Consciousness, Color and Content (review)

In Consciousness, Color and Content, philosopher Michael Tye principally sets out to defend and expand upon his theory of phenomenal consciousness, known as representationalism. Phenomenal consciousness is concerned with what it is like to feel or experience a particular sensation, rather than just to know about the state intellectually. In the book, Tye provides an excellent overview of the area, even while promoting his own theory. As a perceptual psychologist and visual artist, I was intrigued by his manner of argument and presentation, particularly since phenomenal consciousness is a topic about which the cognitive and perceptual sciences say very little. I began to wonder if there are particular neural correlates associated with phenomenal consciousness—or if we can even ask such questions in this way. If so, Tye argues, then such correlates are rather primitive, since phenomenal consciousness exists even at the level of honeybees and similar organisms. The part of the title that initially intrigued me was color, which Tye discusses in some detail in Chapter 7. He argues against the notion, which he attributes to visual and cognitive scientists, that color exists only as a mental state, proposing instead that the common-sense view of color as a property of an object does not conflict with the view of color as a mental state.

In reading Tye's discussion, I was struck by the apparent need for a clearer distinction in the use of the term "color," particularly the distinction between the perception of color and color as a property of an object. I think perceptual psychologists would agree that there is a physical basis in external reality for the perception of color. As Tye points out (p. 159), the major determinant of color under ordinary viewing conditions is the reflectance of the surface, characterized as the percentage of light at various wavelengths reflected from the surface. For most ordinary surfaces, this is a stable physical property. However, the perception of reflectance is influenced by a number of factors, most notably the characteristics of the illuminating light, the adaptive state of the observer and the reflectances of surrounding surfaces. Tye summarizes the common-sense view of color as one of properties independent of mind and illumination, belonging primarily to surfaces but also to films (e.g. soap films) (p. 148). It would thus seem that Tye identifies the term "color" with the reflectance properties of surfaces, while transmittance would be the comparable color property for film. However, in Tye's quotes of cognitive scientists, discussion of "color" includes the mental state as part of the perception of these reflectances and transmittances. Could we call the reflectances and transmittances, the color properties and the mental states "color perceptions"? Then the perception of color properties results in color perceptions, which are mental states with a basis in the neurophysiology of the visual system. I wonder if this kind of distinction would cause problems for Tye's theory of phenomenal consciousness.

In summary, this book is difficult for the non-philosopher, but provocative. With additional reflection and clarification, it could lead to a further convergence of philosophy of mind and cognitive science.