Lincoln and the Cotton Trade

LINCOLN AND THE COTTON TRADE! Thomas H. O'Connor It is habdly an overstatement of fact to say that with the opening of the Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln was a man who had problems . Not the least of the many and varied problems which were continually to plague him was one which had, long before the war, provided a constant source of antagonism between the North and the South—cotton. With the commencement of hostilities, raw cotton assumed enormous proportions as a definite factor in the war plans and strategy of the Commander in Chief. For one thing—and this point has received considerable attention from such historians as E. D. Adams and Frank L. Owsley—cotton was to be a frightening and continuing threat to the diplomatic stability and international security of the United States government. The fact of war, and the subsequent shutdown of cotton exports, drove nations like England and France into virtual hysteria as they threatened intervention, and even war, unless the North met their demands. And with good reason. Britain, the greatest industrial nation in the world, whose largest industry was cotton textiles, was importing from three-quarters to five-sixths of her cotton supply from the South, and depended upon this to keep over half a million workers employed.1 In England, at the opening of the war, a combination of stock-piled goods and an overlylarge cottonsurplus heldpanic and worry to a minimum . Many speculators and industrialists even welcomed the stoppage as a temporary relief to their financial log jam, for this "short war" in America would allow them to dispose of their surplus products at a A doctoral graduate of Boston College, Thomas H. O'Connor has been connected with the History Department of that institution since 1950. He is the author of Massachusetts in the Civil War. Volume I: The Call to Arms, a pamphlet recently published by the Massachusetts Civil War Centennial Commission. 1E. D. Adams, Great Britain and the American Civil War (New York, 1925), ?, 7. Hereafter cited as Adams, Civil War. Frank L. Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy (Chicago, 1931), p. 2. 20 profit within a few months; then it would be "business as usual" once again. But the theory of the short war proved to be wishful thinking. The prospect of four, five, or possibly even more years without a single pound of cotton being delivered caused Britain to give serious consideration to recognizing the Confederacy. Apparently the official warning of Secretary of State Seward—that Britain had the alternative of either not treating with the Confederacy or breaking off relations with the United States—was the main deterrent in 1861. But Lincoln must have wondered how long his government could maintain this position. Much more bitterly outspoken in her demands for Southern cotton, and much more direct in her threats of retaliation, was France. Close to 700,000 French workers depended upon the cotton industry for their livelihood. The court of Louis Napoleon was only too well aware of the restless and unpredictable character of these workers—especially at a time when wheat was notoriously scarce. To make matters worse, France, unlike England, had not stored up a surplus of cotton during 1860-61. As a result, her problem was immediate and acute. Time and time again the French attempted to persuade Britain to join with them to recognize the Southern Confederacy and, if necessary, to shoot thenway through the Union blockade. Once again it took a blast from Seward —this time a counterthreat of a wheat famine, as well as war—to deter France from violence. Any attempt at intervention, warned Seward , would be met by an American embargo on all breadstuffs; and what France "is likely to need most and soonest," he pointed out, "is supplies not of material, but of provisions."2 But how long Lincoln's government would hold off both England and France was a matter of serious speculation. How good a bluff could the President maintain when his blockade was little more than paper and his army little more than unseasoned recruits? Confident of eventual and inevitable recognition, the Confederacy tried in every way to demonstrate the power and influence...