PROJECT MUSE®

Jomini et la strategie: Une approach historique de l'oeuvre
(review)

Owen Connelly

The Journal of Military History, Volume 67, Number 1, January 2003,
pp. 235-236 (Review)

Published by Society for Military History

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1353/jmh.2003.0018>

➔ *For additional information about this article*

<https://muse.jhu.edu/article/40444>

of the imperial troops in a way that shocked French commanders. On a small scale, Maida foreshadowed Wellington's campaign in Portugal and Spain, and that is its significance. Schneid recounts all of this, but strangely, he insists that the war in Calabria was nothing but a "pin prick" and a "footnote in the larger framework of the Napoleonic wars" (pp. 54–55). This is precisely the same kind of argument that has always been made about the Italian theater in general in 1805, 1809, and 1813, so it is odd to hear Schneid repeat it.

Schneid's book is not aimed at a general audience, and it is purely military history with no analysis of the social, economic, and political origins and outcomes of the several wars examined. Nevertheless, people interested in the minutiae of Napoleonic warfare will find it appealing, and it does serve to fill a significant gap in our knowledge of Napoleonic warfare. This reader is convinced that the Italian wars were much more than footnotes in the story of Napoleon's defeat.

John L. Tone

Georgia Institute of Technology
Atlanta, Georgia

Jomini et la stratégie: Une approche historique de l'oeuvre. By Ami-Jacques Rapin. Lausanne, Switzerland: Editions Payot Lausanne, 2002. ISBN 2-601-03297-9. Notes. Bibliography. Pp. 336. Euro 23.70.

This is a work of historiography, focusing on the historical writing of and about Antoine-Henri Jomini, a young Swiss banker who turned to producing military history and theory. He became a baron and brigadier general under Napoleon (serving largely on Marshal Ney's staff). Nonetheless, in 1813, he defected to the Russians, and was made a lieutenant general by Czar Alexander.

Ami-Jacques Rapin is Swiss, a professor at the University of Lausanne, and justly proud of Jomini's worldwide influence and of the fact that his theories were studied at West Point long before those of Clausewitz. He feels, however, that the works of the two theorists complement each other.

The author details Jomini's works and their interrelationship. For example, in 1803, he finished a draft volume of his *Traité de grande tactique* (based on the campaigns of Frederick the Great), later entitled *Traité des grandes opérations militaires*. In search of funds to publish it, he submitted a prospectus for a *Cours . . . de grande tactique* to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Paris, to no avail. He then presented the manuscript of the *Traité* as a "calling card" to Marshal Ney, who assigned him to his staff as a major (despite his lack of military training or experience). It was published as *Traité de grande tactique*, 3 vols. (1805–6), including a volume of his *Histoire des guerres de la révolution française*. In 1807 the *Traité* became the *Traité de [sic; later des] grandes opérations militaires* and was expanded to five volumes by 1809. In 1810 Jomini added a conclusion, published separately as *Résumé des principes généraux de l'art de la guerre, L'Art de la*

guerre, and *Précis de l'art de la guerre*. The *Guerres de la révolution* was ultimately published separately (15 vols., 1818), and a biography of Napoleon added, then published individually (3 vols., 1827).

Jomini's bibliography (supplied by the author) comprises 138 titles. His *Oeuvre* consists of five multi-volume works, plus versions of these—revised, refined, expanded, shortened, or extracted and retitled, plus translations and many specialized studies. The author also lists works on Jomini, including fiction, e.g., *Journal secret de Napoléon Bonaparte* by Lo Duca.

Rapin describes Jomini's *L'Histoire critique et militaire des guerres de la Révolution* as “une étude monumentale.” In this reviewer's opinion it is his most valuable work. It is the most detailed account of France's wars of 1792-97, and its flaws are minor. His *Précis de l'art de guerre*, on the other hand, supplies rules for combat leaders that leave little room for improvisation, which is the heart of the military art.

Owen Connelly

University of South Carolina
Columbia, South Carolina

Manifest Destiny's Underworld: Filibustering in Antebellum America. By Robert E. May. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002. ISBN 0-8078-2073-7. Maps. Photographs. Illustrations. Notes. Index. Pp. xviii, 426. \$45.00.

This book purports to tell the complete story of filibustering in antebellum America. Mostly, however, author Robert May tags the United States as the world home of filibusters, and by today's standards, it is “politically correct.” It is also naïve in many ways. For example, the author buys into the canard that Americans are unusually violent. He quotes a silly Vermonter (that outlaw state) passing through San Antonio as being taken aback that in 1855, “Everybody carries pistols here when traveling and many carry them always.” He had never heard of Comanches and Mexican bandits. This clues the reader in to the slant of the book. Indeed, Professor May goes to great lengths to exonerate countries like Britain and France from supporting filibusters, of course ignoring Britain's occupation of the entire Indian subcontinent under the guise of a trading company with a private army (the East India Company) because Queen Victoria said it was permissible. Then, of course, this author also fails to mention two French filibuster forays into Mexico by Messrs. the Marquis Charles de Pindray in 1851 and the Count Raousset-Boulbon in 1852 and 1854. Besides this, Maximilian's French conquest seems totally forgotten—or excused, except by the Mexicans. Even the Peruvians and Costa Ricans engaged in filibustering. None of this is to excuse the practice, which goes far back in antiquity. But it does preclude hanging a label on the United States for the actions of three thousand or less misguided ruffians, some of whom were named Lopez, Flores, and Carvajal. At least the author comes clean and points out that all of the American presi-