Zulu Victory: The Epic of Isandlwana and the Cover-Up (review)

This book is definitely not a conventional account of the battle of Isandlwana, the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879, and its effect on the Zulu nation. Zulu Victory takes a much different tack and will generate much future research into the Anglo-Zulu War.

The objective of Zulu Victory is to explain what led to the massacre by Zulus of most of the British 24th Regiment of Foot at Isandlwana and how responsibility for it was covered up. The book is organized into three parts: "The Conflict"; "The Battle"; and "The Cover-Up." The first part contains three chapters that discuss "The Ultimatum" given to the Zulus by Sir Bartle Frere, the British commander-in-chief in South Africa; the opposing armies; and the penetration of Zululand by British army columns. The authors make extensive use of personal accounts, contemporary interviews, and letters of survivors in Part Two, "The Battle," which contains two chapters that cover the movements of Lord Chelmsford, the commander of the invading army, and the Zulu attack on Isandlwana, where the units of the British force directly under Chelmsford's command had encamped, on 22 January 1879. Chelmsford was absent from the camp at the time of the attack.

Finally, Part Three, "The Cover-Up," devotes two chapters to the deception and cover-up carried out by Chelmsford's staff, particularly Colonel John North Crealock, in order to deflect charges that their commander's negligence had led to the Isandlwana massacre. A court of inquiry was later held by the Horse Guards, the headquarters of the British Army in London. The inquiry found numerous reasons for the disaster, including over-confidence in the ability of British troops armed with the Martini Henry rifle to withstand massed assault; a lack of knowledge of Zulu warfare; disregard by Lord Chelmsford of his own orders in defending the camp at Isandlwana and, later, at Rorke's Drift; lack of proper reconnoitering; and disregard of non-British reports that the camp was threatened with attack. I would hope that the discussion of the Horse Guards inquiry, as well as the coverage given to the Ammunition Controversy in Appendix C, will finally put some of the controversy over Isandlwana to rest and demonstrate that there were a multiplicity of reasons for the British defeat.

I have only one objection, which concerns the failure to document quotes. The authors have tried to excuse this by saying that they did not want to disrupt the flow of the text by introducing notes. In any case, the text is a model of clear writing and is definitely a good read. The authors' first-hand knowledge of the terrain surrounding Isandlwana is of immense help in following Imperial (British), Colonial, and Zulu movements and the battle which resulted.