Hume's Scepticism and Realism: His Two Profound Arguments Against the Senses in An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (review)

This academic dissertation presents an extensive overview of the current state of affairs of historical scholarship on the extent and scope of Hume's skepticism. Hakkarainen does a commendable job of juxtaposing all the major exegetical positions on Hume's skepticism, the volume thus functioning as an excellent work of reference on this issue. Hakkarainen follows Richard Popkin and Robert Fogelin in arguing for a version of the "two Hume view," in this case one according to which he was both a skeptic and a metaphysical Realist (note the capitalisation). The latter is defined as one who holds the view that entities (said to include substances, essences, properties, and causes) are mind-independent, continuous, and external to the perceiver (xi, cf. 264). Focusing primarily on Hume's two "profound" arguments against the senses (EHU 12.1.7-16; cf. Treatise 1.4.2-4), he offers detailed reconstructions of each step of each argument, guiding the reader through their structure, claims, counter-arguments, responses, and further objections, all summarised with helpful diagrams. From here he proceeds to discuss textual and contextual evidence for reconstructing Hume's attitudes towards these arguments before focusing on the "metaphysical implications" of these attitudes in his conclusion. Commentators discussed along the way include not only Popkin and Fogelin but also Donald Baxter, Annette Baier, Don Garrett, Lorne Falkenstein, Louis Loeb, David Owen, Peter Millican, David Fate Norton, David Pears, Paul Russell, Galen Strawson, Kenneth Winkler, John Wright, and John Yolton.

The volume easily surpasses the standard requirements for a Ph.D award and could perhaps, one day, be converted into a stimulating monograph. In its current form the study is replete with repetition (more than half the book consists of abstracts, introductions, preliminaries, reconstructions, overviews, summaries, and various summative conclusions), which is not to deny that ideas worthy of a wider readership reside beneath the jargon and endless recapitulations.

The suggestion that Hume puts aside his philosophical skepticism when engaged in everyday activities (such as the often-quoted example of playing backgammon with his friends) is in itself neither novel nor controversial. By contrast, the claim that his daily, non-philosophical, attitude is that of a metaphysical Realist is both original and intriguing. It implies, among other things, that Hume takes the "vulgar" belief in the external world to incorporate a metaphysical theory.

Hume certainly maintains (contra Berkeley, for example) that we naturally take it that the "bodies" that we perceive have a continuous and distinct existence. But when it comes to explaining why we think this (in 1.4 of the Treatise) Hume goes through great pains to demonstrate that neither the senses nor reason can supply us with our pre-philosophical belief which is, rather, the result of natural instinct (which combines with the imagination to resolve cases of apparent conflict). Such belief, then, is no more the result of a metaphysical theory than is, say, a dog's belief that its food is in the bag; the ostrich that hides its head when it does not want to be seen is not a Relativist about perception.

If a "two Hume" view is to present us with an account that makes him a consistent thinker, the "everyday" Hume (anti-skeptical on both Hakkarainen's interpretation and the one I offered in its place above) had better not hold any beliefs that directly contradict those of his more skeptical "philosophical" self, for example, that the external world is metaphysically Real.

Hakkarainen's analysis is thought to reveal that Hume claims we have good theoretical reason to suspend our judgment on metaphysical Realism. This is not meant to lead to a universal suspension of all judgement, however, since (i) Hume does not believe this is possible given the nature of human psychology and, more contentiously, (ii) even if we could this would not be pragmatic...