Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited

A serious gap exists in scholarly understanding of nuclear proliferation. The gap derives from inadequate attention to the phenomena of nuclear reversal and nuclear restraint as well as insufficient awareness of the biases and limitations inherent in the empirical data employed to study proliferation. This article identifies "nuclear hedging" as a national strategy lying between nuclear pursuit and nuclear rollback. An understanding of this strategy can help scholars to explain the nuclear behavior of many states; it can also help to explain why the nightmare proliferation scenarios of the 1960s have not materialized. These insights, in turn, cast new light on several prominent proliferation case studies and the unique role of the United States in combating global proliferation. They have profound implications for engaging current or latent nuclear proliferants, underscoring the centrality of buying time as the key component of a nonproliferation strategy.

The article begins with a brief review of contemporary nuclear proliferation concerns. It then takes stock of the surprisingly large documented universe of nuclear reversal cases and the relevant literature. ¹ It proceeds to examine the empirical challenges that bedeviled many of the earlier studies, possibly skewing their theoretical findings. Next, it discusses the features of the nuclear reversal and restraint phenomena and the forces that influence them. In thiscontext, it introduces and illustrates an alternative explanation for the nuclear behavior of many states based on the notion of nuclear hedging. It draws on this notion and other inputs to reassess the role that the United States has played in influencing the nuclear behavior of other states. The conclusionexplores some of the policy and research implications of the article's findings.

Current Proliferation Concerns

The nuclear proliferation phenomenon has taken many twists and turns over the years, with the pace, direction, and loci of action varying considerably. In the late 1950s and 1960s, it was widely believed that nuclear proliferation beyond the original club of five (i.e., China, France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States) was likely to occur before long, and that it would be led mainly by countries in Europe (most prominently Germany, Italy, and Sweden). ² With the establishment of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) regime in 1968-70, however, international concern over nuclear proliferation in Europe began to wane, though worries about proliferation in the developing world persisted, with Latin America and South Africa becoming particular sources of anxiety. More recently, South Asia, East Asia, and the Middle East have become the primary foci of concern. In addition, overall confidence in the stability of the nuclear nonproliferation regime has been shaken by developments in the nuclear arena in India and Pakistan, as well as in Iran, Iraq, and North Korea.

These developments have led two observers to suggest that, despite the remarkable success in producing an indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, the "complex [NPT] regime intended to contain the spread of nuclear technologies is disintegrating." ³ Moreover, the prevailing assumption is that Iran or Iraq (or both) is bound to cross the nuclear weapons threshold before long, while Libya is proceeding along the same path. If this happens, further "horizontal nuclear proliferation" (a spillover effect on other states) is likely to occur both in the Middle East and beyond. A similar process is considered likely if the security situation on the Korean Peninsula and the Indian subcontinent continues to deteriorate. These developments have rekindled interest both in identifying the factors that drive nuclear proliferation and in understanding the processes that govern them. ⁴

Challenges to the Study of Nuclear Reversal

Most nuclear proliferation studies have focused on proliferation trends, their prospects, and means of dealing with the challenges they pose. A smaller body of research has focused on the motivations for acquiring or renouncing nuclear weapons. Relatively little has been written on nuclear reversal, although this phenomenon has attracted somewhat greater interest in recent years. ⁵ Nuclear reversal refers to the phenomenon in which states...