France and the Algerian War, 1954-62: Strategy, Operations, and Diplomacy (review)

This work is a very useful companion for students of the Algerian War. While it is not, and does not set out to be, an overall history, different contributors throw instructive light on significant aspects of the conflict. The work also includes a very full chronology of the war.

In their introduction, Alexander and Keiger summarise recent writing, and recent renewed controversies, over the war and outline areas where further research is needed, in particular on the strategy, operations and diplomacy of the F.L.N. This is followed by one of the most interesting chapters in the book, an account of the French Army's Arzew Training Centre by Colonel Frédéric Guelton of the Service Historique. Guelton notes how at first the French Army refused to accept any specialty to the Algerian War, an attitude that changed to very carefully prepared psychological warfare courses, but under de Gaulle changed again to one of simple conformity to de Gaulle's policies, and 'personal problems.' Three technical chapters, one on the slow recognition by the French Army of the value of air photography intelligence, one on the role of the Marine Nationale in the war, and one describing the impact of an able French army colonel (a former prisoner of both the Germans and the Vietnamese) on a badly disciplined battalion.

The diplomacy theme is pursued in the last five chapters. The first of these considers the relationship between the Gaullist politicians and the military prior to 1958, the Gaullists (and later the Gaullist generals) being concerned with national prestige, the military with the retention of Algeria. The second criticizes existing arguments that de Gaulle's emancipation of Algeria restored France's great power status, claiming instead that his real policy was to create a Franco-North African community capable of challenging "les anglo-saxons." This thesis is open to question, at root le général did not really care greatly for Algeria; it was expendable and his wider foreign policy aims were not as unsuccessful as the author asserts, however irritating they were to Washington. The final three chapters consider United States and British policies and attitudes to the Algerian War—the Americans preoccupied with the solidarity of NATO and the British with stability in the Middle East. Finally, Christopher Goldsmith writes with sympathy about the position of the British ambassador in Paris, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, receiving mixed messages from the Macmillan government.

With excellent maps and a diagram of the Morice Line, the work forms a valuable and readable addition to the Algerian war shelf in university and military libraries.