases of soldiering. On duty, performance had to be quick and unfaih'ng; in quarters, officers were presumed to be friends and gentlemen. Theforgingofthe Army of thePotomac into a powerful fighting force could not be accomplished in the mid-nineteenth century without some 8 Letters and Addresses Contributed at a General Meeting of the Military Service Institute ( New York, 1886), p. 91. Heroafter cited as Letters and Addresses.» Francis A. Walker, General Hancock ( New York, 1895), p. 39. 10 Letters and Addresses, p. 91. 60GLENN TUCKEB brutalities. A few regular officers bullied and intimidated the volunteer regiments. Walker noticed that volunteer officers themselves often were unduly severe because they thought that by being tough they were following regular army practices. Hancock, though a strict disciplinarian, was incapable of "silly brutalities."11 His lack of cupidity and his desire to be free of obligations to others already were established in his character, as well as a sense of the fitness of things. Training at Lewinsville during the winter, some of his officers asked if he would accept as a mark of the brigade's esteem the gift of a silver service. He told them frankly he did not approve of such presentations . In any event, he pointed out, it would be best to wait until the war was over, because the officers might come to have altogether different feeh'ngs about him. Nothing more was heard of the suggestion.!2 Once during drill Hancock showed his strict sense of justice to a captain of the 2nd Delaware who was attached to his command. The captain , a reUable soldier, saw his name published in the list of those A.W.O.L. Angered, he stormed in on his colonel to resign, but the superior demanded that he see General Hancock. He was so indignant he would not comply for four days but finally went to Hancock's tent. "General Hancock," he said, "I have come to you against my will, but because of my personal respect for you." "Sit down, Captain," said Hancock cheerfully, "sit down and tell me about it." The captain poured out his story of how without cause he had been publicly disgraced. Hancock listened, then asserted: "I want you to understand, Captain, that I consider the personal honor of my officers and soldiers as sacred as my own. . . . Now Captain, go back to your tent and leave the whole matter to me. There has been some gross bungling somewhere, and I am going to find it out and have it remedied. I promise you that if I do not set this whole thing right in a week, both to your satisfaction and my own, I will give you an honorable discharge." He began an investigation and four days later learned that not only this captain, but also twelve other officers, had been abused by the War Department due to an irresponsible inspection by a· aide-de-camp who had gone through the camp and listed as A.W.O.L. every officer he did not chance to see on duty. The hastily-prepared list had been published in the newspapers. The War Department was quick to make a correction after Hancock's vigorous protest.13« Walker, General Hancock, p. 38. 12John W. Forney, Life and Militan/ Career of Winfield Scott Hancock (Philadelphia , 1880 ), pp. 338-339. 13¡bid., pp. 328-329. Hancock and Williamsburg61 Hancock's brigade moved with McClellan in early March, 1862, to Centerville, ( then Centreville ) Virginia, in the peculiar "practice" campaign , tofind General Joseph E. Johnston's trenches empty, as expected. Then the army returned to Alexandria to board the transports for the Peninsula and the grand march on Richmond, whence Johnston had already transferred the advance elements of his gray-clad force. When the Federal divisions debarked at Fortress Monroe they were organized into corps. Smith's division, containing Hancock's brigade, was assigned to the corps commanded by General E. V. ("Old Bull") Sumner. Later it was transferred to the 6th Corps. Edwin Vose Sumner, under whom Hancock was to serve in the sanguinary early battles of the war, had been a trouble-shooter during the period of secession. A native of Boston, educated privately rather than at West Point, he had risen through the Black Hawk and frontier fighting to be a captain of dragoons and commander of the cavalary school at Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Distinguished in the charge that broke the Mexicans at Cerro Gordo and in the equally intense cavalry action at Molino del Rey, he won wounds, brevets, and such honors in Mexico that the army