Madness and the Criminal Law (review)

to learn statistical techniques but, rather, an excellent text for those who have an understanding of the mechanics of statistical tests and desire more insight into their appropriate use. There are helpful comments on the problems at the end of the book and useful appendices, tables, a glossary of statistical terms, and an index. In summary, this book is useful for the statistical consultant to the clinician and for physicians familiar with the mechanics of statistical tests who seek more insight into the selection of biostatistical techniques in their research. Marc D. Silverstein Department ofMedicine University of Chicago Madness and the Criminal Law. By Norval Morris. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982. Pp. 209. $20.00. This is a refreshing book to review. First, it is an important source ofinformation from a single author rather than a collection of assembled chapters. Although two chapters have been previously published, the text holds together well and flows easily within its subject matter. It is pedantic in a way which is excusable since the pedant is a scholar and teacher. The nonfictional theme of criminal responsibility and sentencing of the mentally ill is somewhat enhanced by two fictional chapters, "The Brothel Boy" and "The Planters' Dream," although the fiction is more entertaining than provocative to this reviewer. It is certainly nicer than reading most other literature by psychiatrists or lawyers. The book has three other chapters: "The Criminal Responsibility ofthe Mentally 111," "Sentencing the Mentally IU," and "Antisonomy, or Treating Like Cases Unlike." This reviewer began the book opposing what he thought would be its premises and expecting a conservative view on "responsibility." This prejudice was quickly erased, in part by the clarification on page 60 which discriminates between seeing mental condition as relevant to a special defense and seeing it within the overall concepts of actus reus and mens rea. A "special defense" seems to allow special powers of ajudge: (1) power over the acquitted defendant, for example to put him or her into a hospital, and (2) power to place some burden of proof less than "reasonable doubt" on the prosecution. Morris's point of view would eliminate both of diese with a return to thejust-mentioned common law principles . The results would probably be the freeing of more perpetrators of crimes than occurs within the present system in mostjurisdictions. He does, however, appear to feel that the narrow 1975 Butler criteria written in New York, which relied greatly on the concept of"diminished responsibility," would solve some of these problems. This reviewer's experience with diminished responsibility in a number of academic and legal settings would indicate otherwise. The "novel" chapters are a novel idea; however, the points made sometimes become repetitious. The dilemmas broached in the fictional text (e.g., between Grantham and Blair in chap. 3) are illustrative but suffer from the incom654 Book Reviews pleteness inherent in analogy. (On the other hand, the entire concept of developing case law is based on analogy.) Morris notes that the question of the sentencing of die mentally ill arises far more often than does any other in the criminal insanity arena. Chapter 4 is a thoughtful look at the jurisprudential aspects of such sentencing, without the usual irreconcilable arguments over what illness might exist, definitions of psychiatric and legal terms, and the like. The point is made that the mentally ill offender is less severely punished, although not always (in fact not usually) punished for a shorter time, than the ordinary offender. I particularly like Morris's citation of the legal and moral inappropriateness of the "sexual psychopath" concept (mentally disordered sex offender). There are some other views with which I disagree strongly, for example, the often stated old saw about psychiatrists disagreeing radically in courtrooms. While marked disagreement may occur in some cases, psychiatric testimony is remarkably consistent when compared with that of many other kinds of expert witnesses. Apparently vast differences between the experts on the two sides are, in my view, far more often the result of illusions created by the advocates (lawyers )—whosejob it is, after all, to present their case as forcefully as possible. The book is repetitive in places. It brings up many of...