Air Power History: Turning Points from Kitty Hawk to Kosovo (review)

Published conference proceedings are difficult to review because they usually contain a variety of disparate essays of varying quality. Rarely is a reviewer presented with a coherent group of essays that are well written and based on solid research, but that is the case here. Due to space constraints, I will highlight only four.

Richard Overy's introduction provides context and a framework. The goal of the conference held outside London in July 2001 was to discuss "turning points" that have most affected the present application of airpower. Overy applauds this effort, while also noting that most studies have focused on the economic and political effects of air warfare. More work is needed on the social and moral impact of air attack. Over the past decade airpower has increasingly been employed by the U.S. and its allies as a coercive device to shape the decisions of adversary leaders, but this is an inherently nebulous and unquantifiable subject. Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic capitulated, but we do not know why. This is an area that begs further research.

John Ferris examines the history of strategic air defense in Britain prior to World War II and soundly refutes the notion that the Royal Air Force (RAF) was so focused on strategic bombardment that it ignored defense. Instead, Ferris argues that air defense was always a high priority within the RAF, dating back to the First World War. Although Air Marshal Hugh Trenchard, the Chief of Air Staff, did not favor putting much emphasis on defense, his staff and top commanders believed otherwise; Trenchard bowed to their judgment. When the first glimmerings of radar's possibilities surfaced in 1935, the RAF pushed forcefully for its development. By 1940 Britain, alone in the world, had the technology, force structure, command and control network, and forceful commander (Air Marshal Hugh Dowding) in place to fight and win a major air superiority campaign—the Battle of Britain.

Dick Hallion addresses several turning points in World War II, but his most insightful thoughts concern the use of airpower at sea. Long-range airpower, combined with convoy escort carriers and submarines, virtually destroyed the military and merchant fleets of both Germany and Japan. Fully 96 percent of the Italian fleet was sunk by aircraft and submarines. Specially modified long-range B-24s were instrumental in locating and destroying German U-boats and winning the Battle of the Atlantic. Over 70 percent of German merchant traffic between the Bay of Biscay and North Cape was sunk by airpower. In the Pacific, Japan's surface, subsurface, and merchant fleets were largely eliminated by a combination of airpower and submarines. Especially crucial during the final year of the war were the mines sown in Japanese home waters—an area too dangerous for our submarines to venture into—by the B-29s of XXI Bomber Command. Between March and August 1945 these mines accounted for 60 percent of all Japanese shipping losses.

Sebastian Ritchie reviews sensitive government documents regarding operation ALLIED FORCE—the NATO air campaign to liberate Kosovo—and dispels some prevalent myths. Although unable to cite specific documents for security reasons—and yes, this should raise your eyebrows—Ritchie rejects the theory that the threat of a NATO ground invasion was the key factor in Milosevic's capitulation. Although Britain was the first and most vocal advocate for such an invasion, it found little support within the Alliance. France was adamantly opposed to an invasion, arguing that it would require 500,000 troops. The Germans agreed with the French. Britain therefore turned to the U.S. for support, but Washington dallied, and one deadline after another came and went. By mid-May 1999 it was clear to British military planners that even if an agreement could...