sent him to Europe for müitary studies. After that he had a series of garrison assignments that marked him as one of the outstanding officers of the old service. When the states began to secede and Lincoln appeared to be endangered on his journey to Washington for the inauguration, Sumner commanded the President-elect's escort from Springfield to the capital, a trip on which he gained the new President's confidence. After appointment as a brigadier general, he was sent to reUeve Albert Sidney Johnston and secure the West Coast for the Federals. He was sixty-three years old when the Confederates fired on Fort Sumter, and he could see the prospect of a back place on the retirement shelf that was being fiUed by other sixty-year-olds; stiU, he was rugged and dominating, and Lincoln Uked him, and during the first two years of the war his name was always being mentioned as that of a possible commander-in-chief. Age had brought caution and tended to make a bit of a a steer out of the "Old Bull." Probably the main trouble was that the size of the armies overwhelmed him after a lifetime of small-unit soldiering. Hancock, when a second lieutenant, had tiffed with him mildly over a careless remark made during the assignment of quarters at Jefferson Barracks, but the misunderstanding had passed with the years. Some of his qualities Hancock liked: "He was never known to doubt. . . . He never failed to obey an order. . . . He was never too late."H When the elements of Sumner's corps embarked at Alexandria March 14 Pennsylvania at Gettysburg (Harrisburg, 1904), II, 1,071. 62GLENN TUCKER 23, 1862, Hancock wrote to his wife: "I am off at last, and it is a matter of great pain to me that I am unable to see you again before we partGod alone knows for how long. I rode all last night, and whüe I rode, did not cease to think of how and where all this unhappiness is to end."15 McCleUan marched through the slough of the lower Peninsula amid the rains of early April, opposed as much in the rear by the Washington authorities as in the front by John Bankhead Magruder's and Joseph E. Johnston's Southern armies. Stanton schemed and waited almost as eagerly as Johnston for the opportune moment to bring his fist down on the Uttle Napoleon. Attorney General Edward Bates inveighed against him to Lincoln.i8 The President was irresolute himself, fearful that the whole Peninsular plan of invasion, to which he had consented with reluctance, was fully as faulty as he had at first beUeved, and that Washington was being unblocked to the vast Confederate hoards about whom McClellan always seemed to be writing. Nor were McClellan's four corps commanders, McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes, sympathetic to his leadership, however loyal they were in obedience to his orders.17 Looking on from Washington, John Hay, the President's secretary and never McClellan's friend, made it clear that the general was in danger: "Not in front, but in rear."18 Behind the Unes buzzed the black gossip that he was in covert league with the enemy, an iniquitous charge to which Stanton lent a ready ear and eager tongue.19 He did have an enthusiastic army and ardently loyal subordinate officers, and Hancock was among the most confident. McClellan might have overcome his obstacles with speed and resolution , neither of which were qualities in his generalship. Arriving at Yorktown , a ripened fruit ready for his taking, he came up against the Confederate general Magruder with 15,000 men holding a Une along the Warwick River, which cuts almost across the peninsula at right angles to the York and James Rivers and empties into the James. Being flooded, it was a major obstacle. Baldy Smith's Division, with the Vermont Brigade in the active role and Hancock in support, made a reconnaissance which developed the enemy's Une and on April 16 assailed it at Lee's Mills. Here, still in support , Hancock had his first minor brush with the enemy, though for the is Hancock Reminiscences, pp. 91-92. 18 Warren W. Hassler, Jr., George B. McClellan: Shield of the Union (Baton Rouge, 1957), p. 67. 17 Hassler points out that they approved the Peninsula Campaign. Ibid., p. 70. ?» Ibid., p. 86. 