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MODELS FOR PSYCHIATRY: ICONS OR EFFIGIES? HELEN L. MORRISON* Introduction Man, like science, attempts to explain the world in terms of concepts. Science, unlike man, demands systematization of these concepts and endeavors to study their interrelationships. The science of psychiatry, in its search for a comprehensive theory of the realities of man, has often been characterized by its "monolithic separatist postures" [1] which have demanded rigid metapsychological borderlines. This paper will discuss one process of theory making in psychiatry. The major emphasis of this paper is on the use of models in our science. A discussion of animal models used in the study of human psychopathology will serve as examples of psychiatric model building. This work will conclude by addressing those issues which surround the uncritical acceptance of oversimplified , untested theories of the structure of behavior. Our current science belies the theoretical tradition and heritage ofour early researchers. Freud emphasized the continually developing and changing entity of our concepts of the mind and warned against a hardened , inflexible approach to its study. Blum notes that "piecemeal theories tend to foster shortsightedness" and demands that we move from a narrow, dead-ended view of behavior [2]. We have often been unable to accept the goal of science. Science attempts to unify concepts from many disciplines and demands a flexibility not often found in our field. As a result, the use of untestable metapsychological concepts has hampered the scientific understanding of the syndromes in psychiatry [S]. Over the course of the past 40 years, scientific methodology has become synonymous with biological investigation. Early attempts to systematize the study of pathological behavior by utilizing a direct experimental approach foundered in empirical untestability and loose con- *Address: 919 North Michigan Avenue, Chicago, Illinois 60611. & 1982 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved 003 1-5982/82/2502-0253$01 .00 220 I Helen L. Morrison ¦ ModekforPsychiatry jecture. Theoretical reductionism is convenient only in its focus on one area ofstudy. It fails to take into account the multiplicity ofvariables and their interactions in the complex formation ofbehavior [4, pp. 1-10]. We could not account for variations in perspective. In our search for conceptualizations (mistakenly viewed as ultimate realities), we imposed an untenable certainty for the way things are to be [5]. We lost sight of the synthetic view. In our theorizing we stressed coverage rather than consistency . Psychiatry, like quantum physics, found itself "in the same causal boat afloat on a probabilistic sea" [6]. In attempting to formulate the goals of a comprehensive theory ofthe mind, earlier philosophical psychology and common sense needed to give way to the building of psychological theory based on experimental data [7-9]. Hebb [10] set forth goals for theory building but found himself working on a still shaky biological foundation. Theory did not provide us with an objective and fundamental analysis of behavior, and psychiatry turned to the laboratory and empirical scrutiny. Communication within and among orientations once again demanded description [11] and, thus, experimental data. The exploration of studies in behavior began with concepts. These were basic descriptive categories which were used not only in the theoretical sense but also in the observational sense. Observation implied an experience which rested on theoretical assumptions. Theoretical concepts , in order to be tested, demanded operationalization. Areas of investigation lacking any prior concepts lacked structure and continued to be elusive and blank. We searched for explanations of the intangible in terms of the tangible and used what we knew to define the unknown. The study of parallels offered by objects were used in attempts to organize the confusion. We attempted to measure concepts by converting them to variables. Once this was begun, there were attempts to relate these variables and to find their connections. The development of normative theories of behavior needed to be capable of empirical application . Experimentation aided in the derivation of the content of normative theories [12]. Models definitions The bridge between theory and experimental data became the model. A model is the assumptions of the theory and an intuitive basis for study. The model, an imperfect copy, permitted dealing with theories which were in the process of growth. As heuristic devices, models make it possible to make...

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