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European Warfare, 1815-2000 (review)

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for Croatia. The authors put paid to the notion that advice to Tudjman from rented retired U.S. generals and NATO air strikes, drove the Bosnian Serbs to Dayton. Indeed, they argue that the most intense NATO air operation neither forced the Serb evacuation of the restricted area around Sarajevo, nor prevented the Serbs shifting large bodies of troops during the '95 Croatian-Muslim fall offensives. The authors give detailed attention to the travails of the Dutch UNPRFOR battalion in Srebrenica, and touch on the bootless policies of the international community. They ignore, almost entirely, the internal politics of the various entities during the war. Occasional general tutorials on the operational geography for each theater would have been helpful.

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European Warfare, 1815–2000: Problems in Focus. Edited by Jeremy Black. New York: Palgrave, 2002. ISBN 0-333-78668-8. Tables. Notes and references. Index. Pp. 247. \$22.95.

European Warfare, 1815–2000, is not a battle-by-battle account of ground and naval actions but rather a thoughtful discussion of military thought and change. The authors not only cover traditional topics but include underrepresented facets of conflict such as colonial warfare. The discussions of the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s and the Bosnian War in the 1990s are more complete than those found in many warfare textbooks. The authors attempt to present an understanding of their topic and its current scholarship. This work should increase the comprehension of many topics for both undergraduate and graduate students.

Dennis Showalter's essay, "Europe's Way of War, 1815–64," challenges the view that these years were militarily stagnant. Instead he sees this period's militaries as internally concerned with broad change. Soldiers and sailors recognized this as a time of technological advancement yet did not rush to innovate, anticipating that pioneers may not possess superior weapons when war emerged.

Jeremy Black, in his essay "European Warfare, 1864–1913," points out the power of paradigms in military establishments. Western European armies relied on their faith in the offensive, but they failed to recognize the effectiveness of firepower during conflicts such as the Balkan Wars. The offensive war paradigm remained unchallenged among military staffs.

S. P. Mackenzie, in "The Second World War, 1939–45," divides that war into eight broad categories, including conventional ground operations, intelligence, irregular warfare, and economic mobilization. Though he does not see clandestine warfare, strategic bombing, intelligence, or propaganda as war-winning efforts, they were necessary elements in supporting the anti-Axis coalition to victory. German battlefield victories in the early years of

the war, based on the integration of tanks, infantry, airpower, and artillery created the model for later Allied ground victory. With the Allies holding the majority of advantages, e.g., economic mobilization, the accession of Allied commanders like Field Marshal Sir Bernard Law Montgomery, mimicking this new warfare was the final element needed for victory.

Warren Chin's essay "The Transformation of War in Europe, 1945–2000," gives special attention to the war in Bosnia from 1992 to 1995. He makes valid points concerning warfare at the end of the twentieth century. For instance, during the last fifty years the purpose of the military has been to deter wars not to fight them. Western military establishments now require their governments to provide them with clear, achievable objectives. Regional warfare has become increasingly internationalized and the media has a new pronounced role in warfare, helping to shape the opinions of a politically active populace.

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Vieques, the Navy, and Puerto Rican Politics. By Amilcar Antonio Barreto. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2002. ISBN 0-8130-2472-2. Tables. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xvi, 167. \$55.00.

This book deals with the political wrangling over the Puerto Rican island of Vieques, which has been used by the U.S. Navy since 1947 for training in Marine amphibious landings, naval surface fire support from offshore, and air-to-ground bombing from Navy and Marine Corps aircraft launched from carriers. The Navy has argued that Vieques offers training advantages unavailable anywhere else, an argument challenged by the Center for Naval Analyses in 2000. The tiny island is inhabited by some 9,400 people sandwiched between two firing ranges, a few of whom have been killed by training accidents. The matter of Puerto Rico's unresolved status (commonwealth, statehood, or independence) defines Puerto Rican politics. Since the 1970s, political opposition to the Navy's use of the island has grown in national and international clout. So much so that President George W. Bush declared in June of 2001 that the Navy should cease exercises on Vieques by May 2003 and find a suitable alternative elsewhere. Whether the timetable will be met is uncertain, though it would be practically impossible to see how Washington could allow continuing the exercises beyond that date, especially given the importance of the Hispanic vote.

Students of military history and strategy will find that Barreto's book offers mixed rewards. His broader purpose is to link the struggle over Vieques with the compelling political question of status and the rise of a distinct Puerto Rican identity and nationalism. Thus the book's reach is ambitious. Yet it is poor in reporting and analyzing history, often lapsing into sweeping unsubstantiated statements, e.g.: Vieques has been used as a train-