Enhancing Public Ethics: Libertarianism, Legitimation, and the Problems of Technology Regulation
- Enhancing Public Ethics:Libertarianism, Legitimation, and the Problems of Technology Regulation
Benjamin Capps is Assistant Professor at the Centre for Biomedical Ethics, Yong Loo Lin School of Medicine, National University of Singapore. He was previously Research Fellow at the Centre for Ethics in Medicine, University of Bristol, UK. In addition to publishing widely in the areas of stem cell science and neuroscience, Dr Capps has coordinated a number of ethics policy reviews in addiction studies.
Notes
1. An early version of this paper was presented at the 10th World Congress of Bioethics, International Association of Bioethics, Singapore, 28-31 July. I am grateful for the comments from the audience, which I have used to enhance the final manuscript. Any errors, of course, remain my responsibility.
2. Of course, libertarian theories come in many guises. This paper is focused on what might be characterised as strict libertarianism: that is, agents have full sovereignty from the state, and negative rights that preclude forcible interference from other agents when one attempts to do things (what might be considered as a narrow conception of autonomy, or comprehensive liberty), and to acquire and use, as they see fit, property interests. In bioethics literature, such ideas normally transpire as relying heavily on consequential, and often utilitarian, reasoning, so that a libertarian society, according to some, tends to produce the most happiness. If such an agent-neutral approach is unsatisfactory, one may turn to a teleogoical idea that liberty, which, as an agent-relative concept, allows individuals to flourish through self-directed activity. In the moral sense, I am interested in the justice aspects of libertarianism, which pertain to the duties we owe to one another. As I will argue later, libertarianism requires one to have no moral duties to others, and therefore, promulgates as an idea of justice that obliges the state to refrain from prescriptive law.
3. A view typically promulgated by Neoliberals, such as Hayek, F. (1976) The Mirage of Social Justice of Law, Legislation and Liberty: A New Statement of the Liberal Principles of Justice and Political Economy, Rules and Order, Vol II, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 99.
4. Cf. Nozick, R. (1974) Anarchy, State and Utopia, Basic Books, New York.
5. Cf. Bostrom, N. (2008) Dignity and Enhancement. In Human Dignity and Bioethics, President's Council on Bioethics, Washington, DC., 173-206. Bostrom definition is palpably more useful than impossibly broad definitions: "In terms of human functioning, an enhancement is by definition an improvement of what went before"; Harris, J. (2005) Enhancements are a Moral Obligation, WellcomeScience, 1, 16-7.
6. Suffice to say that calling a drug an "enhancement" is scientifically problematic. Evidence suggests that chemical stimulants, such as methyphenidate (e.g. Ritalin) or modafinil (e.g. Provigil), have no direct effect on specific cognitive domains such as memory or executive functions: they do have second-order cognitive effects, such as increasing vigilance or motivation. See de Jongh, R. et al. (2008) Botox for the Brain: Enhancement of Cognition, Mood and Pro-Social Behaviour and Blunting of Unwanted Memories, Neuroscience & Behavioural Reviews, 32, 760-76. In this sense, they are enhancements in the same way that a good night's sleep can be. But sometimes we cannot sleep, or do not want to — so such assumptions about what improves a normal state are entirely contextual.
7. Although the libertarian idea has found footholds in some purely academic endeavours, it has, for various reasons, yet to make any meaningful inroads into biotechnological regulation. It has, however, been common in the debates about drug deregulation. This is possibly because governments have been apprehensive about biotech risks being managed by an "invisible hand", not least because such an approach lacks any accountability. The responses, instead, have been varied and sometimes complex, predominantly turning to monitoring and detecting non-compliance or eliminating the option of non-compliance. The more sophisticated regulatory measures have a tendency to be norm-setting by design; they look at encouraging certain behaviours, rather than relying only on instruments of guidance, coercion and punishment. Both approaches have been variously effective in terms of achieving whatever it is that is chosen as the specific policy goal...