1» Ibid., p. 82. Hancock and Williamsburg63 Vermont Brigade, which was lured into an attack across the river, the affair became spirited and costly. The Green Mountain Brigade gave notice that in the War between the States it would be no less intrepid than it had been in the Revolution. It lost heavüy in regaining the Federal side of the river when the enemy threw in supports. Hancock continued skirmishes almost daüy along the creek until early on the morning of May 4, when two Negroes came into his camp with the surprising inteUigence that the Confederate army was no longer in his front.20 This was the first news of the Confederate withdrawal which had been conducted stealthily during the night. Hancock sent four or five volunteers across the Warwick River to verify the report .21 Heintzelman soon had other confirmatory information, which he obtained by ascending in a baUoon and looking over the deserted Confederate Unes. Thus after McCleUan had devoted a month to shelling Yorktown and the Warwick Une and had settled down for a siege which under his method of warfare would likely prove protracted, he was spared further effort. Lincoln was reUeved and elated. He would learn to be patient later through more prolonged sieges at Vicksburg and Petersburg, but fretted each day while McCleUan, methodical to the point of irritation, yet parsimonious about casualties, stood in front of Yorktown. Hancock's brigade was on the left as the Federals foUowed the retreating Confederates thirteen miles up the Peninsula to WiUiamsburg . This point they could not hope to hold permanently because McCleUan controUed the York River on their flank. He could by-pass WiUiamsburg, send his gunboats and transports to West Point, and establish a beachhead at any favorable moment in their rear. But Magruder wanted to fight at Wilhamsburg, and the reason might have been found even in so remote a quarter as the Cologne, Germany, Gazette, to which a Prussian officer with the Confederates sent an item. It was difficult, he said, to persuade Magruder to give up his Williamsburg works, "for he loved the position as a father loves his child, and to teU the truth, aU the fortifications had been constructed with much talent under his personal direction."22 So the first major battle of the new Army of the Potomac and Hancock 's first opportunity in action came near the historic old Virginia capital and college town, with neither army having its commander ac20Oliver O. Howard, Autobiography of Oliver O. Howard (New York, 1907), I, 217. 21U.S. War Dept., comp., The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (Washington, 1880-1901), Series I, Vol. XI, pt. 1, 534. Hereafter cited as O.R., with all references being to Series I. 22New York Herald, December 25, 1862. 64GLE N NTUCKER tively in charge and neither having more than a plan-of-the-minute to govern its operations. McCleUan was back at Yorktown supervising the embarkation of Franklin's division for transport up the York to West Point in the Confederate rear. Johnston was present but went about the battlefield humming the Camptown Races—"I'll bet my money on a bob-tailed nag"23—and left the resistance mainly to Longstreet. Much shifting of Confederate units occurred in the mud. When the Federals began to show in their front on the morning of May 5, the Confederates had a Une drawn across the Peninsula, two miles in front of WiUiamsburg, the strong point being earthen Fort Magruder in the center, from which radiated Magruder's series of redoubts comprising three main defensive lines. Fort Magruder was at the junction of roads leading to Williamsburg from Warwick and Hampton on the James River and Yorktown on the York River. As the Federals approached, Smith's Division of Sumner's Corps, now commanded by General Erasmus Keyes, which had been on the extreme left at Lee's Mills and at the forcing of the Warwick River, passed to the extreme right. Hancock's brigade now became the right element of McClellan's army. Hooker's division opened the battle for the Federals by assailing Longstreet on the opposite end of the line, with Kearny later moving to his support. Desultory and at times bitter fighting developed aU along the line. Hancock had brought his brigade to the woods in front of Fort Magruder when, at 11.00 a.m., General Smith summoned him to army headquarters in the Whittaker House. There he found Sumner, commanding the army in the absence of McClellan. Sumner told Hancock to take four or five regiments and a battery, move by a road to the right for a mile and a haU, cross Cub Dam Creek, a branch of Queen's Creek, which empties into the York River, and seize, if possible, the Confederate works commanding the creek dam. Sumner had information that these works had been evacuated. Smith added orders aUowing Hancock to advance farther if it seemed advantageous and to send for reinforcements if they were required.24 Hancock took three of his own regiments—the 5th Wisconsin, 49th Pennsylvanian and 6th Maine, plus two regiments from Davidson's brigade , the 7th Maine and 33rd New York, then acting under his orders, and Lieutenant Andrew Cowan's 1st New York battery of six guns. He had an unusual opportunity to conduct his own operation apart from the immediate supervision of his superiors. Success would depend on his own efforts. 