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1 86BOOK REVIEWS Donald makes a good case that the war dragged on needlessly for an additional year before a compromise could be reached on the POWs. By the end of the Korean War England, which had earlier tried to help the United States overcome isolationism, now found itself in the position of having to rein in the United States. In sum, this is a well-written and informative book that significantly advances our knowledge of the Korean War. The two issues of the POWs and alliance politics with England should especially command the attention of interested scholars. Wayne Patterson St. Norbert College Korea: The Peninsular Origins of the War, by John Merrill. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1989. 237 pp. Map, bibliography, index. $32.50 Harry Truman had a simple explanation of the origins of the Korean War. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, the president claimed, ordered North Korea to invade South Korea as part of his plan for global conquest. Alternative theories usually have been more complex, with an increasing number of writers in recent years viewing the conflict as a civil war. John Merrill, in Korea: The Peninsular Origins of the War, reexamines the role of "both local and international factors" (p. 189) in the origins of the Korean War, focusing primarily on "the escalating hostility between the rival Korean governments in the years before the war" (p. 20). While revisionists have discussed the local dimensions of the conflict, they "impute an excessive degree of autonomy to the North Korean leadership" (p. 181). "Almost nothing has been written," the author contends, "on how North Korean unification policy was influenced by the guerrilla struggle in the South and the clashes along the thirty-eighth parallel" (p. 54). Successfully providing "a better understanding " (p. 16) of the Korean War, Merrill concludes that North Korea's attack on June 15, 1950, "was the last link in this chain of political violence" (p. 20). Korea: The Peninsular Origins of the War begins with a useful appraisal of five leading interpretations of the outbreak of the Korean conflict. "None of these theories," Merrill demonstrates, "provides a comprehensive explanation for the origins of the war" (p. 53). Of special value is his detailed assessment of the validity of Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs, which he labels "an intriguing blend of fact and fancy" (p. 29). Attention then shifts to describing the emerging pattern of "ongoing civil strife" (p. 21) in South Korea following American military occupation in 1945. "The roots of the war can be traced to the division of the country," the author asserts, "but the more serious violence began after the two superpowers started to disengage from Korea early in 1948" (p. 181). To prove his point Merrill presents the best factual and interpretational coverage yet available of such key events as the South Korean elections of 1948, the North-South BOOK REVIEWS1 87 Unification Conference, the Cheju-do Uprising, and the Yösu-Sunch'ön Rebellion . When American troops withdrew in June 1949, six months after the Soviets, "the lines of the future conflict were essentially drawn" (p. 97). Ironically the unplanned violence in South Korea not only "came as an unpleasant surprise to the North," (p. 70) but it strengthened Syngman Rhee's regime. While police arrested or killed Communist agitators, "hawkish southern commanders" (p. 136), with Rhee's encouragement, launched a series of military thrusts north of the thirty-eighth parallel in the spring of 1949. At first, "Pyongyang adopted a defensive stance . . . , concentrating on building a 'revolutionary base' in the North while supporting the insurgency ... in the South" (p. 136). But this strategy failed, as its calls for reunification had little impact on South Korea and Rhee's army crushed the Odae-san, Chiri-san, and T'aebaek-san guerrillas . International factors then increased the likelihood of war. Moscow's strengthening of North Korea's "armed forces . . . created a serious military imbalance on the peninsula" (p. 188), while U.S. criticism of Rhee's government undermined the credibility of its commitment to defend South Korea. By June 1950, "North Korean hopes of achieving unification by forming a united front with southern opponents of Rhee, by infiltrating [Republic of Korea...

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