Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History. By William Stueck. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002. ISBN 0-691-08853-5. Maps. Photographs. Illustrations. Notes. Index. Pp. xiv, 285. $29.95.
This volume comprises a lively and balanced reassessment of the origins,
character and impact of the Korean War. William Stueck is the author of
two books dealing with this broad area, apart from the work considered
here. He is concerned with posing key questions, such as how Korea came to
be divided in 1945; how the United States and the Soviet Union sponsored
rival regimes, following the breakdown of the attempt to secure a unified
state; how Syngman Rhee and Kim Il Sung endeavoured to manipulate the
great powers and how the latter imposed their authority; how Stalin and
Mao Zedong viewed each other and perceived the current and future states
of Sino-Soviet relations; how the domestic and international dimensions of
the conflict interacted; why the United Nations became involved in Korea
and how members of the UN reacted to American policy, plus the ways in
which the latter was modified by representations from within the UN; why
the war did not escalate into a nuclear conflict or into a third world
war; and why it took so long to achieve an armistice agreement. Stueck
focuses primaily upon political and diplomatic developments and these are
pursued with clarity and conviction. Due consideration is given to the
significance of evidence that has become available from the archives of
China and the former Soviet Union. Stalin's desire to involve China in the
war so as to obviate the contingency of an improvement in Sino-American
relations is underlined, as is Stalin's determination to prevent formal
Soviet participation in the Korean struggle. The author portrays Harry
Truman in a reasonably positive light, thus resisting the current trend
towards a more critical analysis of the Truman administration. In an
interesting succinct comparison between Truman and Mao, Stueck observes
that the former was flexible and prepared to entertain proposals from
America's allies; far from being seduced by military romanticism (as
happened to Mao), Truman dismissed the principal American advocate of
such an approach in April 1951. Mao was excessively preoccupied with
establishing China's new international presence and ignored advice from
his comrades which ran contrary to his own inclinations. Stueck explains
the importance of the Korean conflict for the development of the
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Cold War and for the continuing legacy of instability in East Asia. The
value of the text is enhanced by the reproduction of admirable
photographs. This book may be recommended to anyone wishing to obtain
an up-to-date synthesis of the major disputes and controversies involved
in the Korean war.
Peter Lowe
University of Manchester
Manchester, England