23DougIas S. Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants (New York, 1942-1944), I, 193. 2" O.R., XI, pt. 1, 535. Hancock and Williamsburg65 The regiments moved circuitously, cutting their way at times through the woods, to cross the dam and approach Fort Magruder from the north whüe the balance of the Federal army assaüed it in front. Emerging from the woods into the open country, Hancock could see the York River a müe to his right, but before approaching nearer to it, he turned to the left and soon reached the dam, about 75 yards long. The tributary was a series of ponds that could be crossed only at the dam. Hancock found the works unoccupied. He learned from Negroes in the neighborhood that they had been held by the Confederates in force on the previous evening, but had been evacuated, on the theory, it developed , that the Confederate army would soon abandon Fort Magruder and WiUiamsburg and continue its withdrawal up the Peninsula beyond West Point. That had been Johnston's aim until Longstreet, in command of the retirement, had begun to reinforce the rear guard in front of WiUiamsburg and had gained such advantages over Hooker that he determined, with Johnston's assent, to prolong the engagement. Mindful that the left of Fort Magruder, where only a few South Carolina companies held the redoubts, was almost naked, he had asked General D. H. HuI for help. HiU had ordered Early's brigade to countermarch. It had already progressed two miles beyond WiUiamsburg on the road to Richmond when it was halted. The brigadereturned and loUed on the campus of WiUiam and Mary CoUege, awaiting further orders. When Hancock emerged from the woods he found himseU on the edge of a clearing roughly two miles long and a müe deep, with a patch of woods in his immediate front. Fort Magruder with its bastions was on the southern edge of the clearing, two miles away. No troops were visible in his front. Hancock observed instinctively that by a sharp attack the Southern Une could be turned and Fort Magruder carried. In order to undertake such a promising movement, he sent back to Smith for reinforcements . He decided that whüe awaiting reinforcements he would move by easy stages toward Fort Magruder. He wanted an additional brigade to serve as a reserve and to secure the country between bis right flank and the York River, an uncertain and unpatroUed area that invited trouble. To reconnoiter that sector, he had already requested cavalry. Smith repUed that he would send four regiments and another battery. On receipt of this information, but before the arrival of the troops, Hancock pushed forward 1,200 yards and took possession of the next redoubt . This did not satisfy him, for he felt that if his flank and rear should be adequately protected, he could oust the enemy troops from the trenches remaining between him and the fort, then demonstrate against the fort and greatly assist Hooker's Division which was attack- 66GLENN TUCKER ing it without much success in front. Already he was able with his artillery to dominate the plain reaching toward the fort, from which he was now about a müe distant.23 Wheeler's battery joined him with four guns and with his ten pieces he opened on the fort. An incident which occurred just afterhe occupied the second Une of trenches showed the uncertainty among the Confederate units about the disposition of their army. Southern troops in remaining trenches between him and the fort were puzzled about the identity of the fresh force that had suddenly appeared in their front and signaled to one of Hancock's staff officers asking who the newcomers were.28 Hancock answered by ordering that the national colors be placed on his front parapet. When the flag was unfurled the enemy deployed skirmishers and began an annoying fire along the Federal Une, which Hancock 's skirmishers quickly answered. Soon Confederate artiUery let loose a reply to Cowan's and Wheeler's