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John W. Mies is a native Chicagoan and member of the Chicago Civil War Round Table. He has long been a student of military history and served overseas with the Navy tn World War II and the Korean War. At present he is a radio writer at CBS in Chicago. Breakout at Harper's Ferry JOHN W. MIES during the early days of September, 1862, the Union Cause was anything but bright. As far as the North was concerned this second autumn of the war could well bring final disaster. Politically and militarily they were about used up. In August a new "white hope" had come out from the Western Army. He was Major General John Pope and he went into the Second Bull Run with an impressive string of victories. He came out with his army smashed and his paper reputation gone. Now, Lee was following up with an invasion of Maryland, and England stood waiting in the wings . . . just about ready to give her recognition to the young Confederacy. Washington was a city of nerves and fear ... in the corridors of government men whispered that the game was lost. A desperate President Lincoln prayed for a victory. Between Robert E. Lee and the Union capital stood the much-abused Army of the Potomac . . . back under the over-cautious hand of Major General George B. McClellan. On September 17th they met on the banks of the Antietam and Lincoln got his victory. Not quite a victory perhaps . . . more like a bloody draw . . . but it was enough. It stopped Lee. But before this climactic slugfest was fought the fate of the Union garrison at Harper's Ferry was to be decided . . . Harper's Ferry was not much of a place for a soldier to be at anytime, but it was particularly bad in September of 1862. A river crossing, lying so to speak, at the bottom of a teacup, it was a natural military trap. Nevertheless, Halleck insisted on defending it. He fondly called it—"The Gate of Maryland"1—seemingly unaware that the instant Lee entered the 1 Samuel B. Pettengill, The College Cavaliers (Chicago: H. McAllaster & Co., 1883), p. 57. 13 14 JOHN W. MIES W IS SaSs^". ?PS ^oa??? 3 2 8 ££> *?·? ? - Breakout at Harper's Ferry15 state by any other "gate" Harper's Ferry protected nothing. Lee wanted it reduced as a Union fortification, because he considered it to be a break in his new line of communications with Richmond.2 The town itself was built on the slope of a hill, rising in triangular shape from the junction of the Shenandoah and Potomac. Bottled up there . . . where old John Brown's dream had ended . . . were some 14,000 Union soldiers, among them about 1,300 cavalry; these cavalry were the 8th New York, 12th Illinois, 7th Squadron, 1st Rhode Island, 6th Squadron , 1st Maryland and a detachment of the Maryland Potomac Home Brigade.3 These Union troopers, led ironically enough, by an Alabama bom, Mississippi bred, West Pointer named Benjamin F. Davis, brought off a brilliant cavalry exploit that for sheer audacity was seldom equaled during the war. The Confederate move against Harper's Ferry was part of Lee's grand strategy for a drive North that he hoped would end Übe war. It began on September 10th under the command of General T. J. "Stonewall" Jackson .4 His long grey columns had swung out of Frederick, Maryland, cocky and confident. Jauntily they pounded up the road with brass and drums blaring out "The Girl I Left Behind Me"5 as the dust swirled about their snapping regimental flags. By the 14th of September, McLaws held Maryland Heights, commanding Harper's Ferry from the north. From atop Loudoun Heights on the far side of the Shenandoah, Walker's artillery , five long range parrot guns, were shelling the Union garrison below. Jackson himself blocked retreat to the west from his positions on Bolivar Heights. The Confederate encirclement was complete and Harper's Ferry doomed.6 At this point the morale of the cavalry along with the rest of the defenders was pretty low. Not that you could blame them very much. For two days they had been...

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