The Question of Animal Awareness by Donald R. Griffin (review)

come ofthis discussion on euthanasia, it is apparent diat more attention needs to be focused on empirical studies having specific relevance to this question. For example, because of major advances in pain control, does the major argument for change in this regard—compassion for the pain-ridden, terminaUy ill patient—stiU have much weight? This type of question can only be answered by ongoing discussions with physicians, reflecting upon their clinical experiences. Ethicists would do well to enter into diat discussion so as to temper dieir own reflections with concrete realism. Veatch's book is one of the most valuable studies available to scholars, students , and die general reader. It should be widely read by those persons concerned with planning and policymaking in this changing field of thanatology. REFERENCE 1. R. McCormick. Ambiguity in moral choice. Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press, 1974. Robert J. Comiskey Institute ofReligion Texas Medical Center Houston, Texas 77025 The Question ofAnimalAwareness. By Donald R. Griffin. New York: Rockefeller University Press, 1976. Pp. 144. $8.95. For die scholarly, this book can be described as a valuable text on cognitive ethology. For the layman, it can be described equaUy weU as an eminently readable , short text on awareness in animals. Donald Griffin has been extraordinarily successful at writing an account that should be ofvalue both to ethologists and to others interested in animal behavior. For the former, various philosophical and psychological schools of thought are discussed, and an extensive bibliography is included. For the latter, although surely also to the delight of the scholar, the book is written witii lively enthusiasm, and it contains examples diat are famiUar to most of us who have observed, or have marveled at, creatures from bees and ants to chimpanzees. Is there evolutionary continuity of mental experience from animals to man? Are animals capable of communicating mental experiences with conscious intent ? Griffin concludes: "It seems more likely than not that mental experiences . . . are widespread at least among multicellular animals, but differ greatly in nature and complexity." His own research qualifies him perhaps uniquely to suggest diat use of the capabilities of communication which animals possess, some ofwhich stUl remain to be discovered (and this is made difficult in diat they do not consist of language, generaUy accepted as a criterion for the existence of mental experiences comparable to those in man), will lead to "a truly experimental science of cognitive ediology." Elisabeth F. Lanzl Franklin McLean Memorial Research Institute University of Chicago Perspectives in Biology and Medicine ¦ Summer 1978 \ 637 ...