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Southeast Asian Affairs 2003, pp. 1 71-88 MYANMAR Reconciliation — Progress in the Process? David I. Steinberg Two significant, electric developments occurred in 2002 in Myanmar, a country in which political change in the past decade had seemed glacial.1 The implications and effects of these turns of events, however, remained indeterminate at the year's end. These two events were the release from house-arrest of one important figure and the effective imposition of such arrest on another, and his later death from natural causes. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD), was freed, and former General (also former President and Chairman of the Burma Socialist Programme Party until 1988) Ne Win and his influential daughter Sanda Win were placed under effective house-arrest.2 General Ne Win died on 5 December 2002. In a sense his death was an anti-climax. Both developments may have been interrelated. Both should have been causes for optimism. However, at the year's close, frustration and pessimism seemed more prevalent reactions. Although internal events predominated during this period, foreign relations, especially with Thailand, became significant too, and were not divorced from domestic concerns. The Release of Aung San Suu Kyi More excitement concerning Myanmar whirled through international circles in 2002 compared with the May 1990 elections in that country and the subsequent year in which Aung San Suu Kyi received the Nobel Peace Prize. At that time, and since 1989, she had been under house-arrest, and was only released in 1995. On 6 May 2002, the military junta, known since 1997 as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), released Aung San Suu Kyi after nineteen months of modified, defacto house-arrest, her second, with the promise that she could travel internally and engage politically in rebuilding the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD), with which she has been associated and which the military had methodically castrated through the arrest of many of its key members and the closure of numerous local offices. She has assiduously responded with early travel, including visiting government projects in central Myanmar and undertaking a tour of the Shan State in November. David I. Steinberg is Distinguished Professor and Director of Asian Studies, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. 172Davidi. Steinberg Yet the release had its anomalies. A large contingent of the international media were given visas and invited to the event, and she was accessible to them. Yet in the official English-language press release her name was not mentioned and the government statement simply said: "Today marks a new page for the people of Myanmar and the international community." It went on to note that 600 detainees had been released in recent months, that the government would continue its fight against terrorism, the total eradication of narcotic drugs and HTV/AIDs, and "we shall recommit ourselves to allowing all our citizens to participate freely in our political process, while giving priority to national unity, peace and stability of the country as well as the whole region".3 There was also no announcement at all in the Burmese-language media that this release took place, although everyone immediately knew in Yangon (Rangoon) and in major cities. Rumours had spread and multiplied with amazing rapidity because of, rather than in spite of, the rigidly controlled and censored press and television. Yet the mood in Yangon following her release was not as optimistic as that outside the country. Although pessimism would be too strong a term to apply to attitudes that seemed to prevail at that time in informed, private circles, a degree of caution was evident that was distinctly at odds with the virtual euphoria in external media circles. This gap has important potential implications. The lack of substantive progress in the reconciliation process during the remainder of 2002 was evident, and the disappointment, even the disillusionment, of foreign officials and informed observers evident. If some significant, positive changes are not forthcoming in the near term, this gap may prompt even more despair over progress in the political process than had been evident earlier, and could result in international condemnations and further sanctions against the military. Wherever the problems...

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