batteries. Hancock, seeing the precision of his own fire and recognizing that the Une in his front was not strongly held, grew impatient to advance again and watched anxiously for the arrival of reinforcements. He was directly astride the left of the Confederate position and sensed that increased pressure would force Longstreet to evacuate Fort Magruder and retire into or beyond WiUiamsburg. At this juncture, instead of reinforcements, Hancock received a message from General Sumner ordering him to fall back to the first works he had taken after crossing the dam. The high command was uncertain. The order disturbed Hancock not only because he saw the great opportunity cast away, but also because he knew the disposition of his division commander, Smith, had been to support him.27 It was now 2:30 p.m. Hancock decided to hold for a time and sent Lieutenant C. K. Crane, Smith's ordnance officer, to both Sumner and Smith with a discreet protest against the withdrawal order. Crane quoted Sumner as saying, "I have just ordered General Hancock to fall back to his first point, sir, and cannot send him reinforcements."28 He then found Smith, who gave this message: "Go at once to General Hancock and teU him that I have wanted and have tried to reinforce him, but that General Sumner has positively forbidden to allow any reinforcements to be sent to him until more troops come up from the rear." When Lieutenant Crane deUvered these two messages, Hancock recognized that he was in a most trying situation. Here at the very outset ^ ¡bid., 550. 2ß ¡bid., 537. 21 ¡bid., 538. 28 ¡bid., 548. Hancock and WiUiamsburg67 of McCleUan's Peninsular campaign he had to make a decision calling into play his full capacity and courage. The easy course would be to comply with Sumner's orders and retire three-quarters of a müe over the ground he had captured. He knew that his troops, whose spirits were now thoroughly aroused, would suffer a sharp loss of morale from such obvious timidity. They too could recognize the importance of their situation on the enemy flank and could understand that a great many casualties might be required to recover the ground once it were abandoned . Hancock's abiUty to make quick and bold decisions now asserted itself . Instead of withdrawing, he determined to protest again. It was 3:30 p.m. He sent 2nd Lieutenant Francis V. Farquhar, an engineer officer , to describe the terrain and his position to Sumner. His object, as he explained it, was to show the "disadvantage of falling back . . . and giving up the advantages we had akeady secured, for which we might have to fightagain the nextday . . . besides the bad impression it would make on my troops, and the inspiring effect it would have on the enemy, who were then engaged in furious contest ... in front of Fort Magruder."28 He told Farquhar to teU Sumner that he would wait a reasonable time for a reply, and if none came he would obey the order to faU back. Farquhar found Smith at Sumner's headquarters. Smith told him to locate Sumner and to say that the two remaining brigades of Smith's division might be sent in answer to Hancock's entreaty. Sumner at first consented; then, before the brigades could move, he countermanded the order and diverted them to reinforce his center battling in front of the fort.30 These transactions required time. When Farquhar did not return promptly, Hancock at 4:20 p.m. sent a written message to General Smith saying he would wait "a reasonable time" for word from Sumner. Fifty more minutes passed. The skies unloosed a heavy downpour which drenched the troops.31 It was 5:10 p.m. Hancock's position was desperate , not with the enemy, but in his relations with his own chief. In final capitulation to Sumner's orders, he prepared to withdraw. Perhaps the best account of his stubborn refusal to budge from his favorable line on the enemy's flank, his anguish at the turn of events, and what then ensued, was provided by 2nd Lieutenant George A. Custer of the 5th Cavalry, a close observer by Hancock's side. Custer had graduated from West Point the previous summer without much promise . He had been present at the fiasco at BuJl Run. When the Peninsula campaign opened he became attracted to Hancock and worked himseU» ¡bid., 538. 30¡bid., 548. 31¡bid., 538. 