Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader (review)

BOOK REVIEWS1 87 Unification Conference, the Cheju-do Uprising, and the Yösu-Sunch'ön Rebellion . When American troops withdrew in June 1949, six months after the Soviets, "the lines of the future conflict were essentially drawn" (p. 97). Ironically the unplanned violence in South Korea not only "came as an unpleasant surprise to the North," (p. 70) but it strengthened Syngman Rhee's regime. While police arrested or killed Communist agitators, "hawkish southern commanders" (p. 136), with Rhee's encouragement, launched a series of military thrusts north of the thirty-eighth parallel in the spring of 1949. At first, "Pyongyang adopted a defensive stance . . . , concentrating on building a 'revolutionary base' in the North while supporting the insurgency ... in the South" (p. 136). But this strategy failed, as its calls for reunification had little impact on South Korea and Rhee's army crushed the Odae-san, Chiri-san, and T'aebaek-san guerrillas . International factors then increased the likelihood of war. Moscow's strengthening of North Korea's "armed forces . . . created a serious military imbalance on the peninsula" (p. 188), while U.S. criticism of Rhee's government undermined the credibility of its commitment to defend South Korea. By June 1950, "North Korean hopes of achieving unification by forming a united front with southern opponents of Rhee, by infiltrating [Republic of Korea] security forces, and by armed guerrilla struggle had all been dashed" (p. 184). Pyongyang launched a conventional military attack after its united leadership concluded that there was "no option other than invading the South" (p. 47). Merrill's study is sound and judicious, benefiting from excellent documentation mostly in U.S. intelligence reports, numerous Korean language sources, and interviews with participants. His writing style lacks crispness, however, suffering from excessive use of the passive voice and the superfluous phrase "in order." Some scholars will have trouble accepting the author's suggestion that "the situation giving rise to the war was much more important than which side crossed the parallel first" (p. 34). Also despite his promise "to place the Korean case within the extensive literature" (p. 15) covering civil war and intervention, Merrill only barely probes the question of Korea's wider significance. For example , the author fails to explain why, in contrast to Vietnam, collective villages, free-fire zones, and search and destroy missions were successful tactics in combating South Korea's guerrilla insurgency. Finally there is much speculation in this account, especially regarding Soviet behavior. But until Communist leaders in Moscow, Peking, and Pyongyang practice archival glasnost, Merrill's study offers perhaps the most satisfactory explanation for the origins of the Korean War. James I. Matray New Mexico State University Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader, by Dae-Sook Suh. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988. 443 pp. Maps, photographs , bibliography, index. $45.00. 188BOOK REVIEWS Kim Il Sung, president of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and general secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK), has been in power longer than any living head of government. During the past four decades he has profoundly affected the lives of his people, who now number twenty million. His impact has also been felt beyond the borders of his small country—notably in South Korea and in the countries surrounding the Korean peninsula. AU this, coupled with his pivotal role in the initiation of the Korean War, makes him a historical figure of considerable importance. The publication in 1988 of this first full-length English-language study of Kim Il Sung's life and politics, therefore, was not only welcome but also appropriate, for the year marked the fortieth anniversary of both the DPRK and Kim's ascension to power. Suh brings to his task impressive credentials: previous research on Korean communism that has resulted in the publication of a number of standard references on the subject; familiarity with the entire corpus of published material on and by Kim Il Sung; and linguistic skills that allow him to utilize source materials in Korean, Japanese, Chinese, and Russian. Suh has scrutinized "all the available unclassified works of Kim in their original form, amounting to more than seven hundred items" (p. xiii), Chinese publications on the...