Timor Leste: Strong Government, Weak State

Southeast Asian Affairs 2004 TIMOR LESTE Strong Government, Weak State Anthony L. Smith Introduction On 4 December 2002 hundreds of demonstrators rampaged through Dili targeting "foreign" properties, including a supermarket and two hotels, and the homes of the Prime Minister, Mari Alkatiri, and his immediate family. Rioters also attacked Dili's An Mur Mosque, which some saw as an anti-Islamic or anti-Indonesian action, but may well have been aimed at the Mosque's most well-known member, Alkatiri himself. The crowd also chanted anti-police slogans. The government of Timor Leste1 is yet to release a full report on the reasons for the riot, which left two protesters dead and others injured, most likely related to the decision of the police to use live rounds to control the crowd. Rumours have abounded as to who the crowd were and what they wanted. Variously they are described as students, the unemployed, former militia men and policemen from Indonesian times, or even a rival group from Alkatiri's own party, Fretilin (and various combinations of all these groupings) . While it was popular to speak of agitators, the fact that a crowd was so easy to mobilize was worrying and indicative of underlying tensions towards the government, the police, and foreign businesses. Dire predictions of widespread chaos did not, however, eventuate. Instead, the security threat to Timor Leste continues to remain a latent, but very real, threat. Pro-Indonesian militia elements still present an irritant to the border security of Timor Leste, causing concerns about the ability of Timor Leste to control its own security with the winding down of the United Nations mission. Yet a threat from within Timor Leste caused a great deal of concern within government circles, namely, the difficulties from ex-Falintil guerrilla fighters who were left out of government hiring after independence. A war of words continues with a hardcore of radical veterans insisting on a return to the 1975 Constitution, a suspension of the current government and a complete withdrawal of the United Nations. Security forces have also struggled to control criminal elements that have emerged throughout the province. Anthony L. Smith is Senior Research Fellow at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, and Associate Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. 280Anthony L. Smith In contrast to looming external and internal threats, the government benches remain the domain of the Fretilin Party. During 2003 Fretilin consolidated its political hold and openly boasts that it will be in power for the foreseeable future. In contrast to the unstable coalitional arrangements of many newly democratizing countries, Fretilin can govern by itself. The Fretilin hegemony of the political executive has frustrated the main opposition parties, who routinely accuse the government of "single-party rule" and "authoritarianism". While a robust opposition exists, it remains fractured and some of the smaller parties experienced internal upheaval. Although Fretilin itself has its own divisions, the so-called "Mozambique clique" (a reference to the exiles that spent the Indonesian occupation years in exile in Mozambique) remain in firm control, including Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri, and his effective second in command, Ana Pessoa, who now heads up the Ministry to the Presidency. Political Machinations Timor Leste's first national elections on 30 August 2001 produced an electoral victory for Fretilin under Mari Alkatiri, who became Prime Minister, and Party Chairman, Francisco "Lu-OIo" Guterres, who became the House speaker.2 Although Fretilin's vote was far lower than many had expected, it achieved an absolute majority with 57.4 per cent of the popular vote, which translated into fifty-five out of eighty-eight Constituent Assembly seats. In a temporary defacto coalition with six seats of the Timorese Social Democratic Association (ASDT) , and with the support of other assembly members including the one "independent " Member from Oecussi, Fretilin was able to achieve a "super majority" of at least two-thirds to push through a constitution. Unwilling to go to the polls after a poorer than expected showing, the Alkatiri administration has refused calls by other political and civic leaders to hold fresh elections to replace the Constituent Assembly. During the 2001 election it became evident that popular resistance leader...