68GLENN TUCKER into a status which Hancock described as a "volunteer aid." As such he had led, as a lone horseman, the brigade's march through the woods and across the dam to the enemy's flank. During the fighting later in the day he watched enraptured at Hancock's elbow, ready for odd jobs as they developed. With a quick miUtary perception that had not been so apparent at West Point, he evaluated and recorded everything that transpired. His account of the battle was found among his papers after his death on the Little Big Horn.32 Hancock's supreme achievement of the battle, in Custer's opinion, was in maintaining his forward position resolutely in the face of orders to retreat. That was the sort of independent judgment which deh'ghted one of Custer's temperament. Hancock saw the importance not merely of holding, but of advancing and as early as 11 o'clock, by Custer's timing , he sent a member of bis staff to Smith for more men. Again and again Hancock risked the impatience—even the drastic action—of his superiors by renewing his request. Custer pictured him as angered: "Those who have seen Hancock . . . can imagine the manner in which he received the order to retire. Never at a loss for expletives, [he] was not at all loath to express his condemnation of the policy, which ... in the end, must prove disastrous." "It is now two o'clock." Hancock took out his watch. "I shall wait till four. If no reply reaches me from headquarters I shall then withdraw." Four o'clock finaUy was at hand. Custer noticed that Hancock's impatience increased minute by minute, and almost with every musket discharge . "A fourth staff officer was dispatched at a gaUop to hasten, if possible, the expected and long-hoped-for message from 'Old BuU.' " At four o'clock Hancock still would not withdraw, but decided to wait haU an hour more. "If no orders reach me during that time," he again told Custer, "I must retire." His entire staff was now in the rear, urgently requesting a reversal of the retreat orders and the dispatch of fresh troops. At 5:10 p.m., just before beginning a withdrawal, Hancock noticed that it was not his brigade which was being reinforced, but the enemy. The trenches in his immediate front were fiUing rapidly. A detachment of Confederate horsemen moved out of the woods to survey his lines from a distance. He immediately sent a messenger to General Smith informing him that the enemy was concentrating on the Federal right. Seeing a fresh Southern regiment enter the woods on his left as though intending a flanking movement, Hancock brought back his two left regiments to the crest of an inchne that formed a better defensive line, 33 Frederick E. Goodrich, Life of Winfield Scott Hancock (Philadelphia, 1886), pp. 197-199. Hancock and WiUiamsburg69 then halted them and faced them again to the front. The other regiments he brought back a short distance to conform to this new position. This rectification of his line, which the enemy understood to be a retirement, was a signal for a sudden and desperate assault by General Jubal Early's brigade, which had been brought over from the WiUiam and Mary campus.33 Major General D. H. HuI had seen that Hancock was unsupported and isolated on the Federal right and had judged that he could be dislodged by a vigorous assault. He had gone to Johnston, who had assented, though Longstreet was not in sympathy with the attempt.3* HuI accompanied Early's brigade. Longstreet, seeing that HiU was intent on the assault, pointed out the objective, which was the old Confederate works to the left of Fort Magruder. HuI brought up the brigade ofGabriel J. Rains to give Early support. When aU was in readiness , he ordered the charge. The Confederates came on impetuously, shouting "BuU Run" and "BaU's Bluff," until they were within thirty paces of Hancock's Une.35 The assault suffered from too many generals. Early accompanied his old regiment, the 24th Virginia, which had given him distinction at Manassas, and which now advanced on the left of the brigade. Early commanded the left regiments, HuI the right. The 5th North Carolina was on the farright, while the center was held by the 23rd North Carolina and 38th Virginia. The twoflank regiments moved with vigor, those in the centerso deUberately that theynever got out of the woods but remained contented with long range firing. Early's brigade consequently attacked with the twoflank regiments, or about half of its 2,300 men.38 The 5th North CaroUna executed an unusual movement as it advanced . Seeing the 24th Virginia unsupported on its far left, and the centerregiments of the brigade lagging, it moved entirely across its own brigade front until it formed a Une of assault with the Virginians.37 These two regiments threw themselves impulsively against the Federal line. Hancock admired their courage. That night he told one of his prisoners that "immortality ought to be inscribed on the banners of the 24th Virginia and 5th North Carolina for their great bravery" in the 33 Walter Clark, ed., Histories of the Several Regiments and Battalions from North Carolina in the Great War, 1861-65 (Goldsboro, N.C., 1901), I, 283. Hereafter cited as Clark, N.C. Regiments. 