Chinese Railway Policy and the Response to Imperialism: The Peking-Mukden Railway, 1895-1911

- 38 CHINESE RAILWAY POLICY AND THE RESPONSE TO IMPERIALISM: THE PEKING-MUKDEN RAILWAY, 1895-1911 By Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum Claremont Men's College From the very outset, railway development in China was inextricably intertwined with foreign policy. In the 1860's the railway policy was part of a larger response to real and imagined Western efforts to open the interior. Although all inquiries by Western merchants had been successfully rejected, the possibility of diplomatic demands for railway rights during treaty revision forced the bureaucracy to establish a negotiating position. The full-scale debate oí 1866-67 thus provided the first indication of official thinking. Not surprisingly the initial expression of bureaucratic opinion revealed universal hostility towards the introduction of railways. Only two of the ten respondents, Li Hung-chang and Shen Pao-chon, thought railways might contribute to self-strengthening if built by China and both felt that the benefits did not warrant such a heavy financial expenditure. A few officials even denied that railways would work in China. However most agreed with Li Han-chang, Governor-General of the Hukuang provinces, that the potential advantages were outweighed by their economic and political side- 39 effects : "Railways have more advantages than steamships. The foreigners wish to build railways from Tientsin to Peking, from Burma through Yunnan, and Kweichow to Canton, and from Shanghai to Hankow. I have read this in the newspapers. Because we do not wish to accede (to their demands) they have become obstinate and use unlimited threats and bluffs ........ I hear that if tiles or stones are left on the tracks the trains will be overturned and nobody will survive ........ It will ruin the fields and destroy the livelihood of our people. The people's anger will be aroused and they will band together and fight. This is inevitable. If the foreigners claim they can look after and protect the railways, we must reply that Chinese officials can not forbid the people (to attack railways) and will not pay indemnities so that should an unexpected incident take place it will not be considered a treaty violation. Opposition to railways thus was the logical outgrowth of the policies of the T'ung-chih Restoration. First, maintenance of the treaty system required the containment of foreigners to the treaty ports to prevent new anti-foreign incidents and the extension of Western influence. Under no circumstances could foreign trade or foreigners, protected by gunboats and extra -territoriality, be permitted further access into the interior as would be likely with wide-scale railway construction. Second, stabilization of the countryside required the removal of disruptive elements and the restoration of traditional patterns of agriculture. The massive infusion of foreign goods and resultant changes in patterns of trade - 40 could set the stage for new rebellions by undermining the livelihood of the people. The ethical precepts of Confucianism and realpolitik dictated that the people's livelihood be maintained. Like the anti-missionary movement, anti-railway sentiment had roots in traditional Chinese xenophobia, resentment of Western aggression and fears of a new Taiping Rebellion. Some officials went so far as to see Western efforts to introduce railways into China as a subtle plot to provoke the people into rebellion or to circumvent China's natural defenses. Moreover the absence of a powerful politically articulate commercial class left the determination of policy to a Confucian bureaucracy unresponsive to the need for improved transportation. By the end of 1867 the government was committed to a policy of opposition to railways. A total ban on all railway construction could be maintained only as long as the bureaucracy saw railways as irrelevant and dangerous. While many officials retained this attitude, the segments of the bureaucracy responsible for national defense increasingly found themselves unable to respond to threats on China's exposed border. Shocked by the immobility of Chinese armies during the Hi crisis (1872) and the Formosan crisis (1874) Li Hungchang concluded that the country would not survive without railways: "If there is another crisis I fear we shall be too slow to meet the - 41 emergency ". Li's pleas fell on deaf ears. Prince Kung warned Li not to press the issue, for even the Empress Dowager...