34 Donald B. Sanger and Thomas R. Hay, James Longstreet (Baton Rouge, 1952), p. 48. James Longstreet, in From Manassas to Appomattox (Philadelphia, 1896), p. 77, stated that he ordered the move not to be made. 35 OR., XI, pt. 1, 550. 38 The charge caused considerable writing by Southern participants after the war, from which the story of the Confederate attack is made. Southern Historical Society Papers (Richmond, 1876-1959), VII (1879), 299-301; VIII (1880), 281283 . 37 O.R., XI, pt. 1, 608. 70GLENN TUCKER charge.38 That, too, was the conclusion of the historian of the North Carolina regiment. "The charge of the 5th North Carolina on this occasion has rarely been surpassed in the history of war for its heroism and gallantry."39 Custer observed Hancock while the enemy was advancing. He rode along the line admonishing, "Aim low, men. Aim low. Do not be in a hurry to fire until they come nearer."40 The Confederates marched a thousand yards across the cleared ground but Hancock had his men hold their fire. There was no longer a question of retiring. He had no alternative now but to fight and win a battle. He found himseU suddenly involved in what promised to be a most heated engagement. He had acted contrary to repeated orders, and the only thing that could save him was victory. He understood this clearly. Custer heard him tell one group, "You must hold this ground," adding wryly, "or I am ruined."41 When the action was joined he galloped along the line, his hat off, indifferent to the hau of bullets. The assailants never were able to come to close grips with Hancock's solid defense. Early was hit in the shoulder at a critical moment and lost so much blood he had to leave the field. Custer noticed that when the Confederates were within twenty paces and while the Federal linewas firing atwill, the attacklanguished. The ground over which the gray soldiers advanced was soft and lumpy, which would havemade the going heavy even had there been no opposition . The confident yelling of the assailants began to trau off. At this instant Hancock sensed his opportunity and ordered the counterattack. His manner had just the poise and finesse that would appeal to the young showman, Custer, who in his journal described it: "With that excessive politeness of manner which characterizes him when everything is being conducted according to his liking, Hancock, as if conducting guests to a banquet rather than fellow-beings to a lifeand -death struggle, cried out in tones well befitting a Stentor: "Gentlemen , charge with the bayonet!"43»Katharine M. Jones, Heroines of Dixie (Indianapolis, 1955), p. 120. The Richmond Enquirer, June 2, 1862, used similar language in regards to the 24th Virginia .» Clark, N.C. Regiments, I, 284. For Early's praise of the 24th Virginia, see O.R., XI, pt. 1, 608.« Goodrich, Life of Winfield Scott Hancock, p. 200.« Ibid., p. 201. 43 Use or the word "gentlemen" in addressing the troops was reported from several sources, such as Prince de Joinville, The Army of the Potomac (New York, 1862), p. 55. But there was at least one dissent. Captain William H. R. Neel of Germantown, Pennsylvania, who was on Hancocks staff at Williamsburg, remembered as a nonagrarian what a striking figure Hancock was at the critical moment of the attack, but scoffed at the softness of his words. Neel must have Hancock and Williamsburg71 Hancock had timed the movement nicely. Custer saw the men—"no the gentlemen," he said, correcting his narrative—bring down their bayonets and spring ahead in a cheering, charging Une. The Confederates , already wavering, were astonished, then swept back. The retreat soon degenerated into a rout. The Federal soldiers were fresher at this stage and overtook many of the retiring enemy, taking about 500 prisoners and bringing in the firstenemy battleflag captured by the Army of the Potomac. On the advance, Hancock, hat off, went along with his men.43 The Duc d'Orléans, one of the French princes on McClellan's staff, attracted by the heavy battle on the right, reached Hancock's Une just as the colors were brought in and at Hancock's request bore the trophy to army headquarters. Just after the repulse of Early the fortifications behind Hancock began to fill up with masses of Federal troops. Darkness was coming on but shouts in the rear soon explained the extraordinary activity. McClellan had ridden up from Yorktown and had arrived on the field as news reached headquarters of Hancock's repulse of the Confederates and his brilliant counterattack. Even whüe he was being cheered by his admiring troops, McClellan was Ustening to the account and grasping its impUcations. He saw instantly the decisive nature of Hancock's battle and recognized what Sumner had not seemed to fathom, that the Confederate left had been turned and that reinforcements to Hancock, who sat astride the enemy flank, would force them out of Fort Magruder and WilUamsburg. McClellan gave his own picture of conditions: ". . . grasping at once the fact that he [HancockJ held the key of the field of battle, I ordered Smith, who was chafing like a caged Uon, to move as rapidly as possible to Hancock's support with his two remaining brigades and Naglee's. Within five minutes of the time I reached the field Smith was off as rapidly as his men could move."44 Naglee followed immediately with a brigade of Casey's division. Then, after ordering a forward movement of his center, McCleUan rode at once to see Hancock's line personally. Before reaching the dam he encountered the column of prisoners Hancock was sending back. He numbered them at between 500 and 600 and placed Hancock's loss at only thirty-one men. This was one of the most briltiant engagements of the war," he wrote later, "and General Hancock merited the highest been listening earlier, for he asserted that "what Hancock actually said would be represented by dashes and asterisks" if any newspaper printed it. Hancock Papers , Montgomery County (Pa.) Historical Society. 43In a letter to his wife Hancock put his loss at 126 dead and wounded. Hancock Reminiscences, p. 92. 44George B. McClellan, McClellan's Own Story (New York, 1887), p. 330. praise." He commended Hancock inferentially for not heeding Sumner, by referring to "his perfect appreciation of the vital importance of his position."45 No such charge as Hancock's had been made to that moment in the war and though darkness and a heavy storm prevented further action in that quarter, McClellan meant to take full advantage of it. By sending in more troops he was preparing to develop a full-scale action on his right in the morning. He was spared that necessity. That night the Confederate army, its left flank turned, again retired. McClellan, on the night of the batde, sent a telegram: "Hancock was superb today."48 The words were so appropriate that they never left Hancock. Until his death he was "Hancock the Superb." Though McClellan had complimented the troops after his arrival at the close of the fighting, two days later he paid the brigade the further tribute of calling personally, parading each regiment, and thanking it for its part in the briUiant action on the army's right at WiUiamsburg.47 After such glory the brigade naturally became attached to its commander . Greenleaf A. Goodale, an enüsted man of the 6th Maine voiced this sentiment: "Certainly after Wüliamsburg, if not before, the brigade believed that whatever General Hancock ordered was exactly right."48 Smith, who all along had had a better perception of Hancock's movement than Sumner, was effusive in his report: "The brüliancy of the plan of battle, the coolness of its execution, the seizing of the proper instant for changing from the defensive to the offensive, the steadiness of the troops engaged, and the completeness of the victory, are subjects to which I earnestly call the attention of the commander-in-chief for his just praise."*8 43 Ibid., p. 331. 48 Walker, General Hancock, p. 43; Robert U. Johnson and Clarence C. Buel, eds., Battles and Leaders of the Civil War ( New York, 1884-1887), II, 199. Hereafter cited as Battles and Leaders. The remark occurred in a telegram McClellan sent to his wife. The frequent statement that it was in an official dispatch to Lincoln or Stanton apparently is in error. A careful search of the Official Records failed to disclose a message with this wording.« Maine at Gettysburg (Portland, 1898), p. 408. 48 Letters and Addresses, p. 45.« Battles and Leaders, II, 198-199, 